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Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign
Policy Export Controls in the 1970s
and 1980s
Kenneth W. Abbott*
"Perhapsit's some reflection of my early upbringing,
but I could never ... hear the word 'linkage' without
thinking of the word 'bologna'."**
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EXPORT CONTROLS
I. INTRODUCTION

During the late 1970s, particularly during the early years of
the Carter Administration, the executive branch imposed an
unprecedented variety of restrictions on private commercial exports' in efforts to further particular goals of United States foreign policy. This linkage of American trade to political ends
abroad strikingly altered the nature of American export controls: the number of controls imposed for foreign policy purposes increased markedly; the range of products and countries
subject to restriction was significantly expanded; and most important of all, new, still poorly defined foreign policy objectives
were asserted as the basis for curtailing exports.
The principal source of executive power 2 during this period
1. This Article focuses on governmental controls regulating the export of
normal industrial products and agricultural commodities by private firms. It
considers only tangentially controls on the export of military arms, equipment,
and services (administered by the Departments of State and Defense under
the Arms Export Control Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)), nuclear material (administered by the Departments of State and Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976), as amended by Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120, 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (Supp. I 1979)), and
other products subject to specialized control regimes.
Nor does this Article examine the many other forms of political control on
international trade: import controls, blockades and other devices to enforce
trade restrictions, freezing or vesting of assets, restrictions on governmental export credits or other forms of public support for international economic transactions, interruption of private payments, discrimination in tariff treatment,
and the like. See M. McDOUGAL & P. FELICiANO, LAw AND MInIMuM WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER 30-32, 325-28 (1961). Although political trade controls may be employed singly or in combination, unilaterally or multilaterally, and for a
multitude of ends, this Article focuses on unilateral export controls used to further national foreign policy goals. Even in the context of total or partial trade
embargoes, the export control element is singled out. Such a focus is in some
ways overly restrictive, but it is justified by the following considerations:
(1) The United States, particularly during the 1970s, has often imposed unilateral foreign policy export controls not in combination with
other trade controls;
(2) the particular considerations relevant to the appropriateness of
export controls must be examined separately, even when export controls are used in conjunction with other forms of trade control; and
(3) most American export controls are imposed under a statute that
does not authorize other forms of controls-a statute that was
amended in 1979 with a particular view to reforming its treatment of
foreign policy export controls.
Of course, many of the observations made here as to export controls are
equally applicable, either directly or by analogy, to other types of political trade
control.
2. Controls on ordinary commercial exports were also in force during the
1970s under two other pieces of legislation: the United Nations Participation
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was the Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA '69),3 which
Act of 1945, § 5, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1976), and the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917 (TWEA), § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287c
(1976), empowers the President to act "to the extent necessary" to apply economic sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
The Security Council may call for economic sanctions pursuant to Article
41 after first determining that a threat to the peace exists or that a breach of
the peace or an act of aggression has occurred. See id. at arts. 39, 41. Member
nations are obligated under the Charter to impose sanctions so approved. Nonmandatory sanctions may also be called for by the Security Council and the
General Assembly. See id. at art. 10. The Security Council has been able to
use Article 41 sanctions only sparingly; its failure to invoke the sanctions
against Iran that the United States had requested following the seizure of the
American Embassy in Teheran illustrates the limits of the procedure. See
Nossiter, Moscow Vetoes Plan to Impose Penalty on Iran, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1980, at 1, col. 5. If mandatory sanctions are imposed by the Council, the President may under the Act "investigate, regulate or prohibit, in whole or part, economic relations or [any] means of communication" between the United States
and any foreign country, its nationals, or other persons in its territory. 22
U.S.C. § 287c(a) (1976).
Two economic sanctions imposed under Article 41 will be referred to
herein. The first and most extensive use of Article 41 was against Rhodesia.
(For convenience, the name "Rhodesia" will be used throughout, although
when sanctions were imposed, the colonial name "Southern Rhodesia" was
generally used; following the internal settlement of 1978, "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia"
was temporarily adopted; in late 1979, the nation briefly resumed colonial status
and was again called "Southern Rhodesia"; and since full independence, the
nation is called "Zimbabwe.") Voluntary sanctions were called for in 1965. 20
U.N. SCOR 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (1965). Mandatory sanctions were imposed in 1966. S.C. Res. 217, 21 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232, S/INF/20 Rev. 1 (1966). Ultimately, a
total embargo was imposed; the policy of the Commerce Department was to
prohibit all exports but for humanitarian items. Sanctions were terminated by
the United States in December 1979, Exec. Order No. 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,787
(1979), reprintedin 22 U.S.C. § 287c app., at 478 (Supp. 1I 1979), and by the Security Council soon afterward. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1979, at 8, col. 4. The second
sanction discussed was imposed in 1977 when the Security Council called for
an embargo on shipments of arms, munitions, military equipment, and material
for their manufacture and maintenance to South Africa. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N.
SCOR 1, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1977 at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/418, S/INF/33 (1977). This sanction followed a call for a voluntary arms
embargo in 1963, S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council 1963 at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/181, S/INF/18/Rev. 1 (1963), with
which the United States had complied. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1) (1980).
Section 5(b) of the TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979),
grants extraordinary powers to the President to control trade, payments, and
other economic transactions. Originally applicable only in wartime, the Act
was amended in 1933 to make these powers available to the President whenever he declared a national emergency. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1.
Four national emergencies--one declared in 1933, another in 1950-remained in
effect as of 1976. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND
DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED
EMERGENCY POWERS, S. REP. No. 94-922, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).

Three sets of political trade controls imposed under the TWEA during the
long period of official national emergency also were in effect in 1976. (1) The
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delegated to the President the authority to prohibit or curtail
exports for the purposes set forth in the Act. 4 The furtherance
of United States foreign policy had always been one of the purposes specified by EAA '69,5 but by the late 1970s Congress and
the President had given the term "foreign policy" new content
Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-500.809 (1980),
first adopted during the Korean conflict, impose an almost total embargo on
North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The People's Republic of China was embargoed under the FACR from 1950 to 1971. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8,584, 11,441 (1971).
(2) The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.809 (1980),
impose a less complete embargo on trade and financial transactions with Cuba.
(3) The Transaction Control Regulations, id. at §§ 505.101-505.60, prohibit trade
and payment transactions involving strategic materials, arms, or nuclear material between any United States person (including any controlled foreign corporation) acting abroad and the Soviet Union, other Communist nations
(excluding Yugoslavia and Cuba), and the nations embargoed under the FACR.
Under all three sets of controls, regulated transactions can be licensed by
the Treasury Department, id. at §§ 500.201, .204, 505.30, 515.333, but all three rely
upon the Commerce Department to license exports from the United States. Id.
at §§ 500.533, 505.30, 515.533. Treasury's involvement, then, is usually limited to
non-United States origin exports by controlled foreign subsidiaries. See generally Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past,Present, and Future, 67 COLmmi. L. RE V. 791, 808-09 (1967).
The National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, §§ 101-501, 90 Stat.
1255 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)), terminated all
powers held by the President as a result of any prior declaration of national
emergency, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976), and prescribed conditions for future declarations and actions thereunder. Id. at §§ 1621-1641. The TWEA was excepted
from this termination provision, id. at § 1651, but in 1977 was amended to limit
its applicability to periods of declared war. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-223, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1625. The existing regulations under the Act could continue in effect until September 1978, and thereafter if extended by the President in the national interest for successive one-year periods. Act of Dec. 28,
1977, Pub. L No. 95-223, § 101(a)-(c), 91 Stat. 1625. The regulations have been
extended three times. Memorandum of Sept. 8, 1978, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1979); Memorandum of Sept. 12, 1979, 3 C.F.R. 490 (1980); Memorandum of Sept. 8, 1980, 45
Fed. Reg. 59,549 (1980).
When Congress amended the TWEA in 1977, it simultaneously enacted the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223,
§§ 201-208, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1706
(Supp. IH 1979)). The IEEPA delegates to the President powers similar to
those contained in TWEA to be used during declared national emergencies
short of declared war, but imposes certain restraints on their exercise. The restraints of the National Emergencies Act also continue to apply to declarations
under IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621(b), 1701-1703 (Supp. I 1979).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-223, tit. I1, 91 Stat. 1625; Export Administration Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235; Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1552; Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86
Stat. 644 (1972) (expired 1979). EAA '69 was in effect from the end of 1969 until
September 30, 1979. It replaced the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7
(expired 1969).
4. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403(b) (1) (1976)) (expired 1979).
5. See id. at § 3(2)(b), 50 U.S.C. app. §2402(2)(B).
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and scope. In 1974 and 1977, two provisions incorporating recently established foreign policy goals were added to the Act:
the first approved the use of export controls to combat restrictions imposed by other nations on access to raw materials and
other supplies;6 the second authorized the use of controls to
discourage other nations from assisting international terrorists.7 Another major objective of American foreign policy,
though never reflected in an amendment to the Act, began to
emerge at the same time-the promotion of respect abroad for
internationally recognized human rights.8 The pursuit of these
goals in the late 1970s changed the character of American export controls.
Ironically, the growth of political export controls occurred
while Congress and the executive branch were vigorously seeking to encourage American exports to cope with a large, persistent United States trade deficit. That growth also coincided
with the onset of a widespread realization that the United
States could no longer, by curtailing its exports, unilaterally
prevent foreign nations from obtaining most sophisticated
products and technologies. 9
Such ironies led many to question the growing American
reliance on foreign policy export controls. As the expiration
date of EAA '69 approached, new legislation was introduced
and extensive congressional hearings were held.lO This activity
culminated in the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA
'79)," which attempts to restrict presidential authority to insti6. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-500, § 11, 88
Stat. 1552 (expired 1979). See text accompanying notes 123-40 infra.
7. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 301(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (expired
1979). See text accompanying notes 141-69 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 170-200 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 356-414 infra.
10. The principal bills were introduced by Senator Adlai Stevenson MIlin
the Senate (S. 737, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)), by Representative Jonathan
Bingham in the House (H.R. 2539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)), and by the
Carter Administration (S. 977, H.R. 3652, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)). Other
bills introduced in the House during the first session of the 96th Congress included H.R. 2344 and H.R. 3301 (Rep. McKinney), H.R. 3154 (Rep. Gibbons), and
H.R. 3216 (Rep. Wolff). The House adopted H.R. 4034, a bill incorporating
changes made in committee; the Senate adopted S. 737; and a conference committee resolved the differences between the House and Senate proposals. See
generally H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-482, 96th Cong. [hereinafter cited as H.R.
CoNs. REP. No. 96-482], 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 1180.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420
(Supp. f-1 1979)). See generally Note, Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the
Export Administration Act of 1979-A Delicate Balance, 12 I & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 415 (1980).
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tute political export controls. As the 1980s began, however, foreign policy controls continued to flourish despite the restraints
imposed by the complex provisions of EAA '79.
Part 11 of this Article describes the United States export
control system as it operated under EAA '6912 and, in most respects, as it operates today. Part M reviews the growth of the
new policies pursued by means of export controls during the
1970s and briefly describes several important controls imposed
in 1977 and 1978 that are used as examples in the remainder of
the Article. Part IV critically analyzes the rationales for the

use of export controls to further foreign policy and suggests
that controls are appropriate in relatively few situations. Part
V considers the foreign policy provisions of EAA '79 in light of
this analysis. Part VI concludes the Article with recommendations for further limiting the use of foreign policy export controls.
II.

THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM

EAA '69 delegated to the President the power to prohibit,
curtail, and otherwise regulate the export of "any articles,
materials or supplies, including technical data or any other information, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States," regardless of destination.13 This power, however, could
only be exercised to effectuate the policies set forth in the
Act.14 Thus the congressional declarations of policy in section 3
of EAA '6915 were crucial in defining the scope of executive
12. An initial description of the export control system as it operated under
EAA '69 permits a clearer presentation of the growth of new policies under that
act and facilitates an understanding of the changes brought about by EAA '79.
The general outlines of the system are unchanged by EAA '79, although the
more important changes effected by EAA '79 will be noted.
13. EAA '69, Pub. L No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403(b) (1) (1976)) (expired 1979). The language relating to jurisdiction
was expanded in 1977. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 301, 91 Stat. 1625
(expired 1979). Presidential authority extends to financing, transportation, and
servicing of exports, and to any person participating in an export transaction.
EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403(b) (1) (1976)) (expired 1979); EAA '79, § 15, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2414 (Supp.
III 1979).
EAA '79 covers exports of "goods" and "technology," §§ 5(a) (1), 6(a) (1), 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2405, which for present purposes are substantially
equivalent to the "articles, materials, or supplies" formerly described. See id.
at § 16(3)-(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415.
14. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. §2403(b) (1) (1976)) (expired 1979).
15. Id. at § 3 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1976 & Supp. I 1977)).
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power.

A. POLICIES
Section 3 expressed inherently conflicting policies. On the
one hand, it stated that the policy of the United States was to
"encourage" trade with all countries with which the United
States had diplomatic or trading relations 16 and to use the economic resources and trade potential of the United States "to
further the sound growth and stability of its economy."' 7 On
the other hand, section 3 asserted three broad policies that justifed restrictions on exports.
First, EAA '69 declared it was the policy of the United
States to use export controls "to the extent necessary to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of
their significance to the national security of the United
States."'18 "National security controls" were intended to restrict
exports that would make a "significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove
detrimental to the national security of the United States."'19
With exports of arms.and purely military equipment controlled
under separate statutory authority,2 0 national security controls
under EAA '69 were directed at products and technologies primarily civilian in nature but with potential military applications: so-called "dual-use" items. 2 ' National security controls
16. The policy contained an exception for cases in which the President determined trade to be "against the national interest." Id. at § 3(1) (A) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(a) (A)).
17. Id. at § 3(4) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(4)).
18. Id. at § 3(2)(C) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (C)).
19. Id. at § 3(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1) (B)). Even prior to the
adoption of EAA '69, in March 1948, controls were imposed on exports to Europe to keep goods with military uses out of the hands of the Soviet Bloc. See
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL AND ALLOCATION POWERS, FOURTH
QUARTERLY REPORT 2,4 (1948); SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL AND
ALLOCATION POWERS, THuw QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 14-15 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as THmD QUARTERLY REPORT].
20. Arms Export Control Act of 1968, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
21. See Extension and Revision of the Export AdministrationAct of 1969Part1. Hearingson H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic
Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
89 (1979) (statement of Stanley Marcuss, Sr. Deputy Ass't Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Trade) [hereinafter cited as House EAA HearingsPart
I]. During the Cold War period and through the 1960s, controls were applied to
a wider range of goods. See text accompanying notes 86-91 infra. For most of
the years when EEA '69 was in effect, however, national security export controls were understood to be primarily concerned with dual-use items. The term
"national security export controls" is used in this sense throughout the Article.
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were intended to restrict dual-use exports to the Communist
nations-the only nations considered threats to United States
national security-but fear that exports to other countries
might be diverted to Communist destinations meant that con22
trols on most items restricted their export to all destinations.
National security controls under EAA '79 are substantially sim23
ilar in purpose and scope.
Second, EAA '69 stated a national policy of using export
controls "to the extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce
the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand."2 4 "Short
supply controls" were imposed on many commodities in the
years immediately following the Second World War and during
25
the Korean War but otherwise have been used infrequently.
Finally, EAA '69 declared that it was United States policy
to use export controls "to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its
26
international responsibilities."
By the mid-1970s, leaving aside the embargoes under TWEA, see note 2 supra,
national security controls constituted the bulk of United States export controls.
22. A 1979 report from the President to Congress, required by a 1977
amendment to EAA '69, concluded that only the Communist nations (except
Yugoslavia) were subject to export controls for national security reasons because no other nations posed an immediate national security threat. National
security controls were said to extend to other nations when necessary to avoid
diversion of exported goods to the Communist nations. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 646 (statement of William Root, Director, Office of
East-West Trade, Department of State). This has been a longstanding orientation of the controls. See, e.g., SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL AND
ALLOCATION PowERs, ELEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1950)

[hereinafter cited as ELEvENTH QUARTERLY REPORT].
23. EAA '79, §§ 3(2) (A), 5, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(2) (A), 2404. See text accompanying notes 707-94 infra.
24. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(2) (A), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(2)(A) (1976)) (expired 1979).
25. Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 830. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
EXPORT CONTROL, SEVENTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1951);
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECOND DECONTROL
ACT OF 1947, at 1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT]. Short
supply control authority is continued by EAA '79, which also mandates controls
on exports of crude oil, certain petroleum products, and red cedar logs. EAA
'79, §§ 3(2) (C), 7(d)-(f), 7(i), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(2) (C), 2406 (Supp. 11 1979).
1 26. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(2) (B), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402 (2) (B) (1976)) (expired 1979). Foreign policy also figured in the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7, and before that in the Second
Decontrol Act of 1947, ch. 248, 61 Stat. 321, which extended certain production
and allocation controls beyond the end of World War 11 In the Second Decontrol Act, however, foreign policy was used in an affirmative sense: controls on
production and distribution were justified so that the United States could fulfill
its economic commitments abroad, principally Marshall Plan aid to Western
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These three policies have been stated in almost identical
form since the adoption of general peacetime export control
legislation in 1949.27 Congress has legislated some subtle
changes in emphasis, 28 added subsidiary policies from time to
time, 29 and made the Export Administration Act the site of the
legislative provisions governing compliance with the Arab
League boycott of Israel and other boycotts of friendly nations.3 0 Since 1949, however, the President's power to control
exports for national security, short supply, and foreign policy
purposes has remained generally constant and, particularly in
the case of foreign policy controls, largely unrestricted.

B. ADMINISTATION
Since 1945, presidential '"power, authority, and discretion"
over export controls has been largely delegated to the Department of Commerce, 31 where most control and licensing deciEurope. See FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 25, at 1-2. See generally
Note, Export Controls, 58 YALE L. J. 1325 (1949).
27. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969).
28. See, e.g., EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(2)(B), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (B) (1976)) (expired 1979) (export controls were only to
be used to further "significantly" United States foreign policy).
29. See, e.g., Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-412, tit. 1, § 103,
86 Stat. 644 (1972) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(6) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979))
(expired 1979) (items subject to controls should be reviewed by appropriate
government agencies and experts from private industry).
30. The first antiboycott legislation was adopted in 1965. -Act-of June 30,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3(a), 79 Stat. 209 (expired 1969)). This legislation declared that it was United States policy to oppose boycotts directed against
friendly nations and to "encourage and request" American exporters to take no
action in support of such boycotts. See id. The Export Control Act expired on
December 31, 1969, at which time EAA '69 took effect. The antiboycott policy,
reenacted by EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(5), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 2402(5) (1976)) (expired 1979), was strengthened by the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 to state that it was United States policy "to encourage and, in specified cases, to require" American exporters to refuse to
participate in such boycotts. Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 202, 91 Stat. 235 (amending 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402(5) (1976)) (expired 1979). Detailed antiboycott rules were
added to the Act. Id. at § 201(a). The same policy and rules are included in
EAA '79. See EAA '79, §§ 3(5), 8, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402, 2407 (Supp. 11I 1979).
31. Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 805. Both EAA '69, Pub. L No. 91184, § 4(e), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(e) (1976)) (expired
1979), and the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 3(b), 63 Stat. 7 (expired
1969), authorized such redelegation. The last delegation under EAA '69 was
Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35,623 (1977), which granted most export
control authority to the Secretary of Commerce with the power of successive
delegation. Exec. Order No. 12,214, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,783 (1980), revises the
scheme of delegation in light of EAA '79.
EAA '79 also permits presidential redelegation, with important exceptions.
Certain presidential powers may not be delegated. EAA '79, §§ 4(e), 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403 (Supp. I 1979). The roles of the Secretaries of Commerce, State,
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sions have been made by a group of regulators now called the
Office of Export Administration (OEA).32 The OEA and its
predecessor agencies have been able to operate with an unusually free hand because virtually all export control functions
have been exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act.33

The administrative hearings, rulemaking procedures, and judicial review that operate as a check on most other executive
agencies have not restricted the activities of the Department of
Commerce, which continues to operate free of these constraints under EAA '79.34 Nonetheless, criminal, civil, and administrative penalties can be imposed for violations of the
regulations, orders, or licenses issued by the OEA,35 as well as

for violations of the statute itself.
and Defense are to a large degree mandated. See id. at §§ 5(a), 6(a), 15, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2404 2405, 2414. Finally, authority may only be delegated to an
official of a department or agency whose head is appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id. at § 4(e), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403. This limitation was intended to restrict the role of the National Security
Council (NSC) in export controls, largely because of NSC refusal to share information with Congress. See generally S. REP. No. 96-169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
15 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 96-169], reprintedin [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1147, 1162. The effort to limit the role of the NSC appears to have

been less than successful. For example, the review of export licenses and control policy toward the U.S.S.R. (undertaken in January, 1980) following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was carried out under the direction of the NSC.
See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 289, A-5 (Jan. 8, 1980). A government
source stated that the role of the Commerce Department in the review was
minimal, and that the change in actual authority of the NSC amounted to the
"emasculation" of the Commerce Department. Id., No. 291, A-1 (Jan. 22, 1980).
The role of the NSC has become a serious political and legal issue. See generally Comment, The Constitutionaland Legal Position of the National Security
Adviser and Deputy Adviser, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 634 (1980).
32. See UNTED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. EXPORT LICENSING SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO BE MORE

RESPONSIVE TO INDUSTRY 3-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1978]; Note, Export Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression,
9 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 333, 341-42, 347-50 (1979). The OEA is required in many
cases to consult with other agencies, notably the Departments of Defense,
State, and Energy, on licensing applications; usually unanimous consent of
these agencies is required in such cases. See Note, supra, at 341-42. EAA '79
mandates the roles of Defense and State more explicitly than prior legislation
and provides that Commerce is to have primary responsibility for licensing decisions. EAA '79, §§ 5(a) (1), 6(a) (1), 10, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a) (1), 2405(a) (1),
2409 (Supp. I 1979).
33. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 8, 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2407 (1976)) (expired 1979). See the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 7, 63
Stat. 7 (expired 1969).
34. EAA '79, § 13, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412 (Supp. I1 1979). The Act requires
the Secretary of Commerce to establish an administrative appeal procedure.
Id. at § 10(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409.
35. EAA '79, § 11, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (Supp. I 1979); EAA '69, Pub. L. No.
91-184, § 6, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. I- No. 95-223, tit.
Il, § 301(b) (2), 91 Stat. 1629; Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub.
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EAA '69 did seek to impose some procedural restraints on
the Executive by calling for periodic reports to Congress and
consultation with American exporters and other nations.3 6 The
37
statute also attempted to provide "an element of due process"
for exporters by, for example, setting time limits for OEA action on license applications, requiring that exporters be allowed to respond to questions raised about their applications in
difficult cases, and mandating that applicants be informed -f
the statutory basis for denial of their applications.3 8 Even the
authors of these procedural safeguards, however, intended
them to hold the Executive accountable only "to some minimal
degree."3 9 The adequacy of the safeguards was severely criticized,40 and additional procedural requirements were included
in EAA '79.41
C.

LICENSING

1.

Types of Licenses

Operational details of the export control system are set out
in the Export Administration Regulations (Regulations) of the
Commerce Department. 42 The scheme of the system is to prohibit, with few exceptions, all exports from the United States to
any destination unless licensed by the OEA.43 This approach is
L. No. 95-52, tit. I, §§ 103(d), 112, tit. I1, § 203(a), 91 Stat. 237 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405 (1976 & Supp. I 1977)) (expired 1979).
36. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 10, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, §§ 116(a), (b) (2), 91 Stat.
243; Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-500, § 3(b), 88
Stat. 1552 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409 (1976 & Supp. 11977)) (expired 1979)
(requiring periodic reports). See also EAA '69, at § 3(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(3)); EAA '69, at § 5 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)) (requiring
consultation). Consultation and reporting requirements of EAA '79 are discussed at text accompanying notes 765-75 infra.
37. H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 [hereinafter cited as HLR.
REP. No. 95-190], reprinted in [ 1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 362, 374.
38. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. . No. 93-500, § 5(a),
88 Stat. 1552, as amended by Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-52, § 107, 91 Stat. 243 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(g) (1976 & Supp.
I 1977) (expired 1979).
39. H.R. REP. No. 95-190, supra note 37, at 13.
40. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1978, supra note 32 at 1; Note,
supra note 32, at 353-55.
41. See EAA '79, §§ 5, 6, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2405 (Supp. H1 1979).
42. The Regulations, published by the Department of Commerce in
looseleaf form, are also published in the Federal Register as issued and are
codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1980). See generally Berman & Garson, supra
note 2, at 813-34.
43. See 15 C.F.R. § 370.3(a) (1980). The principal exceptions are: (1) most
exports to Canada for consumption there, id. at § 370.3(a) (1); (2) certain exports to the United States armed forces, id. at § 370.3 (a) (2); (3) exports regu-
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not as burdensome as it might first appear. The bulk of American exports leave the country under one of several "general
licenses," which are OEA regulations of general applicability
that permit the export of certain types of goods and information to certain destinations without any specific authorization
for individual transactions and without the issuance of any authorizing documents." Even under a general license, however,
an exporter must file a "Shipper's Export Declaration" at the
port of exit or place of mailing,45 giving certain information
about the transaction (partly for statistical and partly for control purposes), and an exporter may also be required to place
warnings against diversion of the goods from their original destination on its bill of lading and commercial invoice.48 Further,
an exporter may not without authorization transfer its bill of
lading, Shipper's Export Declaration, or any other "export control document" 4 7 to any person except as necessary to complete the originally contemplated transaction or in connection
with certain commercial liens.4 8
When the executive branch determines that stricter control
over a particular class of exports is necessary for reasons of national security, foreign policy, or short supply, the specific prior
approval of OEA for individual transactions within that class
may be required. A license of this sort, covering a particular
transaction and embodied in a particularized document issued
upon application, is known as a "validated license."4 9 Generally, the term "imposition of export controls" and similar
phrases refer to the adoption of a validated license requirement
for a certain class of export transactions.5 0 This Article will follow that usage, but doing so should not obscure the fact that
lated by another United States agency, id. at § 370.3(a) (3); and (4) exports to
territories, dependencies, and possessions of the United States. Id. at § 370.4.
44. 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1980). By far the most important is General License
G-DEST, which authorizes the export of any commodity listed on the Commodity Control List (CCL) to any destination for which the CCL does not require a
validated license. Id. at § 371.3. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
45. 15 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (1980).
46. Id. at § 386.6(a). "Destination control statements" are required for
every export under a validated license. Id. at § 386.6(a) (1) (i).
47. Id. at § 387.9(a)(1)(i).
48. Id. at§387.9(b)(1).
49. Id. at § 372.2(a).
50. EAA '79 continues the use of general and validated licenses and also
provides for a "qualified general license"--issued only upon application but authorizing multiple exports-and other types of licenses. See generally EAA '79,
§ 4(a) (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a) (2) (Supp. III 1979). See also 45 Fed. Reg.
45,894 (1980) (regulations governing use of qualified general license).
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under the Regulations all exports are subject to some degree of
control.
A validated license authorizes a specific export transaction:
the export of specific goods (or information) to a specific buyer
in a specific country for a specific end use. 51 The applicant
must specify each of these factors in the license application
and be prepared to substantiate them with documentary evidence; 52 in particular, an applicant must usually include not
only its own statement of the contemplated end use of the export, but also that of the ultimate purchaser.53 In the case of
certain strategic exports to friendly nations, 54 the purchaser's
government will become involved in supervising the disposition
of the goods exported to prevent their diversion to Communist
nations. 55
The Regulations make it unlawful to reexport, transship, or
divert, directly or indirectly and in whole or in part, any United
States export from its originally authorized ultimate destination, unless a new license covering the reexport has been obtained from the OEA or unless the Regulations permit
reexport.56
2.

Country Groups

Although most validated license requirements based on national security considerations apply to the export of controlled
items regardless of their destination, the export licensing system does distinguish among importing nations with respect to
both validated license requirements and licensing policy.57
These distinctions are based on both national security and foreign policy considerations. The Regulations reflect the distinctions primarily by assigning nations to various "country
51. 15 C.F.R. § 372.9(a) (1980).
52. Id. at § 372.6(a)(2).
53. Id. at § 375.2.
54. Participants are the NATO nations, Austria, Hong Kong, and Japan;
Switzerland and Yugoslavia cooperate with similar programs. Id. at
§§ 375.3(b)-375.5.
55. The government may issue an International Import Certificate (IC), id.
at § 375.3(a)-(h), or a Delivery Verification (DV), id. at § 375.3(i). See Berman
& Garson, supra note 2, at 817.
56. Id. at § 374.1. The permissive reexport provisions include instances in
which goods could be exported directly from the United States to the new destination under certain general licenses, reexports back to the United States,
and most reexports to Canada. Id. at § 374.2. See text accompanying notes 591617 infra.
57. See notes 22 supra, 105 infra and accompanying text.
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groups."5 6
Country Group Z includes North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba. 59 A validated license is required for virtually all
exports to Group Z, and the general policy of the Commerce
Department is to deny all such license applications, 60 although
6
humanitarian exports are sometimes approved. 1
Group Y consists of the U.S.S.R. and several Eastern European Communist nations as well as Outer Mongolia and Laos.62
The Regulations state that licenses for exports of controlled
items to these countries will be approved if the items are for a
civilian end use and do not contribute to the military potential
of the importing nation in a way detrimental to United States
national security,63 but further restraints are in fact imposed
for foreign policy reasons. Group W (Poland and Hungary),
Group Q (Romania), and Group P (The People's Republic of
China) 64 are subject to similar validated license requirements
but to more lenient licensing policies than those applicable to

Group

y.65

Group T encompasses the countries of the Western Hemisphere, other than Canada and Cuba. While most national security controls apply to Group T, licenses for exports to
58. 15 C.F.R. Pt. 370, Supp. No. 1 (1980).
59. Id. This Article sometimes refers to these countries as the "embargoed
nations." The Group Z requirements implement the export portion of the embargoes imposed under the TWEA.
60. 15 C.F.R. § 385.1 (1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980).
61. Periodic reports submitted to Congress by the Commerce Department
contain several examples of humanitarian exports: $9,720 of contraceptives approved for export to Cuba; $807,760 of hospital supplies and $389,390 of relief
commodities to Vietnam, see SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, 113TH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss 29 (1976); $1,643,000 of DDT to
Cambodia for control of malaria epidemic, see SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ExPORT ADMINIsTRATION, 115TH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 29 (1977).
62. 15 C.F.R. Pt. 370, Supp. No. 1 (1980).
63. Id. at § 385.2(a).
64. Id. at Pt. 370, Supp. No. 1, as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 27, 922 (1980).
65. The validated license requirements for exports to these four nations
have been virtually identical to those applicable to Group Y for some time. The
CCL of June 1, 1979, for example, contained no entries that distinguished
Group Q or Group W from Group Y. The People's Republic of China was at
that time included in Group Y, but the validated license requirements for exports to Group P, established in 1980, remain identical to those for Group Y.
Group P was created to permit the application of national security licensing
standards different from those applied to Group Y, particularly to the U.S.S.R.
45 Fed. Reg. 27, 922 (1980). While Groups Q and W are treated in the same
statement of licensing policy as Group Y, 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1980), it seems certain that applications for exports to Poland, Hungary, or Romania are received
more favorably than those for exports to the U.S.S.R., East Germany, or Bulgaria.
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destinations in Group T are usually approved without objection.
Group V contains all countries not specifically included in
any other country group, except Canada, to which most exports
can be made without a validated license. 66 Most national security controls also extend to exports destined for Group V, but
licenses are usually approved if there is no concern with diversion to Communist destinations. 67 Within Group V, however,
certain nations are subject to special validated license requirements and unusually strict licensing policies for foreign policy
reasons. 68
3.

Commodities

All commodities that require a validated license for export
to any destination are identified in a single comprehensive
schedule, the Commodity Control List (CCL).69 The CCL
groups commodities into general categories, such as metalworking machinery, electrical equipment, and chemicals,7 0 then
into more specific entries identified by an Export Commodity
Control Number (ECCN). An exporter, having located the
ECCN for the goods to be exported, can determine from the
CCL whether export to a particular country group requires a
validated license, whether any special restrictions apply to particular nations within a group, whether the purchaser's government must confirm delivery, and whether any of several special
licensing procedures are available. 7 ' Virtually all commodities
are in fact listed on the CCL, but the great majority are in66. 15 C.F.R. § 385.6 (1980).
67. Id. at § 385.4(b).
68. Id. at § 385.4, as amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 1258 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 1595
(1980). South Africa and Namibia are most prominently subject to more restrictive treatment. Id. at § 385.4(a), as amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 1258 (1981); 45
Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980). Yugoslavia is generally treated like a Western European
nation. Id. at § 385.4(c).
69. The CCL is published by the Commerce Department and incorporated
by reference at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1980). A single schedule has been used only
since 1965. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 820.
70. See The Commodity Control List and How to Use It (b) (introduction
to the CCL) (available from the OEA, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter
cited as The Commodity Control List], incorporatedby reference in 15 C.F.L
§ 399.1 (1980).
71. See Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.
on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1978) (report on simplification of the Regulations, submitted by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to
The Export Administration Amendments of 1977, § 114, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406
(Supp. 1 1977) (expired 1979)); The Commodity Control List, supra note 70, at

(f).
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cluded only as part of several broad "basket entries," which
function to require a validated license for all exports to Group
72
Z and other embargoed destinations.
4. Information
The export licensing system regulates exports of information as well as goods. The kind of information subject to control-"technical data" under EAA '6973 and "technology" under
EAA '7974---is industrial information that can be used in the design, production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of
goods. 75 It may be in tangible form, such as a prototype,
blueprint, or manual, or in intangible form, such as "know-how"
or the performance of technical services. 7 6 Information in tangible form is normally considered to be exported when it is
physically sent abroad, while intangible information is considered to be exported when it is "released" either abroad or in
the United States with knowledge that it will be transmitted
abroad.7 7 Release may occur through visual inspection of
American equipment or facilities, oral communication, or the
application abroad of know-how acquired in the United
States.7 8 As with commodities, exports of controlled information must be made under either a general or a validated li79
cense.
The export of information that has been made generally
available to the public, and of nonpublic scientific or educational data not related to industrial processes, is authorized by
the most important technical data general license-General License GTDA.80 Some technical data not eligible for export
under this license, such as proprietary information about man72. The Commodity Control List, supra note 70, at (c). Compare the operation of General License G-DEST, supra note 44. If an item appears on the
CCL only as part of a typical basket entry (e.g., "all other electrical and power
generating equipment n.e.s. [not elsewhere specified]" (ECCN 6299)), it may
be exported to any destination other than Group Z and any other embargoed
destinations specified on the CCL (e.g., certain South African institutions, see
text accompanying notes 245-56 infra) under this General License.
73. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b) (1), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977)) (expired 1979).
74. EAA '79, §§ 5-6, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404-2405 (Supp. III 1979).
75. Id. at § 16(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(4); 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1980).
76. 15 C.F. § 379.1(a) (1980).
77. Id. at § 379.1(b) (1).
78. Id. at § 379.1(b) (2).
79. Id. at § 379.2. A major innovation in EAA '79 is an attempt to focus national security controls on technology rather than goods. EAA '79, §§ 2(8),'5(d),
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(8), 2404(d) (Supp. 1I 1979).
80. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1980).
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ufacturing processes, may be exported under a more limited
general license-GTDR-to most non-Communist nations,81
subject in some cases to a requirement that the importer give
certain written assurances concerning later disposition of the
data and its "direct product."82 Nonpublic technical information on certain subjects requires a validated license for export
to virtually all destinations (usually with the exception of Canada) .83
Reexport controls also apply to information exports, 84 and
in some circumstances the controls extend beyond reexport of
the information itself and forbid the unauthorized export of foreign-produced direct products of the information to Country
Groups Q, W, Y, P, and Z.85
I.

THE GROWTH OF FOREIGN POLICY EXPORT

CONTROLS
A. THE

EXPANDING MEANING OF FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1969

1. The TraditionalRole of ForeignPolicy
Since American peacetime export controls began following
World War II, the control program has been predominantly
concerned with restricting exports to Communist nations.8 6 By
1950, most exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had
been placed under control, 87 and out of concern with diversion
81. Id. at § 379.4. No technical data may be exported to Group Z under
General License GTDR, id. at § 379.4(a), and there are strict limits on exports
to Groups P, Q, W, and Y without a validated license.
82. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1980).
83. Id. at § 379.4(c)-(d).
84. Id. at § 379.8.
85. Id. at § 379.8(a) (3). See also text accompanying notes 591-617 infra.
86. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 796.
87. Id. at 796, 818-19. Controls were instituted as early as 1948 to prevent
strategic items from going to Eastern Europe. See TImm QUARTERLY REPORT,
supra note 19, at 14. By 1950, this effort was the major focus of the program.
See ELEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2. By 1951, an export license was required "before shipment to the Soviet bloc of all United States
goods" and technical data. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL,
FrFrEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1951). At least some licenses
for nonstrategic items were granted. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT
CONTROL, TWENTY-EIGEtH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (1954); SECRE-

TARY OF COMMEI CE, EXPORT CoNTRoL, TwENTY-FrFrH QUARTERLY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 5 (1953); [hereinafter cited as TWENTY-FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT].

Furthermore, some nonstrategic items were eventually allowed to be sold to
the Communist nations under a special General License, GLSA. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CoNRoL, Fm=rY-SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 8 (1960).
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many exports to other nations were controlled as well. 88 At
first, in spite of their extensive product coverage, these East-

West trade restrictions were justified primarily on national security grounds, based on the threat perceived in the establish-

ment of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. 8 9 Later,
American involvement in the Korean conflict led to a total embargo of North Korea and the People's Republic of China under

the Trading with the Enemy Act90 and provided an additional
national security justification for controlling exports to their
European Communist allies. 91
The national security rationale for strict controls on American trade with the European Communist states became less
compelling after the truce in Korea and the partial relaxation of

92
tension in Europe associated with the death of Stalin. Al-

though Western Europe took advantage of this change in cli-

mate to expand trade with the East,93 United States export
policy remained highly restrictive.94 The broad unilateral export controls of the late 1950s and 1960s-which continued to

cover many commodities that could not have contributed significantly to Communist military strength-may therefore be
88. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 813, 818-19. Cf. SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL AND ALLOCATION POWERS, SEVENTH QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (1949) (imposition of controls to prevent transshipment
of certain commodites) [hereinafter cited as SEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT];
ELEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 22, at 1, 3.
89. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 796. Commerce Department
quarterly reports on the export control system began to discuss national security issues, along with short supply problems, as early as 1948. See SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL AND ALLOCATION POWERS, FOURTH QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2, 4 (1948). Thereafter, the reports indicate the increasing
importance of security controls. See, e.g., SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT
CONTROL AND ALLOCATION POWERS, EIGHTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 2
(1953); SEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 88, at 3. By 1953, a separate
section of the reports was devoted to security controls. See, e.g., TwENTY-FIFrH
QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 87, at 3. Originally, the needs of European recovery had provided a foreign policy justification for export controls. See note
26 supra.
90. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 792-93; note 2 supra.
91. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL, THIRTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-3 (1950); Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 799.
92. G. ADLER-KARLSsON, WESTERN ECONOMIC WARFARE: 1947-1967 at 7, 8386 (1968); Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 799. Cf. A. LOWENFELD, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS § 1.23, at 164 (1977) (even prior to Stalin's death,
Soviets sought trade with Western nations).
93. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 92, § 1.1, at 148, § 1.23 at 164-65; Berman &
Garson, supra note 2, at 799.
94. A. LOwENFELD, supra note 92, § 1.1, at 148; Berman & Garson, supra
note 2, at 799. Controls on Poland and Romania, however, were relaxed in 1957
and 1964, respectively. See note 65 supra.
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95
said to have been based largely upon American foreign policy.
Outside of Europe, the embargo of the People's Republic of
China and North Korea was extended to Cuba in 1962,96 to
North Vietnam in 1964,97 then to all of Vietnam 98 and Cambodia
in 1975.99 Both in Cuba and Southeast Asia, national security
considerations-growing out of the Bay of Pigs incident, the
Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam War-originally supported the imposition of trade controls. Subsequently, however, foreign policy became the express rationale for these
embargoes,100 and except for the embargo of the People's Republic of China, they have remained fixtures of American trade

policy.
The American controls on trade with Eastern Europe, on
the other hand, began to decline by the late 1960s;101 EAA '69
was intended to spur this trend.102 With the change in attitude
95. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 799-800, 822. Quarterly reports
of the Commerce Department during this period often included statements to
the effect that controls were established under the national security policy of
the Export Control Act, "but are of course administered within the broad con[F]requently these controls are exertext of United States foreign policy ....
cised predominantly to further foreign policy objectives." See, e.g., SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL, TwENTY-SixTH QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1954). Cf. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL, FIFTY-EIGHTH
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (1962) (considers both national security
and foreign policy as supporting controls on the Communist bloc).
The broad unilateral controls may also be said to have rested on a belief
that any contribution to the industrial strength of the Soviet Union was as
great a threat to American national security as a contribution to military
strength. A 1962 amendment to the Export Control Act seems explicitly to have
adopted this view. Act of July 1, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-515, § 2, 76 Stat. 127 (expired 1969).
96. The Cuban Import Regulations of 1962 were replaced in 1963 by the
more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations. See note 2 supra. In
addition to the general authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, see id.,
the Cuban embargo had specific Congressional sanction. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1979).
97. North Vietnam was made subject to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, see note 2 supra, along with China and North Korea on May 5, 1964. 29
Fed. Reg. 6010 (1964). The National Liberation Front, Viet Cong, and Liberation
Red Cross were later made "specially designated nationals" of North Vietnam.
31 Fed. Reg. 8586 (1966).
98. South Vietnam was included on April 30, 1975. 31 C.F.R. § 500.204(a) (1)
(1975).
99. The embargo was extended to Cambodia on April 17, 1975. Id. at
§ 500.201(d).
100. See id. at § 385.1 (1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980).
101. The first, largely symbolic, step was taken by President Johnson in
1966. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 822-83.
102. The more liberal attitude of EAA '69 toward trade with the East was
symbolized in the language of its title, which used the neutral term "administration" instead of the more negative word "control". See A. LowmNFELD, supra
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represented by the 1972 trade agreement between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.,103 the dismantling of controls accelerated. American restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe
came to approach, though always exceeding, the level of controls-a level which called for restrictions on only those commodities with military applications-that for some time had
been maintained by other major Western countries operating
through an international organization known as COCOM.104 By
the mid-1970s, only a relatively small number of high technology, dual-use items required a validated license for export from
5
the United States.10
Thus foreign policy considerations had played a major role
in supporting the broad anti-Communist restrictions that had
been the almost exclusive preoccupation of the export control
program since its inception. By the mid-1970s, however, the
role of foreign policy in anti-Communist controls had declined

to providing justification for the Group Z embargoes and for occasional variations in the strictness with which exports to particular Communist nations were controlled. 106 American
note 92, § 1.32, at 169-73; See generally Berman, The Export Administration Act
of 1969: An Analysis and Appraisal, 3 AM. REV. EAST-WEST TRADE 19 (1970).
103. See A. LowENFELD, supra note 92, § 2.2, at 187-190.
104. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, supra note 92, at 7-8, 89-90. Multilateral controls
administered through COCOM are discussed further at text accompanying
notes 393-401 infra.
105. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 92, § 4.21, at 230-32. Most items on the CCL
since the mid-1970s have been dual-use products multilaterally controlled to all
destinations through COCOM. For example, on the CCL issued as of June 1,
1979, 126 entries were of this character, 46 were dual-use items unilaterally controlled by the United States to all destinations for national security purposes,
and another 26 were unilaterally controlled to specific destinations. Many of
the controls in the latter group applied only to exports to Communist nations,
but the group included some foreign policy controls that are discussed herein.
In addition, ten "basket" entries extended eontrols over all exports to the embargoed nations. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 385.2(a), .4(b) (1980).
106. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 819-20. Such refinements have
included (1) extension of favorable treatment to Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary,
and Romania, see note 65 supra; (2) reduction of controls on third country exports containing United States-origin components to Cuba, 15 C.F.R. § 385.1
(1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1980), in line with the policy of the Organization of
American States, see U.S. Takes Steps to Conform with OAS Action on Cuba, 73
DEP'T ST. BuLL. 404, 404 (1975); and (3) the transfer of the People's Republic of
China from the embargo list to Country Group Y, 15 C.F.R. Part 370, Supp. 1
(1972), then to a newly established country Group P. See note 65 supra. The
more favorable treatment given exports to the People's Republic of China in
1980 contrasts sharply with a tightening of controls on exports to the U.S.S.R.
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See text accompanying notes 80209 infra. While the People's Republic of China was in Country Group Y, the
United States sought to maintain a "balanced" export control policy toward it
and the U.S.S.R. See U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export
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controls on East-West trade had become predominantly national security controls in the modern sense, concentrating on
goods and technology with military applications and, out of necessity, regulating the export of such items to all destina07
tions.1
Until recently, export controls based predominantly on foreign policy considerations and not within the prevailing antiCommunist focus of the control program have been quite rare.
Three types can be identified: controls implementing actions of
the United Nations, controls restricting the export of nuclear
items, and controls aimed at preserving stability in volatile re1
gions of the world. 08
The principal set of controls implementing United Nations
action has been the embargo on trade with Rhodesia (1966 to
1979).109 Controls on arms exports to South Africa are also in
effect as a result of United Nations action." 0
Most controls on nuclear power exports are administered
under special statutes by agencies other than the Commerce
Department,"' but Commerce has retained licensing jurisdiction over many items with nuclear applications.U12 Validated
licenses are required for the export of any such items to be
Administration Act: Hearingson S. 737 Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part I,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1979) (statement of Richard Cooper, Under Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs) [hereinafter cited as Senate EAA Hearings Part

'1.
107. See note 105 supra. The ECCN of an item controlled multilaterally to
all destinations ends with the letter "A"; that of an item controlled unilaterally
to all destinations ends with the letter "B." The IC procedure, see note 55
supra and accompanying text, applies only to "A" commodities, although the
DV procedure may apply to others. 15 C.F.R. §§ 375.3(a), (i) (1980).
108. A section entitled Special Foreign Policy Controls was added to the periodic reports of the Commerce Department in 1966. See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL,SEVENTY-FIIT- .QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 28
(1966). Until recently, this section only noted antiboycott activities and the
three types of controls referred to in text.
109. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.3 (1979) (repealed 1979); note 2 supra. The Commerce Department drew on authority under the EAA as well as under the
United Nations Participation Act to enforce the export side of the embargo.
See 15 C.F.R. § 385.3 (1979) (repealed 1979). Further, the Rhodesian embargo,
like the South African arms embargo, was temporarily implemented voluntarily, before the authority of the United Nations Participation Act could become
effective. See note 2 supra.
110. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1980); note 2 supra.
111. See note 1 supra.
112. See 15 C.F.R. § 378.2 (1980). Certain nuclear-related items previously
controlled by Commerce were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 35,027 (1978).
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used in making or testing nuclear weapons" 3 or in the construction or operation of various nuclear facilities." 4 Since late
1980, all items controlled for national security purposes have
been subject to review under the United States nonproliferation policy before export for nuclear-related uses or to nuclear5
related purchasers."
Finally, controls are sometimes imposed on exports of
dual-use items to promote "regional stability" in situations of
hostility or near hostilityll6 and for related political objectives." 7 The prime examples of such controls have been the
subjection of many Middle East nations to restrictive licensing
policies and a few unique validated license requirements since
the 1967 war,11 8 and the denial of licenses for exports to those
113. These controls implement the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963,
14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. See 15 C.F.R. § 378.3 (1980).
114. See 15 C.F.R. § 378.4 (1980). These were instituted in 1978 to implement
the United States nuclear nonproliferation policy. 43 Fed. Reg. 35,028 (1978).
115. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,446 (1980).
116. Under the regional stability policy, the Commerce and State Departments review proposed exports of items that might contribute to the military
capabilities of countries engaged, or expected to be engaged, in local military
conflicts or that might otherwise contribute to regional tensions. See U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export AdministrationAct.- Hearings
on S. 737 and S. 937 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part III, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1979) (statement of Frank Wel) [hereinafter cited as Senate EAA
Hearings Part III]; Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 223 (statement of Department of State). Regional stability concerns usually lead to restrictive policies on licensing exports of items that already require validated
licenses for national security reasons, rather than new validated license requirements. See note 118 infra.
117. The United States has occasionally restricted exports that would improve the military capabilities of a friendly nation in situations in which American political relations with third countries might be jeopardized. See Senate
EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 41-42 (statement of Frank Weil); Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 65-66 (statement of Juanita Kreps).
During the 1970s, special restrictions were applicable to India, South Korea,
and Taiwan on this ground. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at
66 (statement of Juanita Kreps). Such controls most often take the form of restrictive licensing policies applicable to items controlled for national security
purposes. See Senate EAA HearingsPart III, supra note 116, at 16-26 (validated
license requirements unilaterally maintained by United States in 1979; no validated license requirements specifically applicable to India, South Korea, or Taiwan); Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57
FOREIGN AFF. 894, 909-10 (1979), reprinted in Senate EAA Hearings Part III,
supra note 116, at 44, 59-60 (denial of license to export to Taiwan machinery usable in the fabrication of missiles). Such policies, however, are not set forth in
the Regulations.
118. In June 1967, "precautionary" controls were imposed over the issuance
of validated licenses to all states in the Middle East. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
EXPORT CONTROL, EIGHTY-THIRD QuARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (1968). In
1979, a number of commodities were still said to be controlled for export to all
nations in the region, see Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 65-66
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countries of items that could be used in military operations."

9

(statement of Juanita Kreps); they included aircraft, computers, advanced electronics, and certain vehicles. See Senate EAA Hearings Part III, supra note
116, at 41 (statement of Frank Wel). These "controls" have generally constituted strict licensing policies, applicable to items already requiring validated
licenses for national security reasons for export to any destination. See notes
116-17 supra. Cf. Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 223 (statement
of Richard Cooper) (explanation of State Department policy on refusing export
licenses for regional stability reasons). As of 1980, however, the Regulations do
not mention such policies. Validated license requirements are rarely imposed
under the regional stability policy. But see note 119 infra. On the CCL issued
as of June 1, 1979, for example, only three ECCN entries required a validated
license for export to only Middle Eastern nations, and only one entry required
a license for export to Middle Eastern nations but not to any other destinations
in Group V. Some of these controls might also be based on the anti-terrorism
policy. See text accompanying notes 141-69 infra. As of 1980, only one validated license requirement-for the export to Libya of certain tractors useful in
desert warfare-is identified as based on the regional stability policy. 45 Fed.
Reg. 1597 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(e)). A licensing policy applicable to this category was established. Id.
119. Probably the best known license denial occurred in May 1978, when the
Oshkosh Truck Corporation was advised by the Commerce Department, first,
that its proposed export to Libya of 400 heavy duty trucks could not be made
without a validated license, and second, that the license had been denied. See
Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 910; Ibrahim, U.S. Delays Sales Made to
Libyans, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1978, at 25, col. 3. The Commerce Department
had apparently confirmed to Oshkosh previously that the export could be made
under general license. Oshkosh Awaits Ruling on Truck Sale to Libya, AtrroMOTIVE NEWS, June 12, 1978, at 39. The last-minute reversal appears to have
been the result of pressure by the State Department and the NSC that in large
part grew out of concern expressed by Egypt (Libya's eastern neighbor). Although the trucks were designed to haul oil drilling equipment, they were also
capable of towing tanks for use in desert warfare. In spite of pressure by congressmen representing Oshkosh, a license was only issued when lighter trucks
were substituted. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 910; Ibrahim,
supra, at 26; AuTOMOTVE NEWS, supra at 39. This action was also motivated by
the Administration's anti-terrorism policy, see text accompanying notes 141-69
infra, which frequently overlaps with regional stability efforts, particularly in
the Middle East and in cases involving Libya. See House EAA HearingsPart I,
supra note 21, at 646 (statement of William Root); Use of Export Controls and
Export Creditsfor ForeignPolicy Purposes: Oversight Hearingson the Increasing Use by the Executive Branch of Restrictions on U.S. Exports and Export
Creditsfor the Purpose of Promoting Foreign Policy Objectives of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1978)
(statement of Sen. Case) [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Policy Hearings].
Licenses for the export to Libya of certain commercial aircraft-Boeing
727s and 747s and L-100 civilian cargo planes-have also been denied. Hovey,
Ethiopia Sends U.S. Promise on Somalia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1978, at 3, col. 1;
Ibrahim, supra, at 26; Johnson, U.S. Policies Hamper Exports of C-130, Av.
WEEK, Nov. 13, 1978, at 57; N.Y. Times, March 3, 1979, at 5, col. 6. Mixed concern
over regional stability and terrorism has been behind these denials as well See
generally Hovey, supra; Ibrahim, supra. Libya already had nine Boeing 727s,
those that were blocked being the last to be delivered out of a single order, and
Libya could substitute the European Airbus for the American planes. See
Ibrahim, supra. Boeing's congressional delegation, headed by Senator Henry
Jackson, appealed on its behalf and the 727s and 747s were ultimately licensed.
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While these restraints were of importance, by the mid1970s foreign policy controls seemed a peripheral part of the
United States export control program. In terms of country coverage, 120 product coverage,121 and underlying goals,122 their
field of application seemed narrowly defined and stable. Subsequent developments, however, broke sharply with this understanding.
2. The Access to Supplies Policy
Congress initiated the first expansion in the meaning of
foreign policy under EAA '69 in 1974, following the OPEC oil
embargo of the United States. Section 3 of EAA '69 was
amended, to declare it to be United States policy to use export
controls, within the limits of the section, as a means to secure
the removal of restrictions imposed by foreign nations on ac23
cess to supplies.
The new policy followed from the belief that the President
needed additional powers to respond to OPEC-style embarSee id.; N.Y. Times, March 3, 1979, at 5, col. 6. Some of the 727s previously delivered were later found to have been used to airlift troops in support of Idi
Amin. Those licensed in 1978 were sold on the basis of assurances of exclusively civilian use and were apparently not used in the Ugandan operation. See
House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 128 (statements of Rep. Pease,
Stanley Marcuss); Extension and Revision of the Export AdministrationAct of
1969-Part 2, Hearings and Markup Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1979) (statement of Robin Schwartzman) [hereinafter cited as House EAA HearingsPartII].
120. Non-Communist nations were subject to foreign policy controls only in
such limited circumstances as United Nations sanctions or regional hostilities.
By the mid-1970s, even exports to the European Communist states were controlled primarily for national security reasons, see note 105 supra, although foreign policy had previously played a role in justifying these controls. See notes
95, 106 supra and accompanying text.
121. The products controlled under foreign policy authority were usually
limited to arms (as in the United Nations embargo of South Africa), materials
with nuclear uses, or dual-use items first controlled for national security purposes (as in the case of regional stability controls). The United States attempted to deny a wide range of industrial and consumer goods only to
Rhodesia (under United Nations auspices), Cuba, and the Asian Communist
nations.
122. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
123. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. I No. 93-500, § 4, 88
Stat. 1552 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(7) (1976)) (expired 1979). An almost
identical provision is included in EAA '79. See EAA '79, § 3(7), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2402(7) (Supp. III 1979). There is no doubt that the 1973 embargo precipitated
congressional action. See S. REP. No. 93-1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6234, 6238; 120 CONG. REC. 26,055 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson); see also Erb, Controlling Export Controls, 17 FOREIGN POL'Y 79, 81-82 (1974).
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goes. 124 Without such powers, it was said, the President would
be "virtually powerless" to oppose a foreign embargo and the
United States would have to "take it lying down."125 If the
United States could respond by cutting off exports, however, it
was thought that the President could deter or dismantle foreign
embargoes that were "lying in wait for us down the road" by
threatening or engaging in "economic warfare."126 In fact, the
amendment was probably not necessary to empower the President to respond to foreign embargoes: retaliatory export controls could have been imposed under the general foreign policy
authority of EAA '69,127 or the President could have called on
even broader powers under the Trading with the Enemy Act128
(particularly in 1974 when the required state of national emergency was in effect).129 In 1974, however, the use of export controls to respond to foreign trade embargoes was an unfamiliar
concept. The new policy declaration may thus have served important functions in clarifying presidential authority and in
enunciating congressional support for the use of retaliatory
controls.
The access to supplies policy limited presidential authority
in three ways. First and most important, it provided that export controls could be used to respond to only two categories of
foreign supply restrictions: those having or possibly having serious economic effects (in the form of either inflation or supply
shortages), and those imposed to affect the foreign policy of the
United States.130
The differing operation of these two categories is noteworthy. To come within the first, the foreign supply restriction
need only have a sufficient actual or potential economic impact
on the United States; motive is immaterial. 3 1 The foreign na124. See 120 CONG. REC. 26,055-56 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson).
125. Id.
126. Id. (remarks of Sen. Stevenson, Sen. Chiles).
127. Presidential authority would have been buttressed by the antiboycott
provisions in EAA '69, which declared opposition to "restrictive trade practices
or boycotts" aimed at either friendly nations or at "any United States person."
EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(5) (A), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2402(5) (A) (1976 & Supp. II 1978)) (expired 1979).
128. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. M 1979). See note 2 supra.
129. After 1977, the President could have invoked the IEEPA by declaring a
national emergency. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 1I 1979). See note 2 supra.
130. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, § 11, 88 Stat. 1552 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(7) (1976)) (expired 1979) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 2402(7) (Supp. I 1979)).
131. Some possible motives for imposing restrictions on foreign access to
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tion's purpose may be simply to increase export earnings; indeed the legislative history of the 1974 amendment indicates
that mere price increases, if capable of producing the economic
effects described in the statute, were restrictions against which
the United States might properly retaliate.132 To fall within the
second category, however, no economic effect at all is necessary; the motive of the nation imposing the restriction is all-im-

portant. If, for example, South Africa cut off diamond exports
to the United States to influence American policy toward continued South African control of Namibia, there might be little
economic effect,133 but because the embargo was intended to
affect United States foreign policy, it would trigger the President's authority to retaliate with controls on American exports
to South Africa.
The grant of authority to retaliate against foreign restrictions intended to affect American foreign policy now appears
ironic. It was not long after 1974 that the United States began
to use export controls on a significant scale for just the purpose
condemned in the statute: attempting to influence the policies
of other nations. The irony is heightened by the obvious indignation with which Congress viewed foreign export controls
4
designed to influence United States policy.13
The second limitation placed on presidential authority
under the access to supplies amendment was the requirement
certain commodities are discussed in C.

BERGSTEN,

COMPLETING THE GATr:

TowARD NEW INTERNATIONAL RULES TO GOVERN EXPORT CoNTROLs 4-10 (1974).
132. See 120 CONG. REC. 26,055-56 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Chiles).
133. For example, industry could turn to other sources or alternate materials, and flancees could make do with other gems.
134. See 120 CONG. REc. 26,055-56 (1974). The same sort of irony is apparent
in other contexts as well. The United States legislation aimed at cooperation
with the Arab boycott of Israel, EAA '79, § 8, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. MI
1979), for example, loses some of its force as a moral statement when one reads
that Congress forbade complicity in only those boycotts the target of which is
not the object of any United States boycott. See generally Lowenfeld, ' . .
Sauce for the Gander:" The Arab Boycott and United States Political Trade
Controls, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 25 (1977).
The irony of the access to supplies policy is evident within the history of
the legislation itselL Section 3(7) was added by amendment on the Senate
floor, 120 CONG. REC. 26,056 (1974); the bill reported out of committee, S. 3792,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), would have added to EAA '69 only a finding and policy declaration opposing restrictions on access to supplies. Although the Committee report spelled out numerous adverse consequences of international
supply restrictions, it noted that the Committee expected the President and the
Commerce Department to consider those consequences when imposing controls on United States exports, stating that the "serious dangers" presented by
unreasonable controls should "play an important role" in their deliberations. S.
REP. No. 93-1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 6234, 6238.
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that the President make "every reasonable effort" to secure removal of foreign restrictions through international cooperation
and agreement before imposing controls.135 This requirement
is sound for several reasons. A foreign supply restriction might
be imposed to deal with legitimate domestic economic
problems; in such cases negotiations could address those
problems or at least mitigate the effects of the supply restriction. Similarly, a restriction imposed to influence United States
policy might be lifted if negotiations revealed the possibility of
American retaliation or other costs which might be incurred by
the foreign nation in maintaining the restriction.136 In these
and similar situations, negotiations might preclude the destructive "economic warfare" that retaliatory controls could produce.
Finally, the amendment provided that retaliatory controls
could not apply to medicine or medical supplies.137 This exemption was a compromise proposed by Senator Weicker who
had earlier sought to exempt both medicine and food.138 Although the United States has traditionally been reluctant to
control food exports,139 the Senate was unwilling to bind the
President even to this extent, believing that controls on food
exports would be one of the strongest American weapons in a
confrontation with an OPEC-style natural resources em0
bargo.14
3.

The Anti-Terrorism Policy

In 1977, Congress again added a new policy declaration to
EAA '69, authorizing use of export controls "to encourage other
countries to take immediate steps to prevent the use of their
territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to"
international terrorists (including those who direct and support
135. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, § 11, 88 Stat. 1552 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(7) (1976)) (expired 1979) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 2402(7) (Supp. I 1979)).
136. These are among the issues considered in Part TV infra.
137. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3, 83 Stat. 841, as amended by Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, § 11, 88 Stat. 1552 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(7) (1976) (expired 1979) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405(f) (Supp. III 1979)).
138. 120 CONG. REC. 26,056 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Weicker).
139. The controls on grain exports to the U.S.S.R. imposed in 1980, see text
accompanying notes 803-04 infra, were in fact the first instance in which the
"food weapon" has been used for political purposes. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 289, at A-2 (Jan. 8, 1980). In EAA '79, Congress retained unusual
power to overturn controls on food exports. See EAA '79, § 7(g) (3), 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2406(g) (3) (Supp. 11 1979); text accompanying note 784 infra.
140. See 120 CONG. REC. 26,056 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson).
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them) .141
Throughout the 1970s, the United States and other Western
governments had grappled with many aspects of international
terrorism.l4 2 The 1977 amendment to EAA '69, which continues
unchanged in EAA '79,143 was designed to deal with only one
part of the terrorism problem: the role played by a small group
of nations, so-called "subversive centers,"1 4 in aiding and harboring terrorists.
The anti-terrorism amendment to EAA '69 was not the first
American effort to exert pressure on subversive centers. As
141. Export Administration Amendements of 1977, Pub. L, No. 95-52, § 115,
91 Stat. 235 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. I 1977)) (expired 1979)
(current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. II 1979)).
142. See, e.g., Joint Statement, 14 WEEKLY CoM. OF PRES. DOC. 1308-10
(July 17, 1978). Considerable debate on the proper response to terrorism has
taken place internationally, though few agreements have been reached. See
Browne, TerroriM, in THE U.S. ROLE IN A CHANGING WoRLD POLmTrcAL EcoNOMY: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE 96T CONGRESS 2344-35 (M. Lowenthal & R. Kaufman eds. 1979). The International Civil Aviation Organization has adopted
three treaties aimed at protection of civil aviation, all of which the United
States has ratified. Id. at 231, 237. The Organization of American States
adopted a convention in 1971 aimed at "Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons," and the United States ratified this treaty in 1976. Id.,
at 231. In 1973, the United Nations adopted a treaty aimed at "Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons," such as diplomats, which the United States
has also ratified. Id. at 233, 237. Numerous actions to promote the safety of civil
aviation have been taken in the United States. See id. Responsibility for coordinating efforts to combat terrorist activities rests with the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council. An interagency executive
committee under this committee meets regularly to consider anti-terrorism
measures, and a military unit trained to deal with terrorist incidents has been
created. Id. at 235, 236. In Congress, extensive hearings on the problem have
been held. See id. at 240 (bibliography of congressional documents).
143. See EAA '79, § 3(8), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. I 1979).
144. See Murphy, State Self-Help and Problems of Public International
Law, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORiSM, 553, 563-65 (A. Evans &
J. Murphy eds. 1978). In July 1976, the New York Times reported that Libya
was training, arming, and financing "[a] broad terrorist network, stretching
from the Middle East to Africa and Europe," and described its operation in
some detail. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1976, at 1, col. 1. In 1977, the State Department, responding to an information request from Senator Javits, publicly stated
that Libya had "actively assisted" terrorist groups and individuals since at least
1972. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1977, at 4, col. 3. The correspondence is reprinted
in International Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1977)
(statement of Sen. Javits) [hereinafter cited as InternationalTerrorism Hearings]. The Department also named Iraq, South Yemen, and Somalia, id. at 3-4,
though Somalia was later removed from its list. See S. REP. No. 95-908, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 95-908]. Depending
on one's definition, other governments can be said to support terrorist activities
at least occasionally. See Murphy, supra, at 563. The question of definition
may become a major issue under the Reagan Administration. See note 813 infra and accompanying text.
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early as 1972, following the terrorist attacks at the Munich
Olympics,145 the Senate had adopted a nonbinding resolution
that favored "the suspension of United States aid to and the
imposition of economic and other sanctions against any nation
which provides sanctuary for terrorists."1 46 Between 1972 and
1977, Congress took, or authorized the President to take, a
number of actions of the kind contemplated by the Senate resolution, principally:
-The 1974 Antihijacking Act,' 4 7 empowering the President
to suspend civil air service to nations aiding or harboring terrorists and to third countries that continue to fly to such na48
tionS;
-The 1976 Wolff Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act,'49 requiring the President to terminate economic and military assistance to any nation that aids or abets an international
terrorist by granting sanctuary, except when the President
finds that national security requires a continuation of aid;150
-A 1976 amendment to the Generalized System of Preferences legislation,15' providing that no nation that grants sanctuary to international terrorists may be designated a beneficiary
of preferences unless-like other limitations on beneficiary status-the restriction is waived by the President in the "national
52
economic interest;"'
-A 1977 statute supplementing the Arms Export Control
Act with the language of the Wolff Amendment, thereby requiring termination of arms sales to countries harboring terrorists,
again subject to presidential waiver in the interest of national
145. This event brought about a major increase in anti-terrorism activity in
the United States. See Browne, supra note 142, at 231.
146. S.Con. Res. 100, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 32,651 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. Con. Res. 100].
147. Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. I No. 93-366, tit. I, 88 Stat. 409 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (1976).
148. 49 U.S.C. § 1514 (1976). The United States may also revoke or limit the
rights of air carriers of nations that do not meet ICAO minimum standards for
airport security. Id. at § 1515. None of these sanctions has been implemented.
See Browne, supra note 142, at 237-38.
149. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 303, 90 Stat. 729 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1976)). See
also Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-148, § 509, 91 Stat. 1230 (1977); Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, § 607, 92 Stat. 1591 (1978).
150. 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (1976).
151. Tax Reform Act of 1976, International Trade Amendments, Pub. L. No.
94-455, tit. XVIII, § 1802, 90 Stat. 1962 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (7) (1976)).
152. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1976).
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security;153 and
-A 1977 provision directing the executive branch to use its
"voice and vote" in the several international financial institutions 5 4 to channel assistance away from countries whose governments provide refuge to international airline hijackers.
By 1977, then, Congress had injected the issue of assistance
to terrorists into many facets of American foreign policy, and it
has continued to do so in subsequent legislation resembling
that outlined above.155 Further measures have been extensively debated, but not yet enacted.15 6
Most of the measures adopted prior to 1977 were seen as ineffective because of limited American contact with terroristsupporting states.15 7 The United States has no air transport
agreement with either Libya or Iraq, for example, and neither
country receives American aid. 58 At best, most measures were
regarded as politically symbolic. 15 9 Export controls, however,
were thought to have some potential for influencing the subversive centers largely because they could prevent sales of commercial aircraft, a product that was sought in large numbers by
many nations known to assist terrorists,60 was believed to
153. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 18, 91
Stat. 614 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2753(f)(1) (Supp. 1I 1979)).
154. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 701(a), 91 Stat. 1067 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a) (Supp.
II 1979)). The wording of the legislation suggests that opposition to assisting
terrorists was seen as part of the broader human rights policy, described below.
See id. Aircraft hijacking is the only activity covered by the statute. Id. at
§ 701(a) (2).
155. Congress directed the United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to "work in opposition" to the extension of IMF
assistance to any government that "supports, encourages or harbors" terrorists
or fails to take "appropriate measures" to prevent acts of terrorism. Bretton
Woods Agreements Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 6, 92 Stat. 1051 (1978)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-11 (Supp. I1 1979)). Congress also permitted support of terrorism to be considered in decisions on Export-Import Bank financing. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1904, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B)
(Supp. 1I 1979)).
156. See Browne, supra note 142, at 239. As of 1980, major anti-terrorism
bills were before both houses. See generally S.333, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
H.R. 2441, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
157. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 144, at 566.
158. See InternationalTerrorism Hearings,supra note 144, at 8 (statement
of Sen. Heinz).
159. See Lillich & Carbonneau, The 1976 Terrorism Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 11 J. Irr'L L. & EcoN. 223, 226 (1977). Lillich and
Carbonneau believe that such legislative enactments contribute to the development of a norm of international law condemning terrorism. Id. at 235.
160. Libya, in particular, had ordered many aircraft from the United States.
See note 119 supra.
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have a logical connection with international terrorism,161 and
was supplied mainly by United States companies.162
Oddly, the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to
EAA '69 is virtually silent on the anti-terrorism policy.163 Nevertheless, the adopted policy authorized use of export controls
to combat a broader range of conduct than had any of the prior
legislation directed at subversive centers: all forms of assistance (not merely sanctuary) given to any persons involved (not
just active participants) in any form of terrorism (not simply
hijacking) .164
Like the 1974 policy on access to supplies, the anti-terrorism provision directed the President, before resorting to export
controls, to "make every reasonable effort" to discourage assistance to terrorists through "international cooperation and agreement."' 65 The President apparently determined almost
immediately, and probably correctly, that in some cases exhaustion of these remedies would be futile, for exports of aircraft and other controlled items to subversive centers were
restricted in succeeding years.166 In May 1980, every item on
161. See International Terrorism Hearings, supra note 144, at 9 (statement
of Sen. Heinz).
162. According to the former President of the Export-Import Bank, the
United States is the "dominant producer" of short-range aircraft and longrange, wide-bodied aircraft, although there is strong competition from Europe
for sales of mid-range, wide-bodied aircraft. Oversight Hearing on the ExportImport Bank: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, Investment and
Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979) (statement of John L. Moore).
163. The House retort simply mentions the policy and gives no reason for
its inclusion and no assessment of its probable effectiveness. See H.R. REP. No.
95-190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
362, 380. The conference report does not mention the policy at all. See H. CoNF.
REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 401.
164. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 115, 91
Stat. 285 (amending EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3, 83 Stat. 841) (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. I 1977)) (expired 1979) (current version at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. 1I 1979)).
165. Id.
166. The principal targets of anti-terrorism controls have been the three
subversive centers identified in 1977. Most prominent has been Libya. See S.
REP. No. 95-908, 95th Cong., 2d S.ess. 23 (1978); An Act to Combat International
Terrorism: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978) (statement of Cyrus Vance); Ibrahim, supra note 119,
at 25, col. 3. The others have been Iraq and South Yemen. See Senate EAA
HearingsPart III, supra note 116, at 41 (statement of Frank Weil). Since 1980
anti-terrorism controls also have applied to Syria. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980)
(to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 385.4).
Commerce has provided little information about the items subject to control under the anti-terrorism policy, using such phrases as "equipment particu-
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the CCL already controlled for national security purposes for
export to Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, or Syria 167 was made subject to concurrent foreign policy controls for export (in transactions of $7 million or more) to military purchasers in those
countries.168 Thus, the State Department now has express authority to review most substantial exports of dual-use items to
69
subversive centers under the anti-terrorism policy.1
larly useful in abetting terrorism." Senate EAA HearingsPart III, supra note
116, at 41 (statement of Frank Weil). It is clear, though, that the controls have
consisted primarily of restrictions on licenses for items already controlled for
national security purposes, since extensive validated license controls were not
imposed under the policy. As of mid-1979, only four ECCN entries on the CCL
specifically required validated licenses for exports to the known terrorist-supporting states; in some cases these requirements also applied to other Middle
East nations and were probably motivated in part by the regional stability policy. See note 118 supra. When foreign policy export controls were extended
beyond 1979, see note 778 infra, only two groups of items were said to be under
validated license control for anti-terrorism purposes: crime detection equipment, which was already subject to control under the human rights policy, see
text accompanying note 200 infra; and certain aircraft, some of which were
multilaterally controlled to all destinations. A statement of licensing policy applicable to these items was adopted at the same time, but it merely referred to
the anti-terrorism policy in § 3 of EAA '79. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980) (to be
codified in 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)).
167. This includes most items on the CCL, because most national security
controls apply to exports to all destinations.
168. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,956 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)). The
new controls were prompted by a notification requirement in EAA '79. See note
169 infra.
169. In fact, the Commerce and State Departments have for years reviewed
exports of items controlled for national security reasons under the anti-terrorism policy as well. The Oshkosh Truck case and the denials of licenses for aircraft exports to Libya, see note 119 supra, were explicitly linked to the antiterrorism policy as well as to considerations of regional stability. See Ibrahim,
supra note 119, at 25, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1978, at 3, col. 2. No statement
of licensing policy applicable to the range of items on the CCL has been included in the Regulations, however. Regional stability and anti-terrorism controls frequently seem almost interchangeable, in large part because both have
focused on the Middle East, where the support of Libya and others for extreme
elements in the Palestine Liberation Organization involves them in a major regional conflict. See S. REP. No. 95-908, supra note 144, at 18-20.
EAA '79 requires the Secretaries of State and Commerce to notify certain
committees of Congress before approving any license for the export of goods or
technology valued at over $7 niillion, when the purchasing country has been determined by the State Department to have repeatedly provided support for acts
of terrorism and when the goods or information to be exported would make a
significant contribution to its military (including logistical) capability or would
enhance its ability to support international terrorism. EAA '79, § 6(i), 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405(i) (Supp. 1I 1979). This provision reflects the continuing interrelationship between the anti-terrorism and regional stability policies. Recently,
proposed exports of aircraft and marine engines to Iraq, favored by the Carter
Administration but strongly opposed by some members of Congress, led to controversy over compliance with the new notification provision. See U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) No. 309, at A-1 to A-2 (May 27, 1980); id. No. 313, at A-1, A-3 to
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4. The Human Rights Policy
More important to the expansion of foreign policy export
controls than either of the policies added to EAA '69 was the
emergence of concern for the promotion of "internationally recognized human rights" as an integral part of American foreign
policy17 0-a development never explicitly incorporated in the
Act. Although this Article will attempt neither to discuss the
many difficult and divisive issues raised by the American
human rights policy' 7 ' nor to render a complete history of the
policy, an outline of the major developments is essential.
Intense American involvement with international human
rights can be said to date from 1973,172 when a House subcommittee chaired by Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota
initiated hearings that produced extensive evidence of torture 7 3 and other "rampant violations of human rights" around
the world. 7 4 The subcommittee concluded that American foreign policy had accorded little importance to opposing such
conduct and strongly criticized the Nixon Administration for
embracing governments that had "unabashedly violate[d] alA-5 (June 24, 1980). The Senate voted to revoke the license for marine engines
granted by Commerce. See note 855 infra.
170. On the development of the human rights policy, see generally Human
Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Review of the Administration'sRecord, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsof the House Comm.
on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Human Rights Hearings] (especially CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUE
BRIEF No. 77056, reprinted in id., at 47-73); Bite, U.S. Human Rights Policy, in
THE U.S. ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY: MAJOR ISSUES FOR
THE 96TH CONGRESS 192 (M. Lowenthel & R. Kaufman eds. 1979); Vogelgesang,
What Price Principle? U.S. Policy on Human Rights, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 819
(1978); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COmp. L. 231 (1977).
171. Among the issues often discussed are the following: What are internationally recognized human rights? What order of priority should American policy assign to various rights? What is the morality of attempting to change the
social practices of other cultures? Do efforts to do so violate international law?
These issues are discussed at length elsewhere. In addition to sources cited in
note 170 supra, see generally R. LULICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (1979); Symposium-Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 517 (1979); Symposium-Human Rights, The National Interes
And U.S. Foreign Policy: Some PreliminaryObservations, 14 VA. J. INT'L L 597
(1974).
172. Human Rights Hearings, supra note 170, at 55. The United States has
of course had a history of involvement in issues that would now be considered
part of a "human rights" policy. See Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 232-34.
173. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE (1973).
174. SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP 1 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter

cited as FRASER

REPORT].

See Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 238-39.
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most every human rights guarantee pronounced by the overall
world community.' 75 The subcommittee's general recommendation was clear from the title of its 1974 report: Human Rights
in the World Community: A Callfor U.S. Leadership.176 The
subcommittee also issued numerous specific recommendations
177
for action by both the executive branch and Congress.
While the Republican Administration acted on some of
these recommendations,1 78 the subcommittee's most significant
product was a stream of legislation injecting the human rights
issue into many facets of foreign policy. 7 9 The bulk of these
enactments have affected American foreign assistance programs, a policy area in which Congress is particularly active
due to the need for frequent appropriations. Initially, a "sense
of Congress" provision urged the President to deny economic
and military aid to foreign governments that practiced "internment or imprisonment of [their] citizens for political purposes."180 Building on this modest foundation, subsequent
legislation now requires the executive branch to consider the
human rights practices of recipient countries in decisions on
virtually all forms of foreign assistance-including security
assistance,18' economic assistance,8 2 concessional food
175. FRASER REPORT, supra note 174, at 9; see Weissbrodt, upra note 170, at
239-40.
176. See generally FRASER REPORT, supra note 174. The work of the subcommittee, by initiating widespread official involvement in international human
rights, has been regarded as "herald[ing] a new era in United States foreign
policy." Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 239; cf. Buergenthal, International
Human Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities,14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 611 (1974) (Fraser Committee provided long overdue opportunity to review American foreign
policy in regard to human rights).
177. See Bite, supra note 170, at 205; Salzberg & Young, The Parliamentary
Role in Implementing InternationalHuman Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 Tax.
INT'L L.J. 251, 253-56 (1977).
178. For example, the State Department appointed a Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs and other officers with human rights responsibilities.
Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 55-56; Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at
240 n.35. Congress mandated this position in 1976, International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-329, § 301(b), 90
Stat. 729, and later required the Coordinator to be placed at the Assistant Secretary level, Foreign Relations Authorization Act: Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-105, § 109(a) (1), 91 Stat. 844 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2384(f) (Supp. MI1979)).
179. See Salzberg & Young, supra note 177, at 269-78; Weissbrodt, supra
note 170, at 241-78.
180. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 714
(1973).
181. In 1974, Congress added § 502B to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976)) (amended 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979). Section
502B was originally a "sense of Congress" provision stating that the President
should, except in "extraordinary circumstances," reduce or terminate security
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sales,183 and American aid through international financial institutions.184 Such considerations also must be taken into account
assistance to any government "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights." See Weissbrodt, supra
note 170, at 257 n.94. Without actually defining the term, § 502B gave examples
of conduct constituting a "gross violation," including "torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or
other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty and the security of the person."
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976 & Supp. I1 1980) (amended 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979). Section
502B was made binding on the President in 1976, and the exception for "extraordinary circumstances" was repealed. International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat. 729
(amending 22 U.S.C. § 2304).
In 1978, § 502B was amended to prohibit security assistance to the police,
domestic intelligence, or other law enforcement forces of a government which
is a violator of human rights within the meaning of the section, except upon
presidential certification of extraordinary circumstances. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 6(d) (1), 92 Stat. 730 (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2) (Supp. 1I 1979)).
A somewhat different thrust can be seen in two 1979 amendments to
§ 502B, which (1) permit the President to terminate a prohibition on security
assistance, in the national interest, in light of significant improvements in
human rights practices, International Development Cooperation Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-53, § 511, 93 Stat. 359 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(e) (Supp.
II 1979)); and (2) permit him to take such improvements into account in allocating security assistance and financing for arms purchases. International Security Assistance Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-92, § 4, 93 Stat. 701 (1979) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(f) (Supp. I 1979)).
182. In enacting the International Development and Food Assistance Act of
1975, Congress added § 116 to the Foreign Assistance Act. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1976)). Section 116, always a binding enactment,
prohibits the granting of economic aid to any country which falls within the
definition of a violator of human rights included in § 502B. See note 181 supra.
Aid may, however, be provided to a violator of human rights if it will "directly
benefit the needy people" in the recipient country. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1976).
The foreign affairs committee of either house of Congress can require the
Agency for International Development to justify any continuation of aid under
the exception. Id. Either committee, or either house, may. initiate a procedure
by which Congress can overrule a grant of aid by concurrent resolution. Id. at
§ 2367 (1976).
183. The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-88, § 203, 91 Stat. 533 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. I 1979)), prohibits the sale of agricultural products under Title I of P.L 480 to any government engaging in a consistent pattern of human rights violations, except where
the sale would benefit needy people.
184. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 701, 91 Stat. 1067 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d (Supp.
I 1979)), directs American representatives to the international financial institutions to "advance the cause of human rights" through the use of the "voice
and vote" of the United States, and specifically, to channel aid to countries
which do not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and to oppose aid to countries which do, unless
the aid would serve the "basic human needs" of their citizens. As passed, the
Act is a compromise between the original House bill, which required a negative
vote on loans to human rights violators, and the Administration's desire for
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in the operations of both the Export-Import Bank85 and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.186 Congress has in
addition restricted aid to specific nations as a result of their
human rights practices187 and has required the executive
branch to prepare extensive public reports on human rights
conditions around the world. 88
In a 1976 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Conflexibility. See Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 58-59; see also Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-148, § 507, 91 Stat. 1230 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d-1 (Supp. II 1979)) (employing similar language).
The United States representatives to the financial institutions are also directed to seek adoption of charter amendments that would establish human
rights criteria for evaluating applications for assistance. Foreign Assistance
and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, § 611, 92
Stat. 1591 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d note (Supp. I 1979)). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
(1979), reprinted in Foreign Assistance and Related ProgramsAppropriations
for 1980-Part2-InternationalFinancialInstitutions: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Foreign Operationsand Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 19-20, 173-85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
InternationalFinancialInstitutions Hearings]. The agencies involved are the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank); the
International Development Association; the International Finance Corporation;
the Inter-American Development Bank- the African Development Fund; and
the Asian Development Bank
A less rigorous human rights statute applies to the International Monetary
Fund: the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, must merely report yearly on the status of international human rights
within each nation which draws on the IMF Supplementary Financing Facility
(Witteveen Facility). Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L. No.
95-435, § 4, 92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-10 (Supp. I 1979)).
185. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978, Pub. L No. 95-630, § 1904, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B)
(Supp. I 1979)).
186. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-268, § 8, 92 Stat. 213 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2199(e) (Supp.
I 1979)), applies the standards of § 116, subject to a national security exception, to activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which provides financing and insurance for investments in developing nations.
187. For example, the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-148, tit. I, §§ 107, 114, 91 Stat. 1230 (1977) (expired 1978),
prohibited aid to Uganda, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, and Mozambique.
Other sections of the Act prohibited or limited certain forms of military aid to
Ethiopia, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines. Id. at tit. V, §§ 503A-503B (1977) (expired 1978).
188. Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1976)
(amended 1979), required annual reports on human rights in nations receiving
economic aid. The 1976 revision of § 502B of the Act required both annual and
special reports on nations receiving military aid. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976)
(amended 1978, 1979). In 1979, § 116(d) was amended to require State Department reports on human rights in all nations which are members of the United
Nations, whether or not they receive any aid. International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-53, § 504(a), 93 Stat. 359 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2151n(d)).
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gress explicitly established the promotion of international
human rights as an essential component of United States foreign policy. Congress declared that, in accordance with American obligations under the United Nations Charter and in
keeping with American traditions and constitutional heritage,
"a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to
promote the increased observance of internationally recognized
human rights by all countries." 8 9 This declaration may have
been the most significant provision in the human rights legislation of the 1970s in that it transcended individual assistance
programs to provide direction for the whole of American foreign policy.190 It was without doubt the most significant in
terms of its effect on export controls. By requiring that the promotion of human rights be considered a major part of "the foreign policy of the United States," perhaps even one of its
"international responsibilities,"191 the 1976 declaration had the
same effect as an amendment of EAA '69 itself-it expanded
the purposes for which foreign policy export controls were explicitly authorized.
Much of the impetus for the steady enactment of human
rights legislation prior to 1977 came from the perceived unwillingness of the Republican Administration to pursue human
rights issues. 192 The Carter Administration, however, had a
markedly different attitude toward human rights. President
Carter had campaigned on his intention to include human
rights considerations in foreign policy193 and came into office
with a "clear commitment" to an active international human
rights policy. 1 94 In his inaugural address195 and his March 1977
189. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat. 729 (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2304) (amended 1978,
1979).
190. Foreign Assistance and Related ProgramsAppropriations, Fiscal Year
1980-Part I. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 728 (1979) (statement of
Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs); see Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 251.
191. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(2) (B), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(2) (B) (1976)) (expired 1979). EAA '79 replaced the word "responsibilities" with "obligations." EAA '79, § 3(2) (B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (B)
(Supp. 11 1979).
192. See Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 241 n.39, 244 n.49.
193. See id. at 231 nn. 1 & 2.
194. Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 57.
195. Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 87, 88 (1977).
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speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 196 President
Carter reiterated his Administration's commitment to international human rights as a central tenet of American foreign policy. State Department officials likewise stated their dedication
to the promotion of human rights.197 In 1977 and 1978, diplomatic initiatives and other actions aimed at promoting human
rights became common.1 98 The actions encompassed not only
important symbolic gestures, 99 but more tangible measures as
well; limitations on aid, arms transfers, and concessional food
sales, among other measures, were imposed against nations
that had violated human rights.200
In such an atmosphere, it was perhaps inevitable that export controls would be identified as another potential policy
tool, and the human rights policy became the basis for some of
the most controversial export controls of the 1970s. The specific
controls described below illustrate the Carter Administration's
use of export controls in pursuit of international human rights.
B.

FOREIGN POLIcY EXPORT CONTROLS,

1977-1978

A number of widely publicized and controversial foreign
policy export controls, involving validated license requirements, restrictive licensing policies, and denials of individual
licenses, were imposed during 1977 and 1978.201 The controls
described in this section were based largely on the human
196.

The President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP.

OF PRES. Doc. 397, 401 (1977).
197. See, e.g., Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 2-7 (statement of
Mark L. Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights);
Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & Coip. L, 223 (1977)
(Law Day Address).
198. See Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 4-5; Vogelgesang, supra
note 170, at 822-26; Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 278-79.
199. See Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 57.
200. See id., at 4-5, 8-9, 10-11, 39, 57-58; InternationalFinancialInstitutions
Hearings,supra note 184, at 180-83; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES IN COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S. AD: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE
SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON HUMAuN RIGHTS
PRACTICES]; Vogelgesang, supra note 170, at 826.
For a description of the institutional structures that weigh human rights
considerations in administrative decisionmaking, see Note, United States
Human Rights Policy: Effect on Exports, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 307-11
(1979).
201. The descriptions of validated license controls and licensing policies are
based primarily on official documents, regulations, and other statements of the
relevant executive departments or Congress. Descriptions of license denialsand to some extent the other controls as well-are of necessity based on testimony in congressional hearings and on press reports.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

rights policy embraced by the Carter Administration. It was
these actions to which Congress was reacting when it adopted
the foreign policy sections of EAA '79; they thus form part of
the legislative history of EAA '79 and should be understood
before considering the legislation itself. These incidents can
also serve to illustrate the more general discussion of export
controls as a tool of foreign policy in Part IV. With the illustrative function in mind, this section of the Article first examines
the 1978 embargo on trade with Uganda, imposed not by the
President, but by Congress.
1.

Uganda: A Foreign Policy Embargo

The bizarre history of the reign of Idi Amin in Uganda is
well known. From his rise to power in 1971, Amin subjected the
country to a "reign of terror"20 2 perhaps unique in recent history,2 03 involving an unfathomable series of human rights viola204
tions.
Between 1971 and 1978 the United States took a number of
steps to "distance" itself from Amin: 205 the American Embassy
in Uganda was closed,2 06 American officials vigorously spoke
out against Amin, 207 economic and military assistance was terminated,208 the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private
202. Uganda: The Human Rights Situation: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1978) (statement of Michael Posner) [hereinafter cited
as UgandaHearings]. Mr. Posner's statement summarizes the major incidents
of human rights violations from 1971 through June 1978.
203. Ullman, Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States Versus
Idi Amin, 56 FOREIGN AFF.528, 530 (1978). Only the recent events in Cambodia
seem to approach the devastation of those in Uganda, and in Congress the two
situations were often compared. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 610(a), 92 Stat. 963, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2151
note (Supp. II 1979)) (congressional finding that governmental practices in the
two countries involve "such systematic and extensive brutality" as to require
condemnation). The United States was believed to have more potential influence over Uganda, however. See note 221 infra.
204. See Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 11-15 (statement of Michael
Posner); id. at 96-98 (statement of Thomas Melady); see generally AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA (1978); T. MELADY & M. MELADY, IDI
AMIN DADA: HILER N AFRICA (1977); T. MELADY & M. MELADY, UGANDA: THE
AsIAN EXILES (1976). Thomas Melady was formerly United States Ambassador
to Uganda.
205. See Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 126-28 (statement of William
Harrop). See Note, Recent Developmen InternationalTrade: Uganda Trade
Embargo, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 206, 208 (1979).
206. Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Harrop).
207. Id. at 126.
208. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L

1981]

EXPORT CONTROLS

Investment Corporation ceased financing Ugandan transactions,209 imports from Uganda were excluded from the Generalized System of Preferences, 210 and American representatives
to international lending institutions voted against loans to
21
Uganda. 1
There were few direct controls on trade with Uganda prior
to 1978, however, despite Congressional pressure. 212 Exports of
arms were prohibited, and commercial exports of items already
subject to validated license requirements were reviewed by the
State Department. 13 The Department recommended that
licenses for exports that could contribute directly to human
rights violations be denied,2 '4 but exports that would not assist
the Ugandan government or military were approved. 215 State
Department review was limited, furthermore, to exports of
those high technology items controlled for national security
purposes and a few other products controlled under the human
rights policy. 21 6 All other commercial exports, and all imports,
No. 95-424, § 602, 92 Stat. 937 (amended 1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note
(Supp. III 1979)).
209. Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Har-

rop).
210. Exec. Order No. 11,888, 3A C.F.R. 207 (1975).
211. Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Harrop).
212. See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 612, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprintedin U.S.Uganda Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Int'l Organizations and Int'l Economic Policy & Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 305-06 (1978) ("strongly condemns" human rights violations
and "urges" President to implement measures "such as an embargo on trade");
UgandaHearings,supra note 202, at 5 (statement of Sen. Hatfield); N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1978, at 12, col. 4 (letter from 42 congressmen and 8 senators to the
President).
213. Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Harrop) -id. at 106-07 (statement of Rauer Meyer).
214. Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Harrop).
215. See id. at 106-08 (statement of Rauer Meyer).
216. In 1978, Uganda was in Country Group V, 15 C.F.R. Part 370, Supp. No. 1
(1978). The only exports which ordinarily require a validated license for export
to destinations in Group V are those unilaterally or multilaterally controlled to
all destinations. See The Commodity Control List, supra note 70. As of June
1978, only dual-use national security items, nuclear power items, and three categories of items requiring validated licenses so their export could be scrutinized under the human rights policy were so controlled. The human rights
controls applied to certain nonmilitary aircraft, ECCN 4460B, certain crime control and detection equipment, see notes 266-90 infra and accompanying text,
and certain listening, devices, ECCN 4517B. See Senate EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 106, at 65 (statement of Commerce Department); id. at 219-22
(statement of State Department). All were unilaterally controlled to all or
most destinations in Group V, including Uganda. By way of contrast, several
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continued unimpeded.217
The Administration opposed additional trade controls, arguing that restrictions on exports would have little effect because export volume to Uganda was small and the United
States was not the sole supplier of any significant Ugandan import. 218 Even though the United States imported one-third of
Uganda's coffee exports (its major source of foreign exchange),
the Administration contended that restrictions on imports
would have little effect, reasoning that high coffee prices would
induce other nations to purchase any part of the Ugandan crop
not bought by the United States.2 1 9 Other coffee importing nations had shown no interest in cooperating with an American
ban on imports.220
In Congress, however, it was widely believed that the magnitude of American coffee imports gave the United States substantial influence over Uganda, perhaps enough to oust
Amin.221 Others argued that, whatever the economic or political effect, an American embargo would be symbolically important. 22 2

In

October

1978,

Congress

swept

aside

the

Administration's arguments and imposed a mandatory ban on
both imports from and exports to Uganda. 223 This was the first
commodities required validated licenses for export to other countries in Group
V, notably South Africa and certain Middle East nations. Id.
217. Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 127 (statement of William Harrop).
218. Id. at 106, 128 (statement of Rauer Meyer).
219. Id. at 128 (statement of William Harrop). United States imports from
Uganda in 1977 totalled $248 million, virtually all of which consisted of coffee.
Id. at 105 (statement of Rauer Meyer). See id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Church);
id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
220. Id. at 128 (statement of William Harrop).
221. Senator Hatfield, for example, argued that while an import embargo
could not "guarantee the overthrow of Amin," it could be imposed "with expectations of success" since other importing nations might go along. Id. at 6-7
(statement of Sen. Hatfield). Representative Pease felt that coffee imports
gave the United States "real power to affect events in Uganda.... Whether
Amin would fall from power if he lost his coffee revenue from the West is an
open question; but the impact upon him would be very severe." Id. at 32-33, 35
(statement of Rep. Pease).
222. Id. at 17-18 (statement of Michael Posner).
223. Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L No. 95-435, § 5(c)(d), 92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (§ 5(c) repealed 1979; § 5(d) codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403 (Supp. I1 1979) (expired 1979)). The embargo provision was a rider to
the statute, which authorized United States participation in the IMF Supplemental Financing Facility. A related provision "directed" the President to support international actions, including economic restrictions, against Uganda.
Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 5(e), 92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (repealed 1979).' Prior legislation,
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L No. 95-426, tit. IV,
§ 610(b)-(d), 92 Stat. 63 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note (Supp. I 1979)) (expired 1979), had "urged" the President to support international action to bring
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unilateral American embargo that did not have its origin in
armed hostilities or similar circumstances. 224 It was based instead on congressional findings that the government of Uganda
had committed "genocide" and that the unique economic relationship of the United States justified "an exceptional response."225
The embargo statute prohibited the importation of "any article grown, produced or manufactured in Uganda" until the
President certified to Congress that the government of Uganda
was no longer "committing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights."226 The import ban was to be administered by the Treasury Department, in consultation with the
State Department,227 but regulations were never promulgated
because American companies had already ceased buying
Ugandan coffee under the pressure of congressional and other
public criticism. 22 8
The ban on exports to Uganda, enacted as an amendment
to EAA '69,229 was similar in form to the import prohibition, but
with two significant differences. First, it permitted the continued exportation of food products, a major part of American exports to Uganda. Second, it prohibited the export of all other
items "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." 230 Under the American approach to national jurisdiction, and in line with a 1977 amendment to EAA '69,231 this language made the export prohibition applicable to foreign firms
controlled by Americans, a controversial extension of American
about change in Uganda and required the Secretary of State to report the steps
taken. It had also expressed the "sense of the Congress" that the President
should prohibit exports of military, paramilitary, and police equipment to
Uganda and should propose a United Nations arms embargo, among other
measures.
224. See Note, supra note 205, at 209.
225. Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L No. 95-435, § 5(a),
92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (repealed 1979).
226. Id. at § 5(c) (repealed 1979). The statute did not refer to "internationally recognized" human rights as most similar statutes do.
227. Exec. Order No. 12,117, 3 C.F.R. 362 (1979), reprintedin 22 U.S.C. § 2151
note, at 532 (Supp. 11 1979).
228. See Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 129 (statement of William
Harrop).
229. Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L No. 95-435, § 5(d),
92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (expired 1979).
230. Id.
231. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L No. 95-223, § 301(a), (b) (1) (expired 1979);
see note 13 supra.
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law beyond United States territory. 232 The import ban, in contrast, prohibited only imports into the United States, its territories, and possessions, even though the potential for diversion of
Ugandan coffee purchases to foreign subsidiaries of American
233
companies had been acknowledged by Congress.
The Commerce Department hastily adopted a regulation
that simply repeated the terms of the statute, superseding any
inconsistent provisions in the Regulations. 234 Detailed permanent regulations-including controversial provisions to implement the embargo as to controlled foreign firms-were
proposed in December 1978,235 but events overtook the American embargo before the regulations could be finally adopted. In
April 1979, a force of Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan exiles
captured Kampala, driving Amin from the capital and establishing a provisional government. 23 6 Welcoming Amin's overthrow, the United States moved to establish normal relations
with the new government. 237 President Carter certified an end
to human rights violations (fulfilling the condition imposed by
the statute),238 the temporary export control regulation was deleted, and the proposed regulations were withdrawn. 23 9 In Sep240
tember 1979, Congress repealed the embargo legislation.
2. The South African Military and Police: An Embargo of
Disfavored Institutions
Because of fts racial policies, South Africa has been the target of various trade restrictions imposed by the United Nations,
the United States, and other nations.24 1 The American restric232. See text accompanying notes 618-55 infra.
233. See, e.g., Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 64-65 (statement of Sen.
Church).
234. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,304 (1978) (repealed 1979). The regulation was made effective retroactively to the date of the statute.
235. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,571 (1978).
236. See N.Y. Times, April 12, 1979, at A-1, col. 1.
237. Id. at A-16, col. 3.
238. Memorandum of May 15, 1979, 3 C.F.R. 485 (1980).
239. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,010 (1979).
240. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978-Uganda,
Pub. L. No. 96-67, 93 Stat. 415 (1979) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2161, with regard to
aid to Uganda, and repealing 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(m)).
241. Most notable is the embargo on arms sales mandated by the Security
Council. See note 2 supra. While the arms embargo is primarily administered
by the State Department, the Commerce Department controls exports of armsrelated commodities within its jurisdiction. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1) (1980);
Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, United States Restrictions on Exports to South
Africa, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 581, 587 n.40, 589 n.53 (1979). The commodities so controlled are listed in 15 C.F.R. Part 379, Supp. No. 2 (1980). Related technical
data are also controlled. See id. at § 385.4(a) (3), 379.4(e) (1979). Licensing pol-
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tion with the greatest effect on commercial exports dates from
1978, when the Carter Administration embargoed all exports
and reexports of United States-origin goods and unpublished
technical information to or for the use of any "military and police entities" in South Africa. 242 Although the Administration
asserted that its action was intended both to strengthen American implementation of a United Nations arms embargo and to
further United States foreign policy regarding human rights,243
the President had authority to impose the controls only under
the foreign policy clause of EAA '69, because the relevant Security Council resolutions related only to exports of arms and
244
related equipment.
The South African embargo extends to "any commodity,
including commodities that may be exported to any destination
in Country Group V under a general license." 2 45 As in the case

of Uganda, 2 46 many sensitive exports already required validated licenses for export to South Africa in 1978.247 A restricicy relating to exports of these arms-related items was made more restrictive in
1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 7311 (1978); see Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra at 58285, 589.
The United States also controls the export of certain nonmilitary aircraft,
helicopters, and related equipment to any consignee in South Africa. See 45
Fed. Reg. 1599-1601 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 385.4, 399.4). Aircraft
exports are only licensed on receipt of adequate written assurances of exclusively civilian use. 45 Fed. Reg. 1599 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)
(8)); House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 132 (statement of William
Root).
The validated license requirements applicable to certain advanced computers (ECCN 1565A), already controlled for national security purposes, were
extended in 1980 (with certain exceptions) to exports to certain South African
government agencies on foreign policy grounds. 45 Fed. Reg. 1599 (1980) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (9)). Early in 1981, a validated license was required for the export of any computer, regardless of performance level, to such
governmental agencies. 46 Fed. Reg. 1258 (1981).
242. 43 Fed. Reg. 7311 (1978) (amending 15 C.F.R. Parts 371, 373, 379, 385, 386
& 399). The controls also apply to exports to Namibia. Id. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,450
(1978) (adding 15 C.F.R. Part 385, Supp. No. 2), designated the following controlled entities: The Armaments Development and Production Corporation
(ARMSCOR), the Department of Prisons, the Bureau of State Security, and the
South African Railways Police Force; the National Institute of Defense Research, in cases where the exported goods or information will be used in a research project for the military or police; and certain other law enforcement
officials, not associated with the specified agencies, who perform duties similar
to those of police in the United States.
243. 43 Fed. Reg. 7,311 (1978); House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at
145-46 (statement of William Root).
244. See notes 2, 241 supra.
245. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (2) (1980) (emphasis in original).
246. See text accompanying notes 212-16 supra.
247. These items included equipment related to arms, certain aircraft, crime
detection devices, and the dual-use items controlled to all destinations.
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tive licensing policy had been in effect for arms-related
items;248 licensing policy for dual-use items had fluctuated with
changes in administration.24 9 The embargo, however, meant
that no validated licenses would be issued for exports of any of
these products to the South African military and police. 250 The
embargo regulations also went much further: a validated license became necessary to export any product to the designated entities, even ordinary vehicles, office equipment, or
other commercial items, and no such license would be granted.
The embargo was intended to deny the controlled organizations
25
access to all United States-origin goods and information. 1
The embargo regulations prohibit not only exports and
reexports to military and police consignees, but also exports
and reexports to civilian South African 252 and third-country
buyers when the exporter or reexporter knows (or has reason
to know) that the goods are to be sold to or used by or for the
regulated entities, or used to service equipment used by or for
them.253 Moreover, the regulations prohibit foreign purchasers
from using American-origin parts or components to manufacture products abroad when the purchasers know (or have reason to know) that their products will similarly reach the
254
controlled entities.
248. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1) (1978).
249. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 583-85.
250. See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 281-82 (statement of Charles W. Stewart); U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the
Export AdministrationAct: Hearings on S. 737 and S. 999 Before the Subcomm.
on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs-PartII, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 262-67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate
EAA HearingsPartII] (statement of Charles W. Stewart). The requirement of
a validated license flows from 15 C.F.R. § 371.2(c) (10) (1980). The embargo as a
matter of licensing policy is stated in id. at § 385.4(a) (2)-(3).
251. 43 Fed. Reg. 7311 (1978).
252. A special destination control statement is required on bills of lading
and commercial invoices used in exports to civilian consignees in South Africa,
giving notice that the goods may not be resold or otherwise delivered to or for
the use of the designated entities. 15 C.F.R. § 386.6(a) (2), (d) (3) (1980).
253. Id. at §§ 385.4(a) (2), 371.2(c) (11), 373.1(a). Foreign consignees and distributors approved for participation in special licensing procedures must certify
that goods originating in the United States will not be made available to the
designated entities. Id. at § 373.1 (a) (2).
The fact that the controls apply to American exports to third-country purchasers and civilian South African purchasers only when the American exporter has reason to know that the goods are to be made available to the
military or police is criticized as a "key weakness" of the controls in Mehlman,
Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 593, 595. The authors' suggested remedies for this and other weaknesses include expansion of the controls, the addition of reporting requirements for United States exporters, and stronger
penalties for violations. Id. at 597-602.
254. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (4) (1980).
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The embargo applies just as expansively to the export and
reexport of all nonpublic technical data under the licensing jurisdiction of Commerce, 25 5 and extends to transactions in
which the "direct product" of the data (which might be an item
of equipment, a process, or a service), or any "subsequent
product of the direct product" (such as an item manufactured
or produced by the equipment or process that is the direct
product of the data), is to be delivered to, or used by or for, any
2 56
of the designated South African organizations.
The technical data regulations of the South African embargo appear to extend further than the realistic enforcement
capabilities of the United States, especially in the area of reexports. The regulations, for example, purport to prohibit a
French firm licensed to use an American company's technology
from sub-licensing that technology to a private South African
corporation when the French firm "knows or has reason to
know" that equipment to be constructed with the aid of the
technology will be used in the manfuacture of an item that will
be used to service equipment owned by one of the designated
South African police organizations. Assuming that the foreign
parties involved would not advertise their agreement to American authorities, it would be very difficult to ascertain, let alone
prove, the existence of the sub-license, the use made of the
products of the data in South Africa, or the knowledge of the
255. Id. at § 385.4(a) (3). The only information not subject to the embargo is
that eligible for export under General License GTDA. Id. at §§ 385.4(a) (3),
379.3. When nonpublic technical data qualifies for export to civilian purchasers
under General License GTDR (that is, when the United States exporter has no
reason to know of any intended retransfer to the designated South African entities, id. at §§ 385.4(a) (3), 379.4(e)) the regulations require that the buyers be
notified in writing that the direct product of the data-though apparently not
the data itself; and in this case apparently not the subsequent products of the
direct product-may not be made available in any direct or indirect way to the
designated entities. Id. Exports to third countries appear to be covered only
by a general provision in the regulations making it impermissible to export
technical data from the United States to any destination when the exporter
knows that the data is to be reexported, directly or indirectly, to any other destination without specific permission of OEA. Id. at §§ 379.8(a) (2), 371.2(c) (5).
An exception from this prohibition is available when the contemplated reexport is to a destination to which the data could have been exported directly
under General License GTDA or GTDR. Id. at § 379.8(b) (1). This exception
would not be available if the contemplated reexport were of nonpublic data and
were destined to or for the use of the South African military or police, since
General License GTDR would not be available for such a direct export. Id. at
§ 379.4(e).
256. Id. at §§ 385.4(a) (3), 379.4(e). This extension of the restrictions on
technical data exports appears not to apply to exports to third countries, however. See id. at § 379.8(a) (2).
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French firm.257
Even more severe enforcement problems arise if, in the
same transaction, the original licensee of the American technology is a private South African company.25 8 Information on internal transfers may be more difficult to obtain than
information on reexports, 25 9 and a prohibition on internal retransfers might run afoul of South African law. 260 The only
available penalty, if a violation could be established, would
seem to be disqualification of the South African licensee from
26
participation in subsequent American export transactions. 1
Moreover, the South African government could commandeer
needed information or equipment from the civilian sector in an
2 62
emergency.
Many of the problems of coverage and enforcement in the
South African embargo stem from the "middle road" policy of
embargoing only particularly disfavored institutions. 263 This
and certain other South African trade restrictions 264 are the
only American export controls that formally apply only to par257. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 593-96.
258. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 250, at 264 (statement of
Charles W. Stewart). The embargo regulations appear to contain no provision
prohibiting an internal transfer, although exporters of technical data to South
African buyers must notify their buyers that the products of the data may not
be made available to the military or police. See note 255 supra. The applicable
regulations speak only of "exports" and "reexports"; a transfer of technical
data or its products from a civilian buyer to a police agency within South Africa
is clearly not a United States export and does not fall within the definition of a
reexport either, 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1980). But see Mehlman, Milch & ToumanoL
supra note 241, at 593 n.63, 596.
259. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 593-97; House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 126 (statement of Stanley Marcuss). Information on diversion is obtained primarily from foreign service officials and intelligence agencies. Id.
260. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 596 n.76.
261. See id. at 593 n.63. This penalty has not been applied on a regular basis.

262. See id. at 593 n.64; Senate EAA Hearings Part II, supra note 250, at 91
(statement of W. Robert McLellan).
263. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 597. Short of moving to a total embargo, the authors suggest ameliorating some of the enforcement problems by prohibiting exports to all South African purchasers of any
item which would be useful to the police and military in counterinsurgency operations; or by permitting such exports only when the exporter could establish
that the items "would never reach governmental forces," id. at 598, a showing
that seems impossible in light of the ability of such forces to commandeer civilian goods.
264. Aircraft, for example, can only be exported with written assurances
that they will not be used by military or paramilitary forces, and computer exports are controlled to particular South African government agencies. See note
241 supra.
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ticular institutions in a target nation. In practice, however,
other controls, particularly those under the anti-terrorism and
regional stability policies and the crime detection equipment
controls discussed below, also focus on exports to foreign military and police forces and share similar enforcement
265
problems.
3.

Crime Detection Equipment: Controls on the Instruments of
Disfavored Conduct

The Uganda and South Africa embargoes were products of
American attitudes toward particular countries and their governments. Controls on exports of crime detection equipment,
in contrast, have grown out of a more generalized American attitude toward particular conduct, wherever practiced: torture,
suppression of dissidents, and other violations of basic human
rights. 266
Validated license controls on crime detection equipment
were first imposed under EAA '69 in 1974.267 The items subject
to control have remained constant to the present day. In general terms, they include "any commodity particularly useful in
crime control and detection," 268 ranging from relatively simple
items, such as fingerprinting equipment, riot guns, bullet proof
vests, helmets and restraint devices, to sophisticated devices
such as infrared and ultra-violet photographic equipment, mobile crime science laboratories, voice print identification equipment, and lie detectors. 269 Initially, however, the validated
license requirement applied only to exports to Country Groups
265. For example, aircraft and other items controlled under the anti-terrorism and regional stability policies, see notes 116-19, 166, 169 supra, are by their
nature likely to be purchased by governmental agencies. The same is true for
crime detection devices. See text accompanying notes 266-90 infra. Most items
on the CCL are also closely scrutinized under the human rights policy when
exported to military and police consignees. See text accompanying notes 276,
340-42 infra.
266. Advocates of controls on such equipment refer to it as "citizen control
equipment" to make the point that it can be used to monitor and control dissidents, minorities, or ordinary citizens in the hands of a repressive regime. See
Senate EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 250, at 145, 157-58 (statement of Jerry
Goodman).
267. 39 Fed. Reg. 26,719 (1974) (codified in 15 C.F.R. § 376.14 (1975)).
268. 15 C.F.R. § 376.14(a) (1980).
269. Id. These examples in the Regulations are intended to supplement the
more specific listings of controlled items in the CCL, including items under
ECCNs 4597B, 5480B, 5597B, 5680B, 5998B and 5999B (1979). ECCN entries may
list specific controlled items in some detail, such as "leg irons, shackles, handcuffs, [and] thumbscrews." ECCN 5680B. In 1980, related nonpublic technical data was also placed under control. See 15 C.F.R. § 376.14(a) (1980), as
amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 1598 (1980).
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Q, W, and y,270 then including the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe,
and the People's Republic of China.271 Although the Commerce Department stated only that these controls were imposed because the affected exports "would be contrary to the
foreign policy interests of the United States,

'272

the timing of

the measure suggests that it was a response to the problems of
emigration and treatment of dissidents in the U.S.S.R., then
major issues in the United States.

273

Soon after the Carter Ad-

ministration came into office, validated license controls were
extended to all purchasers in South Africa.274
The regulations were expanded in 1978275 to require a vali-

dated license for exports of crime detection equipment to all
destinations except the member nations of NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The stated purpose of these expanded
controls was to allow the Commerce and State Departments 276
to review proposed exports and determine whether the equipment to be sold would be used in consonance with the Ameri277
can human rights policy.

Congress in 1978 wrote the existing controls into EAA
calling for particular scrutiny by the State Department of
proposed sales to police and internal security forces with
'69,278

270. 15 C.F.R. § 376.14(a) (1975) (current version at 15 C.F.R. § 376.14 (1980)).
All exports, including crime detection equipment, were of course embargoed to
the nations in Group Z and, at that time, Group S (Rhodesia). 15 C.F.R.
§§ 385.1, .3 (1975).
271. 15 C.F.R. Part 370, Supp. 1 (1974). The People's Republic of China now
constitutes Country Group P. 45 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1980).
272. 39 Fed. Reg. 26,719 (1974).
273. The major American response was the well-known Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. See generally Note, An Interim AnalysisT of the Effects of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example,
8 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 193 (1976).
274. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,991 (1977) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 376.14 (1978)). Namibia was also included in the controls. Id.
275. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,985-86 (1978) (codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.14, 385.2, .4, .5 &
Pt. 373, Supp. No. 1 (1980)). These regulations were made retroactively effective. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 914.
276. The State Department reviews applications for licenses to export crime
detection equipment and many other items on the CCL to police and military
consignees in most countries from a human rights perspective. See Senate EAA
HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 219-22 (statement of Richard Cooper).
277. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,985-86 (1978). A similar rationale supported controls on
the export to all destinations of "bugging" equipment, used for surreptitious listening to wire or oral conversations, such as the "martini olive transmitter."
See 15 C.F.R. § 376.13 (1980).
278. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-384,
§ 6(d) (2), 92 Stat. 730, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(m) (Supp. I1 1979). The original
bill would have placed the equipment on the Munitions List (S. 3075, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1978), but a floor amendment by Senator Stevenson moved the
controls to the EAA. 124 CONG. REC. S11,814 (daily ed. July 26, 1978).
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records of torture and other abuses of human rights. 2 79 Legislation was said to be required to ensure that enforcement of the
existing controls would not be subject to "administrative discretion." 280 To strengthen enforcement, the statute provided
that no licenses were to be issued for exports of controlled
equipment to any country whose government engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights unless the President certified that extraordinary
2 81
circumstances warranted the granting of licenses.
Given the stated intent to focus controls on nations with
records of extreme human rights abuse, some were concerned
that the statute made Sweden, Switzerland, and other nations
with exemplary human rights records subject to the same validated license controls as the worst violators of human rights.282
Acting on this concern in EAA '79, Congress gave the President
authority to exempt individual nations,2 83 but no country has
yet been formally exempted. 284 The State Department has endeavored instead to minimize unnecessary trade disruption by
waiving review of license applications for exports to "clean" nations like Sweden and Switzerland285 for foreign relations reasons, this procedure was preferred over a publicly promulgated
list of nations whose purchases were thought to require scrutiny under the American human rights policy.2 8 6
The result, however, is still a burden on trade in the controlled items. Even if review is waived by the State Department, exports to "clean" countries continue to require
validated licenses from the Commerce Department, involving
both expense and delay. Exports to all nations not considered
"clean" must be reviewed by both departments, involving further delay. The State Department routinely approves the applications it reviews unless they involve exports to military or
police forces (which most presumably do) and unless the gov279.

124 CONG. REC. Sll,814 (daily ed. July 26, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Ste-

venson).
280. Id.
281. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2) (Supp. EE 1979).
282. See S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 19.
283. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (2) (Supp. I 1979).
284. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1595, 1596 (1980) (President's extension of foreign policy controls beyond Dec. 31, 1979, states that validated licenses are required to
all destinations except those named in statute).
285. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 221 (statement of
Richard Cooper); House EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 21, at 149 (statement
of William Root).
286. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 148 (statement of
William Root).
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ernment of the importing nation commits "serious" human
rights abuses. 287 A recently adopted statement of licensing policy delineates the considerations applied by the State and
Commerce Departments in unusual detail and indicates that
applications are generally considered favorably.288 Still, a large
number of applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis,289
and there have been significant delays in processing even un290
controversial applications.
4. Petroleum Equipment Exports to the Soviet Union: A
Signal of NationalDispleasure
29 1
the
In 1978, on the personal decision of President Carter,
Commerce Department placed under validated license control
exports to the Soviet Union of most equipment used in exploring for and producing petroleum and natural gas. 292 The Commerce Department release that announced the new controls
stated, somewhat opaquely, that the purpose of the controls
was to assure that petroleum equipment exports "would be
consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United
States."2 93 No national security purpose was mentioned. In
fact, exports of any petroleum equipment thought to have national security implications because of the technologies in294
volved were already subject to controls.
The foreign policy context in which these controls were im-

287. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 221 (statement of Richard Cooper).
288. 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980).
289. See id.; House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 136-37 (statement
of William Root).
290. House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 137 (statement of William Root).
291. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 211 (statement of
Richard Cooper).
292. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) and the Commodity Control List) (current version at 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1980)).
293. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978).
294. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 50 (statement of Stanley Marcuss). The Defense Department has stated that exports of petroleum
exploration and production equipment of the kinds controlled in 1978 do not
contribute significantly to Soviet military strength, since Soviet military requirements are only a small fraction of domestic oil production and would in
any case have priority in the allocation of domestic supplies. See House EAA
HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 177 (statement of Ellen Frost). The Administration was of course concerned with Soviet petroleum production capabilities
because of the implications for Soviet industrial strength and foreign policy,
and Commerce had been monitoring petroleum equipment exports before the
controls were imposed. See Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 58
(letter from Sen. Proxmire).
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posed was shaped by a series of incidents in mid-1978 that had
placed a "serious strain" on relations between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States.295 They included the arrest and trial of an
American businessman on charges of violating Soviet currency
laws;296 the trial of American journalists; 297 and the trial and
sentencing of the dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Aleksandr Ginzburg.298 The State Department has characterized
the petroleum equipment controls as "a signal to the USSR
that business could not continue completely as usual" in light
of these incidents, 299 and as "a signal to the Soviet Union of
[United States] displeasure at various things that they were
doing." 30 0 It is widely believed, however, that the controls were
triggered primarily by the Shcharansky and Ginzburg sentencing,301 and subsequent Administration statements described
the petroleum equipment controls as part of the American
30 2
human rights policy.
Although virtually all commodities used primarily to ex295. Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 31 (statement of
Juanita Kreps).
296. See N.Y. Times, August 13, 1978, at 1147 (microfilm ed.). The businessman, Jay Crawford, an employee of International Harvester Corporation, was
tried in September 1978 and received a suspended sentence. Id., Sept. 7, 1978,
at 71 (microffim ed.); id., Sept. 8, 1978, at 31 (microfilm ed.). He was allowed to
leave the U.S.S.R. in October amid a general relaxation of tensions. Id., Oct. 20,
1978, at 37 (microfilm ed.).
297. Id., July 24, 1978, at 2, col. 1.
298. Id. Shcharansky and Ginzburg went on trial July 10, 1978, on charges
of espionage and subversion. Id., July 11, 1978, at 1, col. 5. The trials were condemned by President Carter. Id., July 13, 1978, at 1, col. 6. On July 13 and 14,
1978, the two were given harsh sentences. Id., July 14, 1978, at 1, col. 5; id., July
15, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
299. Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 224 (statement of Richard Cooper); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 954 (statement of
William Root).
300. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 211 (statement of Richard Cooper).
301. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S13,690 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978) (announcement by Sen. Stevenson of intention to hold hearings on the use of export controls and export credits); Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 915; N.Y.
Times, July 19, 1978, at 1, coL 2. National Security Advisor Brzezinski, National
Security Council staff member Samuel Huntington, and Senator Henry Jackson
all stated after the trials had begun that the United States should interrupt
trade transactions with the U.S.S.R. to show American displeasure. N.Y. Times,
July 12, 1978, at 4, col. 3; id., July 13, 1978, at 4, col. 4.
302. Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 64-66 (statement of
Commerce Department); id. at 109 (statement of Duane Sewell). When existing foreign policy controls were extended as required by EAA '79, however,
the petroleum equipment controls were not identified with human rights, as
were, for example, the controls on crime detection equipment. They were separately identified, and not associated with any underlying policy. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 1596-97 (1980).
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plore for or produce oil and gas were subject to the new requirement, 303 the controls applied only to exports to the Soviet
Union, not to exports to Eastern Europe or other Soviet allies,
where a danger of transshipment presumably exists. Special
restrictions were imposed on exports of nonpublic information
relating to the designated equipment. Such data already required a validated license for export to the U.S.S.R. and other
Communist countries 3 04 the 1978 regulations provided that
such information could only be exported to other destinations
under general license if written assurances were obtained from
the importer that neither the data itself nor its "direct product"
would be shipped, directly or indirectly, to the U.S.S.R.305 In
addition, validated licenses were required for exports of this information to any destination when the American exporter knew
or had reason to believe that the direct products of the data, to
be produced abroad, were intended to be exported or reexported, directly or indirectly, to the U.S.S.R.306
The controls were implemented through extensive case-bycase review of proposed transactions. In fewer than eight
months, some 113 applications were considered; 307 seven agencies were involved in the review process; 3 08 and on average licensing decisions required some forty-five days, with some not
made for more than ninety days. 309 Despite the complexity of
the bureaucratic procedures set in motion, however, the Administration apparently had no intention of denying any petro303. Validated licenses had previously been required only if these items
were to be exported to the embargoed nations in Country Groups S and Z. 15
C.F.R. §§ 385.1(a), 385.3 (1979). The regulations added a number of new entries
to the CCL, all of which were controlled for export to Group S (Group S was
terminated with the end of the Rhodesia embargo), Group Z and the U.S.S.R.,
including Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,700 (1978).
304. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(b) (1977).
305. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978); see 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1) (1980).
306. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1) (1980). The Regulations provide generally that
technical data may not be exported when the exporter knows that the data itself is to be reexported to any destination other than that authorized. 15 C.F.
§ 379.8(a) (2) (1980).
307. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 66 (statement of Commerce Department); cf. Senate EAA Hearings Part III, supra note 116, at 163
(statement of Douglas J. Barnett, Jr.) (indicating 120 cases from Oct. 25, 1978, to
March 13, 1979). Some strain was imposed on the resources of the licensing bureaucracy by the additional complex cases. See House EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 21, at 122 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
308. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 66 (statement of Malcolm Browne). The agencies were the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and Treasury, the National Security Council, and the CIA.
309. Id.
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leum equipment licenses, 3 10 and none were in fact denied 311
until a freeze on high technology exports to the U.S.S.R. was
imposed in January 1980.312 According to the Commerce Department, before the freeze not one of the reviewing agencies
had even recommended denial of a single license application. 313
The United States did not request other nations to follow
the American lead by imposing parallel controls, and none did
so. 314 Although some studies had been conducted to determine
whether and how quickly the Soviets could obtain similar
equipment from other countries, it does not appear that an extensive effort was made, and no firm conclusions were
reached. 3 15 Representatives of the petroleum equipment industry contend that the controlled items are in fact available else3 17
where,31 6 but their position has been disputed by others.
The manner in which the validated license requirement for
petroleum equipment exports was implemented accords well
with the State Department's description of the requirement as
a "signal" to the U.S.S.R. It has been suggested that the requirement was intended as a "reprisal" for Soviet actions 318 or
as a means to force the U.S.S.R. to improve its treatment of dissidents or make other political concessions. 319 Under either of
these assumptions, however, its later implementation (or lack
thereof) seems baffling. The petroleum equipment controls appear to be simply a diplomatic gesture, a move in a game of
largely symbolic actions, an effort to '"fne tune" trade relations
310. No Barrierto Soviet Trade Seen Under U.S. Export Regulations, OiL &
GAs J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 53 (quoting Stanley Marcuss).
311. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 198 (statement of Richard Cooper); Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 41 (statement of
Frank Well).
312. See text accompanying notes 805-07 infra.
313. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 66 (statement of Malcolm Browne).
314. Id. at 210 (statement of Richard Cooper).
315. Id. at 66 (statement of Malcolm Browne).
316. E.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 119, at 67-69 (statement of C. William Verity); House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 67-68,
83-84 (statement of James Giffen).
317. See Huntington, Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy, 32 FOREIGN PoL'Y 63, 73 (1976), reprintedin Senate ForeignPolicy Hearings, supra note 119, at 157, 161. See generally House EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 21, at 914-33 (report of Congressional Research Service on energy
technology controls).
318. 124 CONG. REC. S13,690 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978) (announcement by Sen.
Stevenson of intention to hold hearings on use of export controls and export
credits).
319. Id. See generally Huntington, supra note 317.
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to the political relations of the day.320
5.

The TASS Computer: The Uses of Licensing Policy

All four of the controls considered so far have involved the
imposition of validated license requirements-what is generally
meant by "export controls." The requirement of a validated license, however, is only a beginning: a licensing policy must
also be established.321 The policy may be one of embargo, as in
the cases of Uganda and South Africa, or it may be to approve
all applications, as in the case of the petroleum equipment controls. In many cases, however, the administrators of the controls will wish to retain the ability to "open and close the
economic door"32 2 by granting or denying licenses on a case-bycase basis as in the case of crime detection equipment.
The denial of individual licenses may be seen as a separate
form of foreign policy export control; the regional stability and
anti-terrorism policies, among others, have been largely implemented through denials of licenses that were initially required
for quite different purposes, usually national security. License
denial is a popular technique for several reasons. License denial affects only the particular transaction involved; it need not
prejudice future transactions. It may thus be seen by the target nation as less threatening than the imposition of new validated license controls or a hardening of licensing policy.
Moreover, a license can often be denied more rapidly than new
controls or licensing policies can be drafted; this gives foreign
policy makers greater flexibility because a license for the export of any item on the CCL can be quickly denied whenever
action is called for. License denials also permit greater flexibility to reverse or modify policy toward the target nation; vali320. One possibility may be that the controls were imposed prematurely.
Later, evidence of other sources for the equipment-see Senate EAA Hearings
Part I, supra note 106, at 66 (statement of Malcolm Browne); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 939 (statement of Stanley Marcuss)-along with
consideration of the possible political and even military consequences of a Soviet oil shortage---see Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 87, 103-04
(statements of Duane Sewell); No Barrierto Soviet Trade Seen Under U.S. Export Regulations, OrL & GAS J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 53-may have led to the decision
not to deny any licenses.
321. The licensing policies followed in regard to most controls are spelled
out in the Regulations, though often only in the broadest terms. See 15 C.F.R.
Parts 376, 385 (1980) (special commodity and country policies). In 1980, some
statements of policy were added, and others made more specific. 45 Fed. Reg.
1595 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.14, 385.1, .2, .4).
322. Huntington, supra note 317, at 160.
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dated license requirements, in contrast, are difficult to remove
discreetly when they have outlived their usefulness.
A number of recent license denials based on foreign policy
considerations have involved proposed exports of computers to
the Soviet Union. 323 The best known case may be the decision
of President Carter in July 1978 to deny Sperry Rand Corporation's application for a license to export a Sperry Univac computer to TASS, the official news agency of the Soviet Union.
The computer, to be sold for $6.8 million, was to be used for
324
coverage of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.
The President's decision was made simultaneously with
the decision to control petroleum equipment exports to the
U.S.S.R.325 Like the petroleum equipment controls, denial of
Sperry Rand's application-and others known to be pendinghad been urged during the trials of Shcharansky and Ginzburg
by the President's National Security Advisor and his staff, and
by Senator Jackson and other members of Congress. 326 The
Administration indicated that both actions had been taken primarily to protest the sentences imposed on the two dissi327
dents.
After denying the license, the Administration requested
other computer-exporting nations to refrain from selling to
TASS.328 While some countries responded ambiguously,
France left no doubt as to its position: "[I]t is not the habit in
323. A similar episode occurred in October 1979. While Washington considered how to deal with disclosures of Soviet troops in Cuba, it was reported that
the Defense Department had withdrawn its approval of the export of a Control
Data Corporation computer to the U.S.S.R. at the urging of National Security
Advisor Brzezinski. According to Control Data, the computer used ten-year old
technology and was an "add on" to similar equipment sold three years before.
The Defense Department had already cleared the sale on two occassions in reviews conducted on the basis of national security. While the reversal in policy
was formally based on security considerations, Defense Department officials
made clear that the decision was political, "to express to Moscow Washington's
displeasure" over the troops. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1979, at E-5, col. 1.
324. See InternationalComputer Policy, D.M., Nov. 1978, at 44; Trade Policy
Flap Grows After Computer Cancellation,INFOSYSTEMS, Sept. 1978, at 22.
325. See N.Y. Times, July 19, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., July 19, 1978, at 4,
col. 1.
326. Asking Allies to Snub TASS, Too, Bus. WEE, Aug. 21, 1978, at 123; Using Trade to Influence Russia, Bus. WEEi, July 24, 1978, at 181; N.Y. Times, July
12, 1978, at 4, col. 3; id., July 13, 1978, at 4, col. 4; Wall St. J., July 19, 1978, at 4, col.
1.
327. Wall St. J., July 19, 1978, at 4, col. 1. See Bingham & Johnson, supra
note 117, at 910.
328. Asking Allies to Snub TASS, Too, Bus. WEE, Aug. 21, 1978, at 123; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 1978, at 126. In the past, France, Germany, Japan, and other nations had supplied the U.S.S.R. with computers that the United States had refused to sell on national security grounds.
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France to subordinate the sales abroad of industrial material
for civilian uses to political considerations. Where would we
sell if that were the practice?" 32 9 A French firm eventually secured the order for the TASS system.3 30
License denials affecting items already on the CCL are
often difficult to analyze: the proposed export of an item like
the Sperry Rand computer may raise legitimate national security concerns while simultaneously presenting administrators
with a tempting foreign policy opportunity.3 3 1 Sperry Rand's
application had been under consideration for several months,
presumably because of its national security implications, when
the decision to deny the license was made. 332 The President
stated that approval of the export would have led to a "quantum leap" in Soviet computer capability and that the capabilities of the Univac computer were "far in excess" of the needs of
TASS.333 Sperry Rand, on the other hand, denied that its computer posed a danger to American security, arguing that a
nearly identical system had previously been sold to the Soviet
airline Aeroflot and that Sperry had already lowered the capabilities of the computer ordered by TASS at the request of the
Commerce Department. 33 4 The computer industry generally
believed that denial of the license on national security grounds
would have been unwarranted,3 3 5 while foreign nations and
many other observers were simply confused as to the relative
weight given fiational security and foreign policy considerations in the decision to deny the license. 336 The timing and
context of the Sperry Rand case, however, strongly suggest
that, even if the license might ultimately have been denied on
329. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1978, at 126 (microfilm ed.).
330. Senate EAA Hearings Part III, supra note 116, at 27-29, 38-39 (statement of Frank Wel). Several months later, Sperry Rand was issued a license
to export a modified system. Id.
331. See id. at 27-29.
332. Wade, American-Soviet Relations: The Cancelled Computer, 201 SCL
422, 424-26 (1978).
333. Id. at 425.
334. Asking Allies to Snubb TASS, Too, Bus. WEEK,Aug. 21, 1978, at 123; International Computer Policy, D.M., Nov. 1978, at 44. Cf.Senate Foreign Policy
Hearings, supra note 119, at 255, 256 (statement by Members of Emergency
Committee for American Trade).
335. An ironic statement of the industry position was that the only "quantum leap" involved in the transaction was that executed by the White House
staff over the licensing officials at the Commerce Department. Asking Allies to
Snubb TASS, Too, Bus. WEE, Aug. 21, 1978, at 123; see also text accompanying
note 333 supra.
336. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 42 (statement of Di-

mitri Simes).
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national security grounds, the actual decision was "a political
call.

33 7

The qualities that make license denials popular within the
executive branch as a technique of foreign policy make them
highly unpopular with exporters. Cases like the Sperry Rand
episode lead exporters to believe that their transactions can be
prohibited simply because of the coincidence that their license
applications are pending when American foreign policy makers
are seeking a means of expressing American displeasure over
some event abroad. Exporters may also conclude that they
cannot predict what considerations will affect decisions on their
applications. Although some licensing policies are delineated
in the Regulations, 338 these statements typically fail to bring
any great degree of predictability to trade in the controlled
items. Many other licensing policies are never made explicit.
There is no statement in the Regulations, for example, of the
policies followed in applying regional stability, military balance, or anti-terrorism considerations to decisions on licenses
originally required for national security purposes. 339 Even
more potentially disruptive of commerce, it is clear from the
Sperry Rand case that human rights considerations are also applied to such licensing decisions even though no statement in
the Regulations delineates or even acknowledges such a policy.
It is known that recommendations based on human rights considerations are made by the State Department, and that the
Department reviews exports of some items on the CCL to military and police-related purchasers in most nations, 3 40 yet the
nations or institutions whose purchases are regularly reviewed
or prohibited are not identified,341 since the State Department
337. See id. at 141 (statement of William Root); Senate EAA Hearings Part
III, supra note 116, at 27, 38 (statement of Frank Weil); Senate EAA Hearings
PartI, supra note 106, at 191 (statement of Richard Cooper); Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 910-11; Wade, supra note 332, at 425.
338. Applications for the export of crime detection equipment, for example,
will generally be considered favorably. . . unless there is evidence that
the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights and that the judicious use of export
controls would be helpful in deterring the development of a consistent
pattern of such violations or in distancing the United States from such
violations.
45 Fed. Reg. 1595, 1598 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 376.14). See note 321
supra.
339. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 117, at 910; notes 116-19, 166 supra.
340. Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 219-22 (statement of
Richard Cooper); House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 147-49 (statement of William Root).
341. COMPrOLLER GENERAL REPORT 1978, supra note 32, at 20.
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sees publication of such information as "politically undesirable."3 42 Consequently, from the point of view of the exporter,
review of exports on human rights grounds is almost totally ad
hoc. In cases like the Sperry Rand denial, licensing policy appears even more unprincipled, since such licensing "signals"
are sent not in response to human rights conditions in the importing country, but in response to particular, unpredictable
events.343
IV. THE THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY
EXPORT CONTROLS
There has been little systematic analysis of the rationales,
costs, and effectiveness of American political export controls,
but there is a substantial body of relevant literatuie concerning
the use of multilateral economic sanctions to enforce international law and to implement decisions of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations.
This part of the Article draws upon that literature to analyze
the two principal arguments advanced in support of foreign policy export controls-what this Article will call the instrumental
and the symbolic rationales. The instrumental rationale, which
is discussed first, argues that controls on exports-and on other
forms of economic intercourse-can and should be used as
sanctions 3 " to force other nations (the "target" nations) to con342. House EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 21, at 148 (statement of William Root).
343. The implications of the unpredictability of licensing policy and other
types of foreign policy export controls are considered at notes 552-76 infra and
accompanying text.
344. In social science terms, sanctions are the processes by which societies
regulate the behavior of their members in support of social norms. See 14 INT'L
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 5 (1968). Some American export controls

are said to have been imposed in support of norms of the international community ("internationally recognized human rights"), but even these have been imposed without authority from that community, except in the case of Security
Council-mandated embargoes. Other United States export controls implement
what are basically unilateral policies; such actions conform less closely to the
definition of sanctions as instruments of social controL
In the generally accepted taxonomy of sanctions developed by Johan Galtung,
American export controls would be classified as negative, unilateral, external economic sanctions. Galtung, On the Effects of InternationalEconomic
Sanctions, with Examplesfrom the Case of Rhodesia, 19 WORLD PoL. 378, 381-83
(1967). Galtung analyzed negative, collective, external economic sanctions,
such as the United Nations-mandated embargo of Rhodesia. Id. at 378-83. Such
collective measures obviously correspond more closely to the social science understanding of sanctions.
American export controls are occasionally explicitly described as sanctions. See S. Con. Res. 100, supra note 146.
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form their conduct to norms of behavior approved by the
United States. It asserts that, assuming a rational target nation
government, the desired changes in target nation conduct will
occur if the economic costs created by the denial of American
goods or technology outweigh the benefits perceived by the target nation to flow from the challenged conduct. 345 The symbolic rationale, the second theory to be analyzed, holds that
export controls, even if not instrumentally effective, can and
should be used for expressive or symbolic purposes-to manifest American disapproval of the conduct of a target nation or
to disassociate the United States from the target, for exampleprimarily as an ethical matter. The final section of this part of
the Article examines the costs incurred by the nation imposing
political export controls and argues that controls should not be
used without a careful weighing of those costs.
A.

THE INSTRUmENTAL RATONALE

1. The Instrumental View of Trade Controls
In a recent article concerning United States relations with
the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington presents one of the
most explicit statements of the instrumental rationale.4 6 Professor Huntington calls for an economic policy of "conditioned
flexibility" in American dealings with the U.S.S.R.347 Such a
policy would differ from both the trade-denial approach of the
Cold War years and the "laissez-faire" approach said to have
characterized the period of "detente" in the early 1970s by encouraging American policy makers to "open and close the eco34 8
nomic door" as security and political developments dictate.
Under this approach, American exports would be conditioned
on specific actions by the Soviet Union-reflecting restraint in
overseas troop deployment, support for Cuban military intervention, or repression of dissidents, for example--consistent
with United States foreign policy.3 49 In this way, the United
States would capitalize on its economic resources to induce the
345. See Huntington, supra note 317. He observes that "as good MarxistLeninists, [the Soviets] are perfectly willing to calculate economic-political
tradeoffs and make such exchanges when the benefits are, in their view, worth
the cost." Id. at 73.
346. Id. at 70-74. Professor Huntington is Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. In 1977 and 1978, he was coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council.
347. Id. at 65-70.
348. Id. at 65-67, 71.
349. Id. at 67, 69.
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U.S.S.R. to be more "cooperative" in areas important to American foreign policy.35 0 Huntington cites the controls on petroleum equipment exports as an example of "conditioned
flexibility." 35 '
Professor Huntington sees formidable obstacles to the implementation of his economic strategy: "bureaucratic pluralism
...
; congressional and interest group politics; ... and most
important,... a pervasive ideology that sanctifies the independence, rather than the subordination, of economic power to
government." 35 2 He believes that the obstructive "intellectual
and psychological environment" is changing.35 3 Nonetheless,
he proposes to overcome the obstructions posed by Congress,
interest groups, and bureaucrats by centralizing control over almost all significant economic relations with the Soviet Union in
the executive branch, specifically in the National Security
35 4
Council.
Achievement of the changes in target nation conduct predicted by Professor Huntington and other advocates of the instrumental rationale depends on the accuracy of two premises:
first, that American export controls can effectively prevent controlled items from reaching the target nation so that economic
costs are imposed on the target (economic effectiveness); and
second, that such costs can successfully induce change in the
target nation's policies (political success).355 Each of these
premises requires analysis.
2. Economic Effectiveness of Controls
a.

Foreign Availability

If a target nation can easily and economically obtain from
other sources goods or technology comparable to those denied
350. Id. at 79; ef. note 345 supra (Soviet political cooperation when economically advantageous).
351. Id. at 76-77.
352. Id. at 71.
353. Id. at 74-75.
354. Industrial and agricultural exports, export credits, technology transfers, and "scientific contacts" would come within the jurisdiction of the National Security Council. Id. at 75. At the time Professor Huntington was
writing, the President had already assigned to the National Security Council responsibilities in connection with grain sales, technology transfers, and export
controls. Id. Since that time, the responsibilities of the National Security
Council have been expanded despite efforts by Congress to limit its role. See
note 31 supra.

355. The distinction between economic effectiveness and political success is
drawn in D. LosmAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTnONS:
CUBA, ISRAEL AND RHODESIA 1, 43-44, 125 (1979).

THE CASES OF
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by the United States, the economic costs it incurs will be minimal.3 56 The existence of alternative sources for controlled
items-foreign availability-is the most critical factor in assessing economic effectiveness, 3 57 yet it has never been given appropriate prominence in American export control legislation.
Although EAA '69 from its adoption directed the President
to consider the foreign availability of items proposed to be con-

trolled for national security purposes, 358 a finding of foreign
availability was never a bar to the imposition of such controls.35 9 The Act prohibited controls on items available "without restriction from sources outside the United States in
significant quantities and comparable in quality," 360 but it also
contained an exception that permitted the President to impose
controls notwithstanding such foreign availability if "adequate
evidence has been presented to [the President] demonstrating
that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to
the national security."361 Under this exception, the United
States has historically controlled the export of many items
available elsewhere, 362 and a number of such unilateral controls continue in effect today.3 63 Although the soundness of the
356. A range of costs may be created by export controls in spite of foreign
availability. At one extreme, a target nation might incur only the administrative expense of finding and contracting with an alternative supplier. For example, the United States prohibits the export of writing paper to the South
African police, see note 245 supra and accompanying text, but this prohibition
can be nothing more than an inconvenience to police purchasing agents, who
can easily obtain fully equivalent paper, at an equivalent price and transport
cost, from a reliable supplier in another country. In other situations, the target
nation may have to pay somewhat higher prices or transport costs, accept products of lesser quality, experience longer shipment delays, or the like. See D.
LosmAN, supra note 355, at 10-14.
357. Even under multilateral sanctions, target nations are able to redirect
trade to nonparticipating states, id. at 127, to minimize the economic effects of
the sanctions. Wallensteen, Characteristicsof Economic Sanctions, 5 J. PEACE
RES. 248, 262 (1968).
358. EAA '69, Pub. L No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C..
app. § 2403(b) (1) (1976)) (expired 1979).
359. See id.; Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L No. 92-412, § 104(a) (2),
86 Stat. 644 (1972) (expired 1979); Export Administration Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 103(a) (3), 91 Stat. 235 (expired 1979).
360. EAA '69, Pub. L_ No. 91-184, § 4(b) (2) (B), 83 Stat. 841, as amended by
Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L No. 95-52, § 103(a) (3), 91
Stat. 235 (codified at 55 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (2) (1976)) (expired 1979).
361. Id.
362. Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 840-41.
363. See e.g., Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 67-68 (statement of Juanita Kreps). Secretary Kreps described the results of a Commerce
Department review of all unilaterally controlled categories on the Commodity
Control List (the Department's report is reprinted in House EAA Hearings Part
I, supra note 21, at 1137-60). As a result of that review, eight ECCN entries
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EAA '69 exception has been questioned 36 4 and no wholly persuasive justification for it has been advanced,3 65 a similar "safeguard" provision was included in EAA '79.366
Even this minimal requirement for consideration of foreign

availability applied only to national security controls; prior to
EAA '79, export control legislation had never required that foreign availability be considered in connection with foreign policy controls. President Carter was the first to address this
anomaly: in a major 1978 statement on export policy, the President named foreign policy controls as one of the significant "domestic barriers to exports" and stated that "[w] eight will be
3 67
given" to foreign availability in considering future controls.
Administration officials subsequently indicated that this policy
was being implemented, 368 but their assertions were often little
more than recitals of the President's general statement, usually
accompanied by provisos that controls might still be imposed
were decontrolled, two were newly controlled, twenty-six were continued under
the same controls, three were continued under reduced controls, and seven
were continued under existing controls pending resolution of interagency disputes. Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 68-77. See also UNTrED
STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, EXPORT CONTROLS:
NEED TO CLARIFY PoLIcY AND SIMPLIFY ADMINISTRATION 18 (1979) (confirming 38
unilateral controls) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979].
Two months after Secretary Kreps' testimony, Assistant Secretary Weil reported that 43 entries were controlled unilaterally for national security purposes. Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 15 (statement of Frank
Wel). In June 1979, he reported a total of 73 unilateral controls. Id. at 16-26.
The last figure (73) includes not only the national security controls previously
referred to, but also certain nuclear controls imposed after Secretary Kreps'
testimony, the foreign policy controls discussed herein, the "basket" entries implementing embargoes on Group Z nations, and certain miscellaneous controls.
Id. Most of these unilateral controls remain in effect notwithstanding foreign
availability.
364. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 293 (statement of National Machine Tool Builders' Association); House EAA Hearings
PartII, supra note 119, at 138-43, 158-65 (statement of Rep. Fithian).
365. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 8-9 (1977). The
Carter Administration argued that controls imposed when foreign availability
exists allow the government to monitor the destination of controlled items, Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 34 (statement of Frank Wel), and
to prevent their sale while negotiating with foreign supplier nations to eliminate foreign availability. House EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 119, at 140-43,
158-65 (remarks of Stanley Marcuss).
366. See EAA '79, § 4(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c) (Supp. 1I 1979); note 736
infra and accompanying text.
367. Statement by the President on United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1631, 1633 (Sept. 26, 1978).
368. See, e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 188-90 (statement of Richard Cooper); House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 141-52
(statement of William Root).
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in spite of foreign availability. 369 Moreover, although comprehensive assessments of foreign availability had not been made

for all foreign policy controls then in effect,3 70 no restriction
was limited or withdrawn. 371 Satisfied with the flexibility preserved by the "weight will be given" to foreign availability
formula, the Administration proposed that this language be included in the legislation extending or replacing EAA '69,372
thereby hoping to deflect congressional concern over foreign
availability. In enacting EAA '79, Congress went beyond that
formulation and imposed a foreign availability limitation on foreign policy controls similar to that previously applicable to national security controls. 3 73 This provision, however, seems to
3
have had little effect so far. 74
Analyzing the potential impact of foreign availability involves two separate inquiries: whether other nations produce
items that can be economically substituted for those controlled,
and if so, whether they will sell those items to the target nation.
With regard to the first inquiry, the situation is much different today than in the years immediately following World War
II. Then, the United States was able to deny a wide range of
369. E.g., Senate EAA HearingsPart III, supra note 116, at 26 (statement of
Frank Wel); Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 188-90 (statement
of Richard Cooper); id. at 79 (statement of Juanita Kreps); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 623 (statement of Frank Weil); id. at 935 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
370. See Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 41 (statement of
Frank Wel); cf. text accompanying note 315 supra (petroleum equipment controls).
371. Cf. Senate EAA Hearings Part II, supra note 250, at 258 (statement of
Machinery and Allied Products Institute) (commenting that no action had been
taken by the Executive "to reduce the array of existing restrictions on U.S. exports"). The Administration seemed almost casually able to reconcile existing
controls with the new policy. See, e.g., House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note
21, at 142, 144, 146, 147 (statement of William Root). Foreign availability may,
however, have been one of the reasons why licenses were not denied under the
petroleum equipment controls until the change in policy of January 1980. See,
e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 66 (statement of Juanita
Kreps) (indicating that "no firm Administration conclusions were reached
about whether the items made subject to control were available from foreign
sources").
372. See H.R. 3652, § 3(f), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in House
EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 900, 904. Cf. House EAA HearingsPart
II, supra note 119, at 9 (statement of William Root).
373. See notes 735-51 infra and accompanying text.
374. The President, under EAA '79, extended current foreign policy controls
on Dec. 29, 1979, 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980), having first determined that the absence of each of the controls would be detrimental to American foreign policy
notwithstanding foreign availability. Id. at 1596.
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goods and technologies to the Communist nations simply because it was the only source from which they were available, at
least at reasonable prices. Now, however, the United States
maintains a monopoly or even a substantial technological lead
in only a very small number of goods and technologies. 375 The
vast majority of goods, even goods involving relatively sophisticated technology, are available from a number of other suppliers in Western, Eastern, and neutral countries. 376 Moreover,
most items of which the United States is the sole supplier are
already controlled to all destinations for national security reasons. 37 7 It is thus very unlikely that the United States could
impose new controls for foreign policy purposes without en3
countering a substantial degree of foreign availability. 78
There are admitted difficulties in determining precisely the
existence of foreign availability. Availability of the types of petroleum equipment controlled for export to the U.S.S.R. in 1978,
for example, was hotly disputed.3 79 Professor Huntington
wrote that the United States was "virtually ... the ... sole
supplier" of much of that equipment and that the Soviet Union
was "dependent" on American supplies 3 80 industry representatives countered that "all geophysical equipment currently in
use by American oil companies [was] available overseas with
375. See, e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 5 (statement
of Sen. Stevenson); House EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 119, at 5 (statement of Juanita Kreps); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 40
(statement of Dimitri Simes); id. at 45-46 (statement of Marshall Goldman);
Adler-Karlsson, InternationalEconomic Power: the U.S. Strategic Embargo, 6
J. WORLD TRADE L. 501, 508 (1972). The industry position is well represented in
Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 310 (statement of National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc.); id. at 318 (statement of John James).
376. Some primary products (particularly grain in the case of the United
States) may not be fully available abroad because of inadequate and inelastic
supplies, even when there are other suppliers. There may also be limited foreign availability of specially designed spare parts.
377. Of the 73 unilaterally controlled entries on the Commodity Control List
compiled by the Commerce Department in June 1979, see note 363 supra, the
majority were "B" entries controlled for export to all destinations. Most entries
controlled for export only to certain destinations were either foreign policy controls or basket entries. A few entries were controlled only for export to the
Communist countries.
378. This may in part explain the popularity of changes in licensing policy
and individual license denials, affecting items already controlled for national
security reasons, as tools of foreign policy. See notes 321-43 supra and accompanying text.
379. The debate is concisely summarized in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, POUCY CONSIDERATIONS ON EXPORT LICENSING
1979, reprinted in House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 914, 926-29.
380. Huntington, supra note 317, at 76.
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no reduction in quality." 381 Such a disparity of views is possible primarily because of a lack of reliable information. Target
nations such as the Soviet Union and South Africa are naturally secretive regarding the technologies they have been able
to obtain. 382 Often the only sources of such information are the
American intelligence agencies, 383 and they are frequently unable to obtain satisfactory data.3 84 Friendly nations may also
385
be unwilling to share commercially important information.
The Commerce Department itself has been criticized for lack386
ing adequate resources to investigate foreign availability.
Disagreement is also possible because there is no accepted
definition of "availability." Executive branch officials have argued that American controls should not be discarded when foreign substitutes appear to be of lesser quality, available in
smaller quantities, or the like, 387 although there is no agreement even within the executive branch on the proper standard
of comparability.3 88 Exporters argue that foreign availability
exists whenever a target nation can satisfy its needs with a foreign substitute at an acceptable price.3 89 A sophisticated analy381. House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 68 (statement of James

Giffen).
382. For an interesting example of the difficulties involved in determining
whether a particular item has been obtained by the target and whether it is
available from another supplier nation, see generally Export Licensing: Foreign
Availability of Stretch Forming Presses,HearingBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations (Pt. I), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Export Licensing Hearings1.
383. Export Licensing Hearings, supra note 382, at 30 (statement of Rauer
Meyer).
384. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 28.
385. Export Licensing Hearings,supra note 382, at 28-31 (statements of William Barraclough, Rauer Meyer) (difficulties in obtaining information from
France).
386. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 259-60 (statement of
J. Kenneth Fasick); COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 31.
Commerce has initiated measures to improve its investigative capabilities. See
House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 934-35 (statement of Stanley
Marcuss). EAA '79 mandates further improvement.
387. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 92 (statement of
Stanley Marcuss); COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 28.
388. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 5. The Defense
Department has a clear and quite conservative definition, see House EAA Hearings Part11, supra note 119, at 16 (statement of Ellen Frost). Such a definition
is more appropriate for national security controls: the products and technologies controlled have military applications, and whatever damage they might do
to American security is done if they are exported. In the case of foreign policy
controls, the United States will normally have other opportunities to influence
a target nation if a questionable export is allowed.
389. See Senate ForeignPolicy Hearings,supra note 119, at 57 (statement of
C. William Verity); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 971 (letter
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sis of foreign availability under the instrumental rationale
might reject these extreme positions, attempting first to calculate the costs to the target nation of shifting to the available
foreign substitutes and then to estimate the likelihood that imposing costs of that magnitude would lead to the desired political results. Such precision, however, is probably
unattainable. 3 90
With many foreign policy controls, it is hardly necessary to
engage in this detailed analysis. With an embargo like that of
Uganda or of the South African military and police, for example, foreign availability unquestionably exists for all but the
most sophisticated items. Virtually all crime detection equipment is freely available elsewhere. In 1980, the United States
embargoed all exports for use at the Moscow Olympics, 3 91 but
again foreign substitutes were readily available for most of the
prohibited exports. The instrumental rationale simply cannot
justify controls imposed in the face of such unquestioned for392
eign availability.
Even given the decline of the United States' position as a
from John Chambers). See also id. at 43 (statement of Dimitri Simes). In the

case of the petroleum equipment controls, it has been suggested that the Soviets could not only "make do" with less advanced foreign substitutes, but might
actually be able to use them more effectively for most purposes than American
equipment. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 379, reprinted in
House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 928.
390. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 379, reprinted in
House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 914, 926-29.
391. See note 802 infra and accompanying text.
392. One commentator argues that a presumption of effectiveness should
apply in evaluating controls intended to further human rights; a "burden of
proof" should be placed on those who would argue ineffectiveness due to foreign availability. Brown, ".

.

. in the National Interest," in HUMAN RIGrs AND

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 161, 167-68 (P. Brown & D. MacLean eds. 1979).
A burden of proof scheme would be difficult to administer under the present system, in part because EAA '79 exempts new controls from the Administrative Procedure Act; controls may thus be implemented without prior notice
or opportunity for comment. EAA '79, § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a) (Supp.
HI 1979). The recent practice of the Commerce Department has been to issue
regulations with immediate effectiveness but in interim form, allowing an opportunity for post-imposition public comment, see, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 C.F.R.). This practice still does not
permit anyone outside the executive branch to make a case for foreign availability before new controls are imposed. Even an opportunity for prior comment
would not give a fair opportunity to carry a burden of proof, since there would
be no impartial decisionmaker; comments are addressed to those who proposed
the control. At the licensing stage, exporters rarely play any greater part in the
decision process. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1978, supra note 32, at 9-

12.
More importantly, foreign availability is the prevailing condition in the
markets for most products. If a burden of proof is to have any factual justifica-
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supplier in world markets, instrumental controls could be effective if foreign supplier nations were to cooperate in enforcing
them. Since the late 1940s, the United States has sought the cooperation of foreign nations in enforcing national security controls through the informal organization known as COCOM.393
The members of COCOM-Japan and the NATO nations (except Iceland)-first agree on broad categories of strategic goods
and technologies to be kept from the U.S.S.R. and other Communist nations and then prepare lists of specific items within
these categories. 394 Members agree to control the export of
items on the lists; a nation wishing to permit the export of a
39 5
controlled item must request a COCOM exception.
In recent years, however, COCOM has been viewed as ineffective.396 Europe and Japan have long advocated reductions in
product coverage, 3 97 and the United States has lost the power
to enforce cooperation. 398 Further, COCOM has its own foreign
tion, it should be placed on those whose position rests on the exceptional situation-those who propose instrumental controls.
The idea of placing a burden of proof on the controllers has been discussed
in Congress, see, e.g., House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 85 (statement of Rep. Bingham), frequently in connection with proposals to legislate a
"right to export." See S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 3-4, cf CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 379, at 914, 928. No such "right" has yet
been enacted, but EAA '79 moves in that direction by emphasizing that export
controls are to be considered exceptional measures. See notes 724-32 infra and
accompanying text. Part VI of this Article considers procedures by which
something resembling a burden of proof might be placed on the Executive.
393. "COCOM" is a military-style acronym for "Coordinating Committee."
See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 834-42; SPECIAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS, reprinted in Export Administration
Act: Agenda for Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on ForeignRelations, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 52 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COCOM REPORT].
394. COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 52.
395. Id. at 52-54. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363,
at 10-13.
396. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-190, supra note 37, at 20; Export Licensing
Hearings,supra note 382, at 31 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
397. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 8; Berman
& Garson, supra note 2, at 840-41.
398. When COCOM was formed, the main American tool for inducing cooperation within the organization was the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act
of 1951 (Battle Act), Pub. L. No. 213, §§ 101-105, 202-203, 301-335, 65 Stat. 646 (repealed 1979), which authorized an Administrator in the State Department to
terminate all military and economic assistance to any nation that did not agree
to cooperate with the American strategic embargo. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL
REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 7-8; G. ADLER-SARLssON, supra note 92, at 27-28;
Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 836-38. Leverage over the COCOM nations
based on American aid has long since disappeared. Id. In 1979, the Battle Act
was repealed, EAA '79, § 17(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(e) (Supp. 1I 1979), on the
ground that it was obsolete. See S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 15-16. In
the early days of COCOM, informal pressures based on American technological
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availability problem: nonmember nations are now able to offer
products and technologies previously available only through
COCOM.399 Finally, United States officials charge that Europe
and Japan have been more lenient in interpreting agreed standards and more lax in enforcing them, 400 in spite of a relatively
high degree of consensus on the importance of COCOM to na-

tional security.4 01

Foreign policy controls enjoy no equivalent consensus-indeed, most other Western industrial nations tend to avoid politically motivated controls on trade.4 02 Virtually no Western
industrial nation has joined the United States in any of the foreign policy controls dicussed in Part I of this Article;40 3 indeed, other Western nations have usually moved to fill the
commercial void resulting from American controls. 404 Lack of
superiority were also used to obtain cooperation. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, supra
note 92, at 51. Such influence, too, is now largely unavailable. Thus, there are
no effective sanctions that the United States can impose against a nation that
refuses to abide by the COCOM embargo lists. COCOM REPORT, supra note
393, at 54.
399. See H.R. REP. No. 95-190, supra note 37, at 20; Senate Foreign Policy
Hearings,supra note 119, at 265 (statement of Machinery and Allied Products
Institute) (non-COCOM competitors include Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland).
400. COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 54-55; H.R. REP. No. 95-190, supra
note 37, at 20. See also Senate EAA Hearings PartIII, supra note 116, at 27-28
(statement of Frank Weil). On the other hand, the United States has in recent
years submitted almost half of all COCOM exceptions requests, leading to similar complaints by the other members. COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 5354.
401. See COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 55.
402. See Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 56 (statement of
Juanita Kreps); id. at 208-10 (statement of Richard Cooper); House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 191 (statement of William Root). Even with consensus at a general ethical or political level, as in the case of South Africa,
Rhodesia, or Cuba, there may be little agreement on precise goals or the appropriate course of action. See M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 94-96 (2d ed. 1980); L. KAPUNGU, THE U.N. AND ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA 40 (1973); H. STRACK, SANCTIONS: THE CASE OF
RHODESIA 30 (1978).
403. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 142, 146-47 (statement of William Root) (summarizing American foreign policy controls with reference to lack of foreign cooperation in each). Although American controls
aimed at Iran and at the U.S.S.R. after the invasion of Afghanistan have received greater cooperation (in part due to intense United States pressure), cooperation has hardly been total, and effectiveness remains at best an open
question.
404. See Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 27-29 (remarks of
Sen. Stevenson and Frank Wel) (French sale of computer to TASS replacing
that denied by United States). Cooperation with non-Western nations is even
less common. See Schreiber, Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign
Policy, 25 WORLD POLITICS 387, 394-405 (1973) (American embargo of Cuba led
to reorientation of trade to Communist nations).
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international cooperation has similarly plagued programs of
multilateral economic sanctions. 405
Studies of the United Nations embargo of Rhodesia reveal
an additional dimension of the foreign availability problem: illicit trade. Even with nearly universal participation in the embargo, Rhodesia was able to "prosper" under sanctions for
some ten years4 06 and was able to purchase virtually anything
it desired during the entire period of sanctions. 407 Much of its
trade was with (or through) Portugal, its colonies, and South
Africa, countries that did not join in the sanctions, 408 but "unacknowledged" or clandestine trade came to account for over half
of Rhodesia's exports and imports. 40 9
Some governments seemed unable to stop illicit trade despite the best of intentions due to a lack of bureaucratic resources, 41 0 insufficient legal authority, or similar problems. 41 1
Some breaches of sanctions, however, resulted from deliberate
governmental decisions such as the Byrd Amendment, which
permitted the United States to import Rhodesian chrome "in
405. See, e.g., Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, The "Economic Weapon" The
League and the United Nations, 1964 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 183, 194-85, 187
(describing lack of cooperation in the League of Nations embargo of Italy in
1935 and the United Nations embargo of the People's Republic of China in the
1950s).
406. H. STACK, supra note 402, at 237.
407. D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 98-99. Strack concludes that the economic sanctions against Rhodesia were less successful than the political and
other types of sanctions employed, H. STmACi, supra note 402, at 247, while Losman finds that the controls on exports to Rhodesia were the least effective of
the economic sanctions. D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 98-99. The major limit
on Rhodesia's imports under sanctions was a shortage of foreign exchange. Id.
408. South Africa is Rhodesia's neighbor to the south, and Mozambique, a
colony of Portugal when sanctions began, lies to the north and east. Since Rhodesia is landlocked, the assistance of these two states was crucial to its survival. See H. STAci, supra note 402, at 241-43. Indeed, Strack concludes that
the independence of Mozambique in 1975 was the most important development
in finally settling the Rhodesian crisis, in that after independence Mozambique
joined in the sanctions and began to act as a base for guerilla warfare. Id. at 31,
237-38, 252.
409. H. STRAcK, supra note 402, at 129. For an overview of "sanctions-breaking" activity and techniques, see id. at 129-41; L. KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at
108-13; P. KUYPER, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: THE
NETHERLANDS AND RHODESIA 99-121 (1978); R. LILuCH & F. NEwMAN, supra note

171, at 438-50.
410. See UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA 32 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL
REPORT 1977].
411. See P. KUYPER, supra note 409, at 99-121. Kuyper's work is a detailed
case study of the implementation of the Rhodesian sanctions by the Netherlands, a strong supporter of sanctions in the United Stations.
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blatant disregard of [its] treaty undertakings." 412 Still other
governments were actively involved in clandestine trade,4 13 the
now classic example being the complex machinations used to
deliver petroleum to Rhodesia in violation of the embargo and
in the face of a naval blockade.414
In short, international precedents confirm the American experience: efforts to achieve international cooperation in trade
controls are unlikely to eliminate foreign availability. If foreign
availability cannot be eliminated, instrumental trade controls
are likely to fail.
b.

Import Substitution

Just as export controls will be ineffective if the target nation can obtain comparable items from other suppliers, they
will also be ineffective if the target can develop comparable
items itself.415 Large, economically diverse and sophisticated
nations, such as the U.S.S.R.,416 are most adept at import substitution,4 17 but even less sophisticated nations like Rhodesia
can successfully develop substitutes. It is therefore rarely accurate to say that export controls "deny" essential goods or
technology to a target nation. Even if alternative supplies are
unavailable, controls can normally only postpone the time
412. Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973). The Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock
Piling Act, Pub. IL No. 92-156, § 503(2), 85 Stat. 427 (1971), forbade the President
to regulate or prohibit the importation from a non-Communist nation of any
product determined to be strategic and critical under that Act so long as it was
not illegal to import the same product from a Communist nation. Although the
amendment is still in effect, it ceased to apply to Rhodesia in 1977 by reason of
an amendment, adopted with the strong support of the President, to the United
Nations Participation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-12, 91 Stat. 22 (1977) (amending 22
U.S.C. § 287c (1979)). For a case study of the amendment, see H. STRAcK,SUpra
note 402, at 146-64.
413. See R. LILLICH & F. NEwmAN, supra note 171, at 439-43.
414. Id. at 449-50. See PoliticalDevelopments in Southern Rhodesia: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-63 (1977). The involvement of British officials in these
transactions (Britian was the sponsor of the sanctions) created a scandal in the
United Kingdom. R. LILLICH & F. NEwMAN,supra note 171, at 449-50.
415. See M. DOXEY, supra note 402, at 110; D. LosmAN, supra note 355, at 126;
Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 191.
416. The U.S.S.R. could in time probably develop any product the West
sought to deny it, if the product were important enough, and the U.S.S.R. has
done precisely that with many forms of technology. See Senate ForeignPolicy
Hearings,supra note 119, at 15 (statement of George Ball); id. at 57 (statement
of C. William Verity, Jr.); id. at 243 (statement of George Helland); Holzman &
Portes, The Limits of Pressure, 32 FOREIGN POL'Y 80, 87-89 (1978).
417. D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 126; Galtung, supra note 344, at 385-86;
Kiser, What Gap? Which Gap?, 32 FOREIGN POL'Y 90, 91 (1978).
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when the target nation obtains the controlled items, 4 18 while

imposing the costs of developing substitutes.419 These costs
may in time 420 or in special situations4 2 l be sufficiently burdensome to lead to political concessions by the target nation, but
judging from experience, such cases will be rare.
Forcing a target nation to develop import substitutes may
actually confer a benefit. American export controls have forced
the U.S.S.R. to develop certain technologies for which it had
been dependent on the United States;422 the 1980 grain embargo, similarly, is said to have had "an important stimulative
effect on Soviet agricultural policy ... ."423 Rhodesia developed industries under sanctions that might not otherwise have
become established for decades. 424 In such cases, sanctions result in a threefold loss for the countries imposing sanctions:
the desired political concession is not made, the opportunity for
future sales of the controlled item is lost, and whatever influence might have flowed from the target nation's dependence on
the item disappears. 425
418. House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 84 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); Holzman & Portes, supra note 416, at 87-89. The preservation of "lead
times" in the development of technologies with military applications is the acknowledged aim of American national security controls. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 161 (statement of Ellen Frost).
419. See D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 18, 118-19, 127; H. STRACK, supra note

402, at 86-97. Among the possible costs are the following: gains from trade on
the basis of comparative advantage may be lost, forced diversification may lead
to reductions in economies of scale, resources may have to be diverted from
other projects, and inefficiencies may develop from the lack of foreign competition. The greatest costs will result from controls on items for which demand in
the target nation is relatively inelastic-spare parts, certain raw materials-and
for which substitution is difficult-petroleum being the prime example. D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 14-16, 133.
420. The toll taken by the sanctions on Rhodesia, for example, did not become serious for some years. See H. STmAcI, supra note 402, at 96-97.
421. Professor Huntington argues that the 1978 controls on petroleum
equipment exports were designed to take advantage of such a situation. Huntington, supra note 317, at 76.
422. See note 416 supra; Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at
10 (statement of George Ball); id. at 291 (statement of National Machine Tool
Builders Association). See also Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at
104-05 (statement of Sen. Stevenson).
423.

Brand, Russia'sPrivate Farms Show State-Run Ones How to Raise Out-

put, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Brand, Soviets See Pluses in GrainEmbargo, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 27, col. 2; Medvedev, The GrainEmbargo: I,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1981, at 21, col. 1.
424. H. STRAc, supra note 402, at 15; D. LosmAN,supra note 355, at 111-12,
126-27.
425. See Bingham &Johnson, supra note 117, at 917.
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The Likelihood of Instrumental Success

Even if export controls can be designed to impose significant economic costs on a target nation, the likelihood that they
will be politically successful remains small. The extensive economic sanctions brought to bear on Cuba, Rhodesia, and other
nations, for example, have imposed enormous costs without
achieving the desired results.4 2 6 Studies of these sanctions
contradict an assumption basic to the instrumental rationalethat target governments respond rationally to economic pressure. These studies demonstrate that resistance to sanctions is
also compelled by less rational forces like personal and national pride, and that a target nation will often endure substantial sacrifice rather than accede to external demands. 4 2 7 They
also demonstrate that a target nation may have a startling ability to resist economic deprivation.4 28 These findings are discussed below. For the sake of clarity, the discussion is divided
somewhat artificially into political and economic categories.
a. Political Factors
Two factors that influence the target's decision to resist are
particularly relevant to United States export controls. First, the
value to the target government of the policy or conduct under
attack fundamentally affects both its logical and emotional responses.4 29 When the target believes strongly in its course of
conduct, sanctions may lead to a strengthening of the will to resist rather than the capitulation predicted by the instrumental
rationale.43 0 The importance of this factor casts doubt on the
efficacy of many American export controls-such as those intended to promote regional stability in the Middle East and to
oppose Middle East terrorism-which seek to influence deeply
426. See L. KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at 127-28; D. LosuAN, supra note 355,
at 43-44, 125; H. STRAcK,supra note 402, at 237.
427. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of
George Ball) ("no political leader of a major country can ever admit, either by
word or action, that he is taking instructions from the U.S. Government").
428. Galtung finds that "hidden forces" are released in the target. Galtung,
supra note 344, at 409.
429. Cf.M. McDoUGAL & P. FELCIcANo, supra note 1, at 33 (quoting Clausewitz: '"The smaller the sacrifice we demand from an adversary, the slighter we
may expect his efforts to be to refuse it to us." Id. at n.92.)
430. Galtung, supra note 344, at 389; cf.Doxey, The Rhodesian Sanctions Experiment, 1971 Y.B. WoRLD AFF. 142, 157-59. Wallensteen's study of twentieth
century economic sanctions found that most sanctions programs sought
changes in policies that were fundamentally important to the target nation, and
that target governments bolstered their internal support by stressing the challenge to fundamental values. Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 256-57, 262.

1981]

EXPORT CONTROLS

held values. Some commentators believe that changes within a
target nation's society may be perceived as more fundamental
than changes in external relations. 43 1 To the extent this is true,
it also casts doubt on controls aimed at changing human rights
practices in the Soviet Union, South Africa, and elsewhere.
Second, sanctions imposed in public view may force the
target's government to resist in order to avoid public embarrassment and to demonstrate its independence. 4 32 Although
even Professor Huntington acknowledges the dangers of publicity and urges a policy of "quiet leverage" applied "subtly and
discreetly rather than openly and arrogantly," 433 such advice is
difficult to follow. 434 New validated license controls are highly
visible, whether imposed by the executive branch and announced in the Export Administration Bulletin and the Federal
Register or imposed by Congress. Huntington urges the extension of validated license control over a larger number of products, even with no present intention of prohibiting their export,
so that the Executive can in the future prohibit exports more
easily, and presumably more discreetly, through license denials. 435 Even individual licensing decisions, however, tend to become public knowledge through the complaints of exporters
and the efforts of the trade and general press. More importantly, any significant extension of validated license controls
would place a greater burden on the already strained resources
of the export control bureaucracy; would increase the expense,
delay, and uncertainty with which the exporting community
must contend, even if all licenses were granted; and would run
counter to the efforts of Congress to increase the amount of information flowing to the public about control policy.436 These
costs greatly outweigh any benefit that might be gained from
reducing the publicity given to export controls.
431. See Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 256-57, 262.
432. House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of George
Ball); M. DoxEY, supra note 402, at 121-22; Sirkin, Can a Human Rights Policy
Be Consistent?, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 199, 202 (P. Brown
& D. MacLean eds. 1979).
433. Huntington, supra note 317, at 72.
434. Some of the controls discussed in Part III of this Article seem to have
been announced as publicly as possible-in a presidential statement, for example-in pursuit of various secondary goals. More recent sanctions aimed at the
U.S.S.R. and Iran were, if anything, announced with even greater fanfare than
any controls discussed in Part III. See notes 802-10 infra and accompanying
text.
435. Huntington, supra note 317, at 76. Again, the petroleum equipment
controls embody Huntington's recommendations. See note 351 supra and accompanying text.
436. See note 765 infra and accompanying text.
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Economic sanctions may also strengthen a target government's ability to mobilize effective resistance to external pressure once a decision to resist has been made. Popular support
for the regime may increase, giving it a stronger hand in resisting the sanctioners' demands. 437 The very economic sacrifices the target society must endure may boost morale and
political cohesion. 438 Target leadership has in some cases increased political unity by skillful internal propaganda that
paints the government as the unyielding defender of national
interests, 439 using the sanctions as a political rallying point.440
Such political measures, as well as the economic mobilization
needed to resist sanctions, may incidentally tend to strengthen
the conservative forces in a society and make its government
more authoritarian, to the possible detriment of the target nation's population.4 4 '
b. Economic Factors
Although some nations are more vulnerable than others to
the economic effects of sanctions, 442 any target nation can take
437. Strack, for example, notes a "consensus among scholars" that economic sanctions are not only ineffective instrumentally "but may well be dysfunctional or counterproductive... in the sense that they tend to increase the
internal political cohesion of the target-state and increase its will to resist." IL
STRACK, supra note. 402, at xi-xii.

438. Galtung, supra note 344, at 389, 394; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra
note 405, at 191 (finding that the effort to influence a target by expressing disapproval of its conduct through sanctions "seems uniformly to have boomeranged" by increasing morale). Cf. M. DoxEY, supra note 402, at 120-23
(external threat may induce heightened sense of solidarity).
439. Galtung, supra note 344, at 395. In the early years of 'the Rhodesian
sanctions the Smith government rallied support by casting itself as the defender of national interests against outside pressure, unyielding to foreign demands. See Doxey, supra note 430, at 157-59. Externally, manipulation of the
target's image can weaken the resolve of sanctioning states. See H. STRACK,
supra note 402, at 249-50.
440. The phrase is from Schreiber, supra note 404, at 404, describing Fidel
Castro's use of American sanctions to make himself "look like a hero" to his
people and to divert attention from pressing internal problems.
441. House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 54 (statement of Thomas
Wolfe). Wallensteen found that target governments became both more authoritarian and more stable during sanctions. Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 255-58,
264. In the case of Rhodesia, Kapungu finds that the sanctions welded together
the conservative elements of the society into a strong alliance, L. KAPuNGU,
supra note 402, at 128, while Strack finds that in 1975 the Rhodesian Front
Party was "never stronger" in spite of ten years of sanctions. H. STmAcK, supra
note 402, at 237. Some of the methods used by the government to consolidate
its political position are described in L. KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at 103-08. Cf.
D. LosmAN, supra note 355, at 128-30 (detailing potential adaptive adjustments
within target states).
442. The most important factors in determining the vulnerability of a target

1981]

EXPORT CONTROLS

steps to minimize and absorb the economic costs imposed by
sanctions without acceding to the demands of the sanctioners. 44 3 A target nation can also impose costs upon the sanctioners as part of its defense. A major reason for the failure of past
sanctions programs has been advance preparation by the target
on all of these fronts.4 44 The methods of preparing for economic warfare have become so widely known in the twentieth
century that they can be referred to as "standard."445 They include stockpiling, rationing, developing domestic substitutes,
stimulating diversification, and developing both overt and illicit
alternative supply sources.446 Countries that expect to be the
targets of new or expanded American foreign policy controls
can institute such measures in anticipation.
Once sanctions are imposed, the target can minimize its
costs through trade reorientation, import substitution, and similar measures. When sanctions are not complete and universal,
their impact will often decrease over time as new economic patterns become established.447 The target may receive substantial economic assistance from allies or other nations opposed to
the program of sanctions, leading to new, supportive political
relationships. 4 48
A particularly pernicious variant of cost minimization is
economy to export controls are generally thought to be the importance to the

target nation's economy of the following factors: imports from the sanctioning
states, imports of the items controlled (especially the elasticity of demand for
imported products) and the economic sectors that depend on imports. See L.
KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at 44-47; D. LosmAN, supra note 355, at 14-16, 133; Galtung, supra note 344, at 385-86.
443. The only strategies available to a target nation are (1) to take advantage of foreign availability by restructuring its trade patterns away from the
sanctioning states, or by developing illicit trade; (2) to restructure its own economy to develop substitutes for controlled imports; and (3) to absorb the costs
imposed by the sanctions. See D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 126-28; Galtung,
supra note 344, at 387-88; MacDonald, Economic Sanctions in the International
System, 1969 CAN. Y.B. INT'L I. 61, 85-86.
444. See L. KAPuNGu, supra note 402, at 130; H. STRAcK, supra note 402, at
22-23.
445. M. McDOUGAL & P. FEraca~, supra note 1, at 328.
446. Id.; M. DoxEY, supra note 402, at 119-22; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld,
supra note 405, at 191. Rhodesia's preparations are described in L. KAPUNGu,
supra note 402, at 108-21.
447. D. LosmAN, supra note 355, at 14-16,45; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra
note 405, at 195. Cf. Galtung, supra note 344, at 410-11 (whether lack of universality accounts for failure of multilateral sanctions programs can only be assessed by reference to individual cases).
448. See, e.g., Schreiber, supra note 404, at 394-405 (describing assistance
rendered to Cuba by Soviet Union). But cf. H. STmAcK, supra note 402, at 252-53
(target's maintenance and development of international relationships does not
necessarily lead to the acquisition of legitimacy from other countries).
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the allocation of costs to powerless sectors of the target nation's society. Rhodesia, for example, had a dual economy during the sanctions period: most Africans lived near subsistence
while most Europeans lived at a more prosperous level. 449 The
Rhodesian government was able to deflect many of the economic burdens resulting from sanctions-especially unemployment-onto the African population, keeping the white
population at high levels of employment through subsidies and
450
other measures.
Research has demonstrated that target nations can absorb
the irreducible economic costs of sanctions and can even prosper by mobilizing their economies to a degree only possible
with the heightened morale and political unity of a crisis.
Some sixteen years ago, Taubenfeld perceptively summarized
for the American Society of International Law the potential of
economic mobilization in this setting, 45 1 observing that techniques first learned in wartime and since practiced in planned
economies may allow a target to refuse the demands of its
sanctioners, at least for some time, even in the face of "universal, perfectly applied" economic sanctions. Rationing and voluntary sacrifice can reduce demand. To increase production,
the target nation can utilize underemployed capital equipment,
land, and labor to full capacity, resulting in nearly costless production increases. In the crisis atmosphere it can often find
"slack in the system" that enables it to expand the productivity
of land and labor beyond normal capacity. It can extend its
capital stock beyond its normal life through deferral of maintenance and similar techniques. 452 Such measures, coupled with
the protection from import competition which sanctions incidentally provide, may lead to something of an economic
453
boom.
The populations of target nations have been willing to
make the sacrifices necessary for the success of these tactics, 454
reflecting the combined operation of the political factors discussed above and the economic techniques just discussed. The
449. See M. DOXEY, supra note 402, at 76.
450. L. KAPuNGU, supra note 402, at 116-18; D. LOSMAN, supra note 355, at
112-15; H. STACK, supra note 402, at 237.
451. See Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 188.
452. Id. at 188-92.
453. There often is a second boom following the end of sanctions because
built-up demand must be satisfied and extended capital stock must be replaced. Id.; M. DOXEY, supra note 402, at 110-11.
454. D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 128; Galtung, supra note 344, at 391-98;
MacDonald, supra note 443, at 85-86.
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actions taken by the government to mobilize the economy, the
psychological response to external pressure, and the sacrifices
incurred in resisting sanctions all contribute to a level of morale and political unity that make successful mobilization possible.
Most targets will also be able to retaliate economically by
defaulting on government and private debts, freezing the assets
of the sanctioners and their citizens, or expropriating property.4 55 A target that trades actively with the sanctioners-especially if it supplies vital raw materials-can impose
substantial economic costs on them through trade controls of
its own. 45 6 Any target can also retaliate by taking action
against citizens of the sanctioners within its borders. 45 7 Even
when economic counter-measures are not available, powerful
nations can respond with political and military moves,4 58 while
weak nations may be able to mobilize international public opinion against the sanctioners by protesting interference in their
45 9
affairs by stronger powers.
The best example of target resistance is again the case of
Rhodesia. 460 The Rhodesian embargo is in many ways the most
favorable precedent for the use of multilateral economic sanctions: the level of participation and the endurance of the sanctioners were particularly impressive,4 6 ' and the embargo at
least contributed to the final settlement of the crisis.4 62 The
455. See M. DOXEY, supra note 402, at 120; MacDonald, supra note 443, at 84.
Losman and Strack both note that Rhodesia's counter-sanctions in the financial
area were more effective than the financial sanctions imposed upon Rhodesia,
at least initially. D. LOsMAN, supra note 355, at 105; H. STRACIK, supra note 402,
at 97-98. Rhodesia regularly reminded sanctioning states of the counter-sanctions it could impose. H. STRACK, supra note 402, at 249-50.
456. The United States for example, depends heavily on imports for many
essential metals and minerals. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TwENTY-THiRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE TRADE AGREE-

MENTS PROGRAM 140-41 (1978) (Table 33).
457. The impact of hostage-taking, albeit not in the context of retaliation for
economic sanctions, was demonstrated by the United States-Iranian crisis in

1980.
458. Such responses were of concern in relation to the controls on exports
of petroleum equipment to the Soviet Union. See note 320 supra and accompanying text.
459. See Doxey, supra note 430, at 123. A sanctioning state will ordinarily
evaluate the possible retaliatory moves of the target before initiating sanctions
and will not implement them if the likely cost seems too high. Such considerations produce much of the inconsistency that plagues the American doctrine of
promoting respect for human rights abroad. See, e.g., Sirkin, supra note 432, at
205.
460. See R. ILUmCH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 171, at 450-63.
461. H. STRACK, supra note 402, at 252.
462. Id. at 253.
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fact remains, however, that Rhodesia survived over a decade of
nearly universal embargo before beginning to implement any of
the social or political changes sought by Britain and the international community.463 It is true that its survival depended in
large part on strategically located nonparticipants and on illicit
trade,4 6 4 but much of its success-which may be deplored, but
cannot be denied-must be credited to its own ability to
restructure its trade, diversify and mobilize its economy, and
46 5
Inotherwise adapt to the pressures created by sanctions.
deed, some analysts feel that sanctions alone would never have
led to capitulation by Rhodesia's white government; success
came only with the escalating guerilla war.466 Cuba likewise illustrates the ability of a target to resist. It has absorbed even
greater economic punishment from the American embargo than
Rhodesia did from sanctions46 7 and its economy has struggled.
With substantial help from the Soviet Union, however, it too
has survived with its policies unchanged and now poses even
4 68
greater challenges to American foreign policy.
It bears repeating that the analysis of target nation resistance presented in these sections is based primarily on experience with multilateral sanctions programs involving not only
export controls but controls on imports, financial transactions,
transportation, and communications-true economic warfare.
In that context, it is wholly appropriate to speak of "capitulation" and "economic mobilization." In the context of United
States export controls, however, the language of economic warfare is normally out of proportion to the facts. Except in highly
unusual circumstances, the type of export controls authorized
by the EAA469 can have nothing like the political or economic
effects of full-scale multilateral sanctions. The analysis of effec463. The Salisbury Agreement of March 3, 1978, reprinted in R. LmUCH & F.
NEwMAN, supra note 171, at 396-401, first led to elections in Rhodesia and the
installation of a Black Prime Minister.
464. See notes 406-09 supra and accompanying text.
465. See L. KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at 103-122; H. STRACK, supra note 402,
at 85-97.
466. See H. STRAcK, supra note 402, at 237-38; Arnold, White Exodus, not
Sanctions, is DrainingRhodesia, 11 NEw ATmcAN DEv. 393, 394 (1977).
467. D. LosrmN, supra note 355, at 43-45, 125.
468. See Schreiber, supra note 404, at 394-405.
469. The trade controls against Uganda and the Group Z nations do constitute nearly total trade embargoes (with the important exception of food exports to Uganda). These embargoes, however, have rarely been multilateral,
and have not been instituted under the EAA. The 1979 House EAA bill would
have provided that the Act did not authorize total embargoes. This. provision
was removed in conference, because no provision was thought necessary.
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tiveness presented in these sections thus applies a fortiori to
American political export controls.
4. Quasi-InstrumentalMotivations
The pure instrumental rationale is concerned with forcing
change in target nation behavior. Other theories advanced to
justify political trade controls also focus on the potential effect
of controls on the target, although they acknowledge that actual
change in target conduct is not attainable. These theories
might be called quasi-instrumental rationales.
One such theory holds that export and other trade controls
are effective ways to punish a target for past behavior. One
student of economic sanctions concludes that punishment is
often the dominant motive of sanctioning states, even when
their expressed goals are instrumental. 4 0 Other scholars have
also identified retribution as a motivation for both multilateral47 1 and unilateral 472 sanctions programs. Although retribution is rarely advanced openly in support of United States
export controls, 473 it often appears as an underlying rationale.474
Another theory holds that controls can function as a deterrent, putting the target nation on notice of the economic hardships the sanctioners can create and leading it to think twice
before repeating disfavored conduct. Deterrence, unlike retribution, is openly advanced in justification of American political
export controls. 475
Export controls are also sometimes urged as a means of
communicating to the target nation that the United States disapproves of its conduct. 47 6 The expression of disapproval, not
470. Galtung, supra note 344, at 380-81.
471. E.g., H. STRACK, supra note 402, at 238.
472. See Schreiber, supra note 404, at 389.
473. But see text accompanying note 318 supra (petroleum equipment controls first justified as "reprisal").
474. See, e.g., Uganda Hearings, supra note 202, at 82 ("there are certain
prescriptive rules of behavior which apply to the rulers of all nations. Those
who violate such rules jeopardize their standing in the community of nations.
Uganda... belongs outside of the fellowship of civilized nations and should
thus be denied its benefits.") (statement of Sen. Weicker).
475. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 376.14(a) (1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 1595,
1598 (1980) (crime detection equipment controls).
476. For example, President Carter stated of the various actions taken to
protest the Shcharansky and Ginzburg trials, "We have expressed our displeasure in a very moderate way." N.Y. Times, July 21, 1978, at A-6, col 1. The function of "sending a message" to the target has also motivated certain
multilateral sanctions. Wallensteen, for example, concludes that most sanc-
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the creation of economic hardship, appears as the primary purpose. The precise object of conveying such a message of disapproval is not always made clear; it may be thought that
exerting moral or psychological pressure on the target will lead
it to change its policies or will act as punishment or as a deter477
rent.
Unfortunately, these justifications for export controls are
subject to the same limitations as the instrumental rationale itself. The economic, political, and psychological factors discussed above make export controls generally an unsatisfactory
form of retribution, a weak deterrent, and an ineffective vehicle
for exerting moral pressure.478
Other potential results claimed for political trade controls
do not involve any effect on the target nation itself, but are nevertheless put forward as instrumental in nature. The benefit
most often cited in this context is gaining the favor of third
countries that oppose the target nation's conduct, "associating
the U.S. diplomatically with one group of countries as against
another."4 79 The United States, for example, refused to terminate the embargo of Rhodesia upon the installation of the
Muzorewa government primarily for this reason.4 0 Another
benefit claimed is "rais [ing] the visibility" of an issue such as
human rights,481 even if little can be done to increase respect
for human rights within the particular target country. The aim
may be to exert subtle pressure on other nations,4 8 2 to lay the
groundwork for cooperation in future actions, or to mobilize
tions programs function primarily as a rejection of the target and its values.
Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 262-65; see Galtung, supra note 344, at 399.
477. See Galtung, supra note 344, at 399-404. When strong, positive emotional feelings prevail between the target and the sanctioners, the moral pressure of disapproval might achieve results. Ordinarily, however, expressing
disapproval will not cause the target to repent and might have the opposite result. C. BROWN-JOHN, MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS IN IxTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYsis 363 (1975).
478. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 42, 78 (statement of

Dimitri Simes).
479. H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1979); see House EAA
HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 191 (statement of William Root).
480. See Trade Sanctions Against Rhodesia: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1979) (statement of Cyrus
Vance).
481. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 147 (statement of
William Root).
482. Pressure applied to third countries through example and the force of
public opinion may help make controls instrumentally effective. See, e.g.,
Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 112 (statements of Sen. Church and William Harrup); Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 56 (statements of
Sen. Proxmire and Juanita Kreps); id. at 79 (statement of Juanita Kreps).
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public opinion. 4 83 More generally, some have argued that
strong moral stands will increase international respect for the
48 4
United States, thereby creating new leverage.
These indirect justifications for political trade controls
seem intuitively to have merit. Even though they are often
phrased in instrumental terms, however, they cannot be analyzed or tested in the same way as the instrumental rationale
or its more direct variants. Because the benefits claimed are so
subtle and so much a matter of judgment, these arguments are
best considered in the context of the symbolic rationale, discussed in the next section.
5.

Summary

The literature reveals a "striking consensus . . .that economic sanctions alone have been ineffective in the fulfillment
of their primary [that is, instrumental] objectives."48 5 Following an exhaustive study of the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, for example, Strack
concluded that, in terms of their political achievements, sanctions "must be regarded as marginal instruments of influence
best employed in conjunction with other means of influence
such as armed force."48 6 Kapungu also concluded from his
study of the Rhodesian case that sanctions are only likely to be
effective as an adjunct to the use of force.487 The Taubenfelds
concluded from their study of collective sanctions that there is
a "prima facie case against economic measures used alone." 48 8
The concept of a prima facie case against the effectiveness
of export controls suggests fundamental changes in the scope
of executive authority under the EAA. As demonstrated in this
section, the likelihood that political export controls will be successful in modifying (or even in deterring) target nation conduct must ordinarily be regarded as extremely small. 489 With
483. Helping to create world public opinion favorable to human rights is one
of the achievements credited to the United States human rights policy. See,
e.g., Robertson, Human Rights, A Global Assessment, in D. KOMMERS & G. LOEscHER,HuimAN RIGHTs AND AMERICAN FOREIGN PoUCY 5, 24 (1979).

484. See, e.g., Farer, United States Foreign Policy and the Protection of
Human Rights: Observationsand Proposals,14 VA. J. INT'L L. 623, 625-27 (1974)
("the appearance of virtue can be converted into the currency of power").
485. Barber, Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument, 55 INT'L AFFs. 367,
373 (1979); see H. STRAcic, supra note 402, at xi-xii.
486. H. STmAcK, supra note 402, at 253.
487. L KAPUNGU, supra note 402, at 129.
488. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 188.
489. But see Galtung, supra note 344, at 410. The Rhodesian sanctions might
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successful instrumental use so exceptional, an unrestricted delegation of authority to the Executive to control American exports for political purposes seems misguided. Executive
authority would be more nearly consistent with the actual utility of export controls if the President were required to make a
case for the effectiveness of any proposed instrumental control
sufficient to overcome the "prima facie case" against it.490
B.

THE SYMBOLIC RATIONALE

The instrumental rationale has been the dominant theoretical justification for multilateral economic sanctions in the twentieth century4 91 and has been advanced in support of American
foreign policy export controls as we1. 492 Yet the deliberations
on EAA '79 suggest that the principal justification for United
States political export controls may now be symbolic rather
than instrumental: that controls can and should be used to give
vent to American disapproval or outrage at the behavior of a
target nation, regardless of whether there are any direct or in493
direct instrumental results.
Students of multilateral economic sanctions agree that
their expressive function has often been a central reason for
their use.494 Wallensteen, for example, found that public statements by governments imposing economic sanctions tended to
be dominated by expressive, emotional elements, reflecting
perceptions that the target had breached norms important to
the sanctioners; the instrumental or pragmatic content of the
statements was very small.4 95 He concluded that, although the
have been more effective had not two neighboring states refused to participate.
See note 408 supra.
490. In note 392 supra, it is suggested that those who propose instrumental
export controls should carry a burden of proof on the issue of foreign availability. The present point expands on that suggestion to take account of other issues discussed in this section. Part VI of this Article considers how the
suggestion could be implemented.
491. See Barber, supra note 485, at 370, 373; Galtung, supra note 344, at 379,
388. Some analysts think of economic sanctions only in terms of instrumentality. See, e.g., D. LosmAN, supra note 355, at 1.
492. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 317. Various writers have characterized instrumental goals as "primary" and symbolic purposes as "secondary."
See, e.g., H. STRACK, supra note 402, at 24-30. Barber also identified-in the context of multilateral controls-the "tertiary" purposes of supporting international law or organizations. Barber, supra note 485, at 370-73.
493. See, e.g., Uganda Hearings,supra note 202, at 5 (statement of Sen.
Hatfield) ("We are looking now to this committee to articulate and to bring into
focus the essence of indignation represented by these various resolutions.").
494. See, e.g., Galtung, supra note 344, at 411-12.
495. Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 252-54.
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language of instrumentality may later be used to rationalize
their actions, the motives of sanctioning states are less to mod49 6
ify target nation behavior than to express their own feelings.
The Taubenfelds concluded that some sanctions programs have
actually been designed to fail instrumentally: to be strong
enough to express disapproval, but not effective enough to truly
497
damage the target or cause it to retaliate.
In the United States, the importance of the symbolic function is evident from the highly emotional statements in Congress by supporters of the Uganda embargo 498 and the
restrictions on exports of crime detection equipment. 4 99 The
symbolic rationale is captured in a hypothetical case that is frequently repeated as a shorthand for symbolic controls: should
the United States refuse to sell thumbscrews, useful only as instruments of torture, to an agency of a government believed to
violate human rights, even though such a refusal would do
nothing to prevent that government from torturing its citizens?
Among members of Congress, the executive branch, and private interest groups, there is wide agreement that it should.500
On the part of the executive branch, the symbolic rationale
has most often been expressed as a desire to use export controls to "demonstrate our opposition" to "abhorrent behavior"
(such as apartheid),501 to "disassociate" or "distance" the
United States from repressive foreign governments or agencies
thereof,502 or to respond to "extreme acts" of which the United
States disapproves. 503 Even when foreign conduct is not as
morally offensive as apartheid, but is merely distasteful or dis496. Id.
497. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 201. Galtung agrees that
the symbolic function is best served when the "value-deprivation" imposed on
the target nation is kept low. Galtung, supra note 344, at 411-12.
498. See, e.g., House EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 119, at 149 (statement
of Rep. Pease); notes 474, 493 supra.
499. Discussions of the crime detection items, in particular, often assumed a
highly emotional character, as speakers drew analogies to the sale of gas chamber equipment to Hitler, concentration camp supplies to Stalin, and handcuffs
to the KGB. See, e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 250, at 140-41,
157 (statement of Jerry Goodman); id. at 147-48 (statement of Robert Gordon);
Senate EAA HearingsPartIII, supra note 116, at 26 (statement of Frank Weil).
500. See, e.g., HR. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979); House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 80 (statements of Rep. Bingham and James
Giffen).
501. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 132, 145, 148 (state-

ment of William Root).
502. Id. at 686 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
503. House EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 119, at 9 (statement of William
Root).
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favored, the government has relied on export controls to
achieve distance from events or practices it opposes, refusing
to continue "business as usual" with the responsible governments.04 Indeed, the desire to use export controls symbolically became, under the Carter Administration, the principal
argument for continued and unrestrained executive discretion
505
to control exports for foreign policy purposes.
The belief that the government should restrict or prohibit
exports in order to express moral feelings, or simply to disassociate itself from distasteful conduct, regardless of instrumental
effects, is predictably controversial. It is derided as a desire to
produce a rewarding "moral glow," as a simplistic refusal to
"sup with the devil,"5 06 and as a hypocritical policy;5 07 and it is
denounced by businessmen. 08 By others, however, it is supported as allowing the nation to express its moral feelings in a
satisfying way, preserve its self-respect, 09 and release accumulated moral indignation.5' 0 Instrumental results, though longrange and indirect, may also be anticipated.5 11
This writer is prepared to agree that restrictions on economic intercourse are sometimes appropriate to express American distaste or moral outrage at the policies or conduct of
another nation. The thumbscrew case, for example, is appealing. The rationale does, however, have troublesome implications. First, restrictions on trade are a costly means of
expressing national opinion on moral or political issues. 12 In504. See, e.g., President's Report on Grain Embargo Under EAA '79, reprinted in U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 292, at M-1 (Jan. 29, 1980). See also
note 299 supra and accompanying text.
505. E.g., House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 686-87 (statement of
Stanley Marcuss), House EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 119, at 9 (statement
of William Root); id. at 145 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
506. House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 17 (statement of George
Ball).
507. See, e.g., House EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 119, at 147 (statement
of Rep. Fithian).
508. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings, supra note 119, at 322-23
(statement of John James).
509. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 485, at 380; Bilder, Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Policy: Short Term Prospects, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 608-09 (1974).
510. See Hoffman, The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative
Analysis, 4 J. PEACE RES. 140, 154-55 (1967); Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 25254. Hoffman finds that sanctions allow governments to act when they experience irresistible pressure to provide such a release, but simultaneously allow
them to placate those pressuring the government not to act or not to do too
much.
511. See notes 479-84 supra and accompanying text.
512. For a discussion of the costs of imposing export controls, see text accompanying notes 521-706 infra.
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deed, one attraction of the thumbscrew case may be that it involves nearly de minimis costs. Second, there has been an
increasing number of issues on which the United States has
felt compelled to express a position. This Article has traced the
growth of foreign policy export controls during the 1970s largely
in terms of the emergence of such morally engaging issues. Finally, there appears to be an increasing tendency to turn to export controls as a favored vehicle for symbolic expression,
particularly on the part of the executive branch, which has
broad authority to invoke controls under the EAA.
The latter two observations underlie the criticism that
American export controls have been imposed simply because
the responsible officials have concluded that they must "do
something" in response to a development abroad that implicates one of a growing number of sensitive issues. 513 The
charge is not baseless-the need to act, regardless of results,
has been identified by scholars as a frequent motivation for
both unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions. 514 Galtung
finds that the value of "at least doing something," or of creating
"the illusion of being instrumental," is of major importance to
sanctioning states.5 15 Barber notes that "[i]t is generally important for governments to be seen to be concerned and busy"
and concludes that an important objective of economic sanctions is to demonstrate the government's willingness to act,
even if little is achieved.16 The "do something" tendency visible in United States export control policy 5 17 has been of concern not only to the business community,5 1 8 but also to more
objective students of international relations, 19 and even to
some advocates of action to promote the observance of human
513. See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 266 (statement
of Machinery and Allied Products Institute); House EAA HearingsPartI, supra
note 21, at 79 (statement of James Giffen) (if executive branch has export con-

trol authority, it will inevitably use it).
514. See, e.g., Wallensteen, supra note 357, at 252-54, 262.

515. Galtung, supra note 344, at 411-12; see Hoffman, supra note 510, at 15455.
516. Barber, supra note 485, at 380. Barber cites a remark of David Lloyd
George concerning the British sanctions against Italy, occasioned by the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia, under the auspices of the League of Nations: 'They came
too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the Government." Id.
517. The most striking example is in UgandaHearings,supra note 202, at 85
(statement of Sen. Weicker) ("[T[o me what is important . . . is that we

act. ... What I am really for is that we do something.").
518. See note 508 supra and accompanying text.
519. See House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 442 (statement of Dimitri Simes); id, at 295 (statement of Arthur Downey).
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rights. 5 20
The challenge of the symbolic rationale is to draft legislation that will permit the symbolic use of export controls in situations of major moral or political importance, but that will
restrain the growth of symbolic controls as a reflexive response
to the enormous range of foreign acts and policies of which the
United States might disapprove. Part V of this Article will examine how EAA '79 attempts to meet that challenge.
C. THE COSTS OF POLrrcAL EXPORT CoNTROLS
Neither the instrumental nor the symbolic rationale for
political export controls can be properly evaluated unless the
costs incurred by the nation implementing such controls are
balanced against the potential benefits. This section will consider three types of costs: economic, political, and systemic.
1. Economic Costs
a. Lost Transactions
The economic costs of export controls are largely the product of several classes of foregone transactions that extend well
beyond the balance sheets of the exporters directly affected.
The first class consists of export sales actually prohibited.
According to the Commerce Department, the value of sales for
which licenses were denied on foreign policy grounds during
1977 and 1978 was only $112 million.521 Other transactions
might properly be included in this class, however: sales lost because of delay 522 in processing license applications,

52 3

and sales

520. Weissbrodt expresses concern that piecemeal responses to human
rights violations motivated by a desire to "do something" damage the structure
of the United States human rights policy. Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 262.
521. Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 82 (statement of
Juanita Kreps).
522. Delay is a problem of long standing. Despite past congressional efforts
to establish deadlines for consideration of license applications, the problem
seems to have remained quite serious. See, e.g., Senate EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 106, at 11 (statement of Comptroller General Elmer Staats); id. at
29, 43, 53, 63 (statement of Juanita Kreps); Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra
note 250, at 61 (statement of Scientific Apparatus Makers Association); id at 63
(statement of American Electronics Association). Congress tried again in 1979.
One of the "principal objectives" of the 1979 House bill was to improve the efficiency of the licensing system by establishing a series of "suspense points" at
which certain actions would be required. H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5. The Senate bill had similar objectives. S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note
31, at 9-11. Section 10 of EAA '79 establishes procedures for processing license
applications based on the Senate provision. See H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 96-482,
supra note 10, at 49-50.
523. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 964-66 (statement of

1981]

EXPORT CONTROLS

not consummated because the parties expected that the licensing process would be lengthy and expensive or that the needed
license would not be issued. For the exporting firm, such lost
sales translate into reduced production, profits, and reinvestment; for the workers of the firm they may translate into reduced wages or unemployment. 24 Similar effects are felt
among suppliers to the exporting firm, and a negative 'ripple
5 25
effect" passes through affected communities.

The second class of foregone transactions is closely related
to the first. Rarely do exports of sophisticated industrial machines, aircraft, or other capital goods involve the sale of only
the original item. Such exports ordinarily lead to further sales
as well: spare or replacement parts, "add-on" equipment, new
generations of equipment to replace obsolete models, and training and maintenance services.5 26 The loss of these sales produces comparable adverse effects, though they are less visible.
The third and broadest class of foregone transactions results not from direct interference with specific exports, but
from the existence of a practice of interfering with exports.
Since major export sales often lead to and grow out of longterm business relationships, the confidence of both buyer and
seller is required.5 27 To the extent foreign purchasers believe
that the United States has adopted a policy of prohibiting or restricting exports for political reasons, they may come to think
James Gray); id. at 285 (statement of Frederick Huszagh). Professor Huszagh,
Executive Director of the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative
Law at the University of Georgia, conducted extensive research on export control procedures as adviser to the Committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations of the National Governors Association. Id. at 282. He notes that
empirical studies have shown delay in delivery to be a significant factor in a
buyer's decision to purchase capital goods. The Rusk Center is conducting research to estimate the effects of licensing delay on the competitiveness of the
product groups most frequently subject to United States validated license procedures, and their "[p]reliminary calculations suggest that for some high technology products delivery delays have a significant effect on competitiveness."
Id. at 285.
524. See Senate ForeignPolicy Hearings,supra note 119, at 33 (statement of
David Packard); id. at 302-04 (statement of American Electronics Association).
On the effect on employment in particular, see id. at 365 (statement of United
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers). Cf. C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at
20 (beyond the "obvious effect on jobs and output," export controls will
"weaken the controlling country's exchange rate over the long run, adding to its
inflationary pressures, even if there is no such effect in the short run").
525. See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 324 (statement
of Dresser Industries, Inc.).
526. See id. at 306 (statement of American Electronics Association); id. at
311 (statement of National Foreign Trade Council).
527. See Shultz, Give Us the Rules, and We Will Finish the Job, AcRoss THE
BoARD, May 1979, at 78, 80.
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of American firms as unreliable suppliers 528 and may consequently consider third country or domestic suppliers more favorably. Even if alternative products are more expensive or of
poorer quality, concern over American export control policy
5 29
Alcan render them equivalent in the minds of buyers.
though the effect may be more pronounced in nations already
subject to some controls and aware of the danger,53 0 it may be
felt in any nation that fears becoming a target of future controls.531 Further, because the United States seeks to regulate
reexports of its products and technical information and even of
the goods made with the use of controlled information, major
American trading partners may begin to seek alternate supply
sources for sensitive products and technologies, even for benign products to be exported to sensitive areas, all to avoid the
interference of American reexport controls. 532 Any permanent
diversion of trade brought about by such concerns could profoundly affect the relative economic and political power of the
United States.

5 33

528. This is a concern of both the business community and government officials. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 24-25 (statement of David Packard); id. at 306 (statement of American Electronics
Association); Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 250, at 85, 91-92 (statement of Robert McLellan for National Association of Manufacturers); Senate
EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 106, at 7 (statement of Elmer Staats); id. at
152 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten).
529. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 285 (statement of
Frederick Huszagh) (buyer awareness of past license denials may create a
"learning curve," leading buyers to "consciously discount the attributes of U.S.
products by the probability that the license will not be granted.").
530. See Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 250, at 264-67 (statement
of Machinery and Allied Products Institute) (examples from the case of South
Africa). William Root, of the State Department's East-West Trade Office, states
that the U.S.S.R. has made the United States the "supplier of last resort."
Rattner, Trade Curbs By U.S. Hinge On Its Allies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, at 14,
col. 1 (quoting Root). See also Medvedev, supra note 423 ("the leaders clearly
plan to end all future substantial grain purchases in America").
531. See C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 20.
532. If alternate supplies are not available, United States controls may provide an incentive for new or expanded production within foreign states. See
House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 236 (statement of John Chambers). But cf. Huntington, supra note 317, at 73 (foreign manufacturers may
hesitate before expanding capacity to meet a demand that could quickly be
weakened by a loosening of American controls). Some diversions of trade to
producers new to the market have become permanent. See Senate EAA Hearings Part II, supra note 250, at 261 (statement of Machinery and Allied Products Institute); C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 20.
533. See Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 49 (statement of
Sen. Stevenson); id. at 187 (statement of Richard Cooper); Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 21-22 (statements of Sen. Stevenson and David
Packard); id. at 156 (statement of Dean Rusk); Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra
note 405, at 198.
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Concern over possible interruption of future transactions
influences American exporters as well as foreign purchasers.
Entering a new export market is an expensive and lengthy process. 5 34 Concern over possible future controls may make the
risks attendant upon researching and preparing a market,
building customer relationships, and negotiating sales too high,
especially for new and smaller exporters.5 3 5 Exporters' concerns are heightened when licenses appear to be denied because a foreign policy gesture is needed, when controls are
issued retroactively or without opportunity for prior public
comment, and when licenses are suspended or revoked or consideration is publicly given to doing S0.536 In the view of many
in American business 537 and government, 538 such actions have
already chilled the efforts of business to increase exports, off539
setting governmental efforts to promote them.
These types of lost transactions, only the first of which
comes to the attention of government officials, 540 directly affect
not only the welfare of the export community 541 but also that of
534. See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 305 (statement
of American Electronics Association); id. at 311 (statement of National Foreign
Trade Council).
535. Cf. id. at 311, ("exporters simply will not bear these huge 'up-front'
marketing costs without some degree of certainty about U.S. export controls");
House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 285 (statement of Frederick Huszagh) (license mechanism creates "sizeable impediment to the entry of small
and medium firms into the export market"); id. at 295 (statements of Frederick
Huszagh and Arthur Downey) ("unanticipated license decisions... [deprive]
companies of substantial investments").
536. See, e.g., notes 275, 321-43, 392 supra and accompanying text. For example, in 1978 the government publicly considered revoking a controversial license
permitting Dresser Industries to export to the U.S.S.R. certain equipment and
technology for the manufacture of oil well drill bits, see Bingham & Johnson,
supra note 117, at 915, again considered revocation publicly in 1980, U.S. ExPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 333, at A-I (Nov. 30, 1980), then finally revoked the license. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 336, at A-4 (Dec. 9, 1980).
537. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 25 (statement of David Packard); Senate EAA Hearings Part II, supra note 250, at 63
(statement of American Electronics Association); House EAA Hearings PartI,
supra note 21, at 69 (statement of William Giffen); Schultz, supra note 527, at
78, 81.
538. See, e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 106, at 205 (statement
of Richard Cooper).
539. George Shultz, President of Bechtel Corporation and former Secretary
of Labor and of the Treasury and Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, points out that American exports are a "wasting asset" from the point
of view of their use as political tools. The more political export controls are
used, the more exports are discouraged, and thus the less effective controls will
be in the future. Schultz, supra note 527, at 82.
540. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 47-48 (remarks of
Sen. Heinz, Sen. Stevenson, and Juanita Kreps).
541. It should be noted that the economic burden falls disproportionately
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the whole nation. During the years when the controls described in Part HI of this Article were being imposed, for example, the United States was running a large and increasing
deficit in its balance of merchandise trade (from $9.3 billion in
1976 to $34 billion in 1978).542 The trade deficits "weakened the
value of the dollar, intensified inflationary pressures . .., and
heightened instability in the world economy." 543 Their seriousness was recognized by the leading international economic pol5 45
in
icy makers in the executive branch 544 and by Congress;
even among firms engaged in export trade. Even leaving aside the makers of
arms, crime control equipment, and similar products, the burden has fallen in
the United States principally on the manufacturers of certain goods-such as
computers, aircraft, and machinery-for which there is strong foreign demand
and at least somewhat limited foreign availability, and on those manufacturers'
employees, shareholders, and communities. In effect, because these goods represent the nation's greatest comparative advantage and provide a large share of
its export earnings, the United States has elected to impose the maximum economic cost on itself. If political export controls are routinely extended to grain
exports, this process will be repeated.
The internal incidence of costs has been recognized as a problem of multilateral economic sanctions. Doxey, supra note 430, at 105; MacDonald, supra
note 443, at 73; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 197-98. For example, opposition by import-export interests in Britain and France is said to be
one reason why League of Nations sanctions against Italy were not more successful. MacDonald, supra note 443, at 73; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra
note 405, at 198.
542. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 847 (1979) (Table No. 1491)
(figures adjusted tcr balance of payments basis). Other components of the balance of payments were in surplus during those years, but an overall current account deficit was incurred for both 1977 and 1978. Id.
Merchandise exports grew by less than 8% in 1976 and by only 6% in 1977,
though they increased by over 21% in 1978. Id. at 860 (Table No. 1506). Merchandise imports increased by over 25% in 1976, over 22, in 1977, and over 16%
in 1978. Id. Much of the increase in imports was due to petroleum imports, see
id. at 867-68 (Table No. 1515), but in dollar value petroleum imports actually declined in 1978. Id.
543. United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOc. 1631
(Sept. 26, 1978). See also SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L FINANCE, 96TH CONG., IST
SEss., U.S. EXPORT POLICY REPORT 1 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as
EXPORT POLiCY REPORT]; C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 20.
544. See, e.g., Exports: Time for a NationalPolicy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomics of the JointEconomic Comm., 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 72 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten) [hereinafter cited as National Policy
Hearings];id. at 84 (statement of Julius Katz); Senate EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 106, at 163 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten); id. at 187 (statement of
Richard Cooper).
545. Extensive hearings were held on the need to improve export performance. Most notable were the 11 days of hearings held in 1978 before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Stevenson. The subcommittee produced a detailed report with broad recommendations for improving American export performance. See EXPORT POLICY REPORT, supra note 543.
See generally National Policy Hearings,supra note 544; National Export Pro-
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testimony on export controls, former Secretary of State Dean
Rusk called the deficits "an emergency situation."5 46 The tendency of political export controls to contribute to the trade deficits was pointed out explicitly by the American exporting
5
community, 4 7 and was finally recognized by the President. 48
Although there have been improvements in the merchandise
trade balance since 1978,549 it remains true that export controls
distort national trading patterns, sacrifice some gains from
trade, 50 and thereby contribute to inflationary pressure and
55
monetary instability. '

b. Unpredictability
The third class of costs described above-the indirect costs
to the United States flowing from a reputation of unreliability
abroad and of arbitrariness at home-is particularly noteworthy. Cumulatively, such costs may far exceed the hardship that
controls can impose on any target nation.5 5 2 These larger costs
gram: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Export promotion has in fact become
fashionable in Congress, to a degree that appears to reflect the "mercantilist instinct which seems to be inbred in human beings." C. KInDLEBERGER, POWER
AND MONEY 117 (1970). While this Article recommends a reduction of certain
restraints on exports, it does not endorse every effort to increase exports.
546. House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 7.
547. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 260, 261-62,
264-66 (statement of Machinery and Allied Products Institute).
548. See notes 578-80 infra and accompanying text.
549. According to the Commerce Department, the deficit was $42.36 billion
in 1978, $40.37 billion in 1979, and $36.36 billion in 1980. Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1981,
at 11, coL 1.
550. A related issue in recent years has been whether trade with the
U.S.S.R. should be perceived as a zero-sum game (any gains from trade realized by the U.S.S.R. are losses for the United States), or as a positive-sum game
(both parties benefit from trade). See, e.g., House EAA HearingsPart I, supra
note 21, at 47 (statement of Marshall Goldman); CONGREssIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, supra note 379, at 918-20. According to Thomas Wolfe, Assistant Professor of Economics at Ohio State University, many observers believe that the
U.S.S.R.-with a centralized, planned economy-is able to obtain disproportionate benefits from trade transactions with American companies. This belief
leads to greater faith in foreign policy export controls, which by hypothesis
withhold more benefits from the U.S.S.R. than from the United States. Professor Wolfe contends that observers both overestimate the disproportionate distribution of the gains from East-West trade and overemphasize the importance
that the Soviets give to those benefits, and thus hold exaggerated expectations
for trade controls. House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 52-53.
551. See C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 20.
552. No aspect of foreign policy controls elicits as much scorn from critics
as their self-punishing nature. See, e.g., Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra
note 106, at 48-49 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson and Stanley Marcuss); Senate
Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 323 (statement of Dresser Industries, Inc.).
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are principally due to the unpredictability that inheres in foreign policy export controls, 553 a quality that becomes apparent
when political controls are compared with national security
controls in terms of their underlying policies, product coverage,
and target nations.
The basic policy thrust of national security controls-to
prevent or delay the acquisition of militarily useful technologies by nations perceived as a threat to United States national
security 554-- is widely understood and accepted by American
business. 555 Disagreement with the policy tends to focus, as it
has since the mid-1960s, on product coverage. In contrast, there
is no central foreign policy goal around which public understanding and support can readily coalesce. The concept of for55 6
eign policy has a "treacherous breadth and homogeneity":
its breadth includes every aspect of American international relations, subsuming all the interests of a great power,557 while
its homogeneity, at least as reflected in the EAA, gives all of
558
these interests equal authority as bases for trade controls.
Further, although the purpose of national security controls has
remained generally stable for some years, the goals of foreign
policy are fluid. In the words of a former Secretary of Commerce:
[Ilt is sometimes very difficult to identify foreign policy goals. For one
thing, they may shift from one time to another.
553. The business community is nearly unanimous in holding that "the lack
of predictability is the major problem in the current export control system."
Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 250, at 91 (statement of Robert McLellan). See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 51 (statement
of Donald Morfee).
554. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
555. See Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 321 (statement
of John James); Senate EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 250, at 274 (statement
of MAPI); Shultz, supra note 527, at 82.
Though not strictly relevant to the issue of predictability, it is important to
note that American business strongly supports the policy of keeping militarily
useful items from adversaries, but may not share many of the foreign policy
goals pursued through the use of trade controls. See, e.g., Senate ForeignPolicy
Hearings, supra note 119, at 321-22 (statement of John James); Bingham &
Johnson, supra note 117, at 911 (with respect to promotion of human rights, "no
type of foreign policy control.., sends businessmen up the wall faster").
556. Brown, supra note 392, at 164.
557. Such interests inlude access to raw materials, opposition to terrorism,
promotion of human rights, regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation, the mix
of geopolitical concerns that supports the Group Z embargoes, and more.
558. EAA '69 drew no distinctions among foreign policy goals as bases for
export control authority. EAA '79 urges restriction of controls to situations in
which they are necessary to further "fundamental" foreign policy objectives.
EAA '79, § 3(10), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (1) (Supp. 111 1979). The provision
seems to have little operative force. See note 729-32 infra.
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It would help us enormously if we knew precisely what those goals
were. Changes in foreign policy come not only from the administration
but also from the Congress....
... At any point in time, precisely what is a foreign policy goal and
how you honor that goal may be quite difficult to determine. 5 5 9

In the eyes of American business, the fluidity and diversity of
foreign policy make trade contingent on unforseeable events.5 60
The export community is generally aware of the types of
goods and technologies controlled for national security purposes. Although the precise items controlled are revised periodically, 561 the coverage of national security controls has not
changed drastically for some time. 562 Further, since security
controls are limited to sophisticated products and technologies,
a limited number of exporters are affected. There are frequent
disagreements over product coverage,5 63 but these disagreements are generally at the margin; at the core, there is consensus on the types of products that must be controlled. Although
the current move to control "technologies" rather than "products" has to some extent broken the old consensus, 564 a new
559. Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 46 (statement of
Juanita Kreps).
560. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 69 (statement of
James Giffen).
561. COCOM controls are revised every two to three years; the most recent
revision took place in 1978-79. See Export Licensing: COCOM List Review Proposals of U.S.: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House InternationalRelations Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1978); COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 18-20, 22-27.
EAA '79 requires review of multilateral security controls at least every three
years and of unilateral controls every year. EAA '79, § 5(c) (3), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2404(c) (3) (Supp. I 1979). Similar requirements apply to items controlled
for foreign policy purposes. Id. at § 6(k), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(k).
562. See COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 53.
563. Beyond particular license denials, exporters argue particularly that security controls are too extensive, see Shultz, supra note 527, at 82; cf. Senate
EAA Hearings Part II, supra note 250, at 274-77 (statement of Machinery and
Allied Products Institute) (government should minimize number of products
subject to national security controls by defining products and technologies
most important in maintaining national security); Bingham & Johnson, supra
note 117, at 906-07 (government should restrict scope of controls and insist on
vigorous enforcement of controls that remain), and that product definitions
should be revised more frequently. See Senate EAA Hearings Part II, supra
note 250, at 118 (statement of James Gray). See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 18-27. The depth and importance of such
disagreements should not be underemphasized. See generally House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 537-41 (statement of Reps. Wolff and Miller
on H.R. 3216).
564. The "Bucy Report" (formally entitled "An Analysis of Export Control
of U.S. Technology-a DOD Perspective"), presented to the Defense Science
Board by its Task Force on United States Technology on February 27, 1976, was
the genesis of the current effort by the Defense Department to identify "critical
technologies," with the aim of concentrating controls on transfers of such tech-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

one seems to be forming. 565

In contrast, there is no natural core product coverage for
foreign policy controls. Such controls can and do affect products ranging from high technology items originally controlled
for national security purposes to stuffed animals ("Misha" dolls
for the Moscow Olympics) or copper buttons for South African
police uniforms. Political controls may prohibit the sale of
every conceivable product to certain buyers, such as the Group
Z nations, the South African military and police, and the concessionaires at the Olympics. The result is unpredictability for
all exporters.
American business knows with certainty the countries
against which national security export controls are aimed. Although since 1977 the EAA has provided that a nation's Communist or non-Communist status alone should not determine
whether controls are imposed, 566 the longstanding preoccupation of national security controls with exports to Communist
destinations has not changed. 67
Foreign policy controls, on the other hand, are not by nature directed at any particular nation or group of nations. With
the variety of foreign policy goals that can be pursued under
the EAA, few nations in the world can be considered safe from
the application of controls. The human rights policy, in particular, leads to broad potential country coverage. It is an unpleasant fact that an alarming number of nations show sufficient
disregard for human rights to be considered potential targets of
nologies and thereby permitting expanded exports of high technology products.
Highlights of the report are reprinted in Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra
note 119, at 170. See generally COMPMOLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note
363, at 60-64; House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 537-41 (statement of
Reps. Wolff and Miller on H.R. 3216). The "military critical technologies" approach is continued under EAA '79, § 5(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (Supp. III
1979).
565. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 1020 (reprinted
speech of J. Fred Bucy).
566. EAA '79, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b) (Supp. I1 1979); Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 103(a) (3), 91 Stat. 235
(amending EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841) (expired 1979).
567. The 1979 country policy report of the State Department concluded that
only the Communist nations (other than Yugoslavia) should be subject to national security controls because only they pose an immediate threat to American national security. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 646
(statement of William Root). Most categories on the CCL are controlled for export to all destinations, but licenses for exports to "free world" destinations are
usually granted if the end use is appropriate and there is adequate protection
against diversion. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(b) (1) (1980) (policy governing licenses
to countries in Group V).
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American export controls. 5 68 Amnesty International, in its 1973
Report on Torture, stated that "torture has virtually become a
world-wide phenomenon... encouraged by some governments
and tolerated by others in an increasingly large number of
countries."5 69 Shestack and Cohen, urging a more active
human rights policy, wrote in 1974 that "one can call the roster
of the United Nations and find human rights violations in each
case."5 7 0 The State Department under Secretary Kissinger declined to release its 1975 report on human rights in nations receiving United States military assistance "since all but a
relative handful of countries committed human rights viola571
Sirkin states that "[m]ost developing countries
tions ....
are currently under authoritarian rule; a substantial number
might qualify as gross violators [of human rights]."572
The Carter Administration pointed to improvements in the
world human rights situation after 1977;573 while there is room
for optimism, the situation remains "discouraging and alarming."5 74 The State Department's 1979 report on human rights in
nations receiving American assistance, for example, includes
the Freedom House ratings of civil and political "freedom" prevailing in the nations of the world. Fifty-five nations are rated
"not free," while another fifty-three are considered only "partly
free." Even the group of "free" nations includes some-such as
Greece, Turkey, and Spain-where respect for human rights
may not be firmly rooted.5 7 5 With this pool of potential targets,
foreign policy controls affecting transactions of American ex576
porters could be imposed at any time.
568. The vast majority of nations are in fact subject to controls on
purchases of crime detection equipment. See notes 266-90 supra and accompanying text.
569.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 7 (1973).

570. Shestack & Cohen, Internatonal Human Rights: A Role for the United
States, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 675 (1974).
571. Gwertzman, U.S. Blocks Rights Data on Nations Getting Arms, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1975, at 14, col. 6.
572. Sirkin, supra note 432, at 210.
573. See, e.g., Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 5-7 (statement of
Mark Schneider); Report on Human Rights Practices,supra note 200, at 4-7.
574. See Robertson, supra note 483, at 8.
575. Report on Human Rights Practices,supra note 200, at 661-62, 664-65.
576. See House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 9 (statement of Dean
Rusk). Because of the large number of potential targets, export controls raise
the problem of inconsistency which has plagued other aspects of the human
rights movement. See, e.g., Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 18-19
(statement of Rep. Ryan); id. at 33 (question to State Department); id. at 47, 49
(Congressional Research Service Issue Brief); Sirkin, supra note 432, at 210.
The scope of the human rights policy has been limited by confining its application to "gross violators" of "internationally recognized" human rights, to the in-
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The broad potential applicability of political export controls
is both a product and a cause of what may be called a "control
psychology."5 7 7 The use of political export controls on a sufficient number of occasions leads foreign nations, American exporters, and other interested groups to expect that, in the
future, the United States will continue to pursue a range of foreign policy goals and to react to a variety of international developments by imposing controls. As these expectations become
established, issue-oriented groups in the United States will increasingly call for trade controls, seeing any program of governmental action not including them as insufficient. Government
officials will turn ever more readily to trade controls as a policy
instrument, assuming that foreign nations and domestic constituencies will perceive any American reponse not including
controls as an indication of less than full disapproval. The
more these effects lead to the use of controls, the greater will
be the pressure for their use in the future. With the imposition
of controls becoming ever more likely, importers and exporters
(actual and potential) will seek greater certainty by redirecting
stitutions within a nation most directly involved in human rights violations, to
products used in human rights violations such as torture, and the like. Still,
choices among potential targets have to be made.
In 1976, the State Department reported on human rights practices in six
nations receiving military assistance, concluding in each case that "extraordinary circumstances" and "the national interest" justified continuing aid in spite
of human rights violations. See generally DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUmAN
RIGHTS AND U.S. PoUcY: ARGENTINA, HAITI, INDONESIA, IRAN, PERU AND THE

PHILIFPINES (1976) (Report Submitted to the House Committee on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN

RIGHTS AND

U.S. PoL-

Icy]. (The "extraordinary circumstances" and "national interest" standards are
contained in § 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (1)
(1978)). Among the considerations cited as justifying these conclusions were
the following: access to raw materials (such as oil); the need to safeguard
American investments; the desire to retain influence with powerful nations; the
need to safeguard United States military security, military bases, and important allies; and the desire to maintain confidence in American security commitments. HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. PoucY, supra, at 6, 11, 16-17, 22, 27, 32; see
Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 271 n.134. While consideration of such factors
has been criticized, see, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note 170, at 271-73; Brown,
supra note 392, at 162-63, it seems only realistic to believe that they will continue to be considered. See also Vogelgesang, supra note 170, at 827. To the
extent that they are considered, and economic sanctions are employed against
some violators of human rights but not against others, the United States leaves
itself open to charges of cynical inconsistency, reducing the moral force of its
policy. Cf. Hoffman, The Hell of Good Intentions, 29 FOREIGN PoL'Y 3, 8-9 (1977)
(avid pursuit of all human rights violations is likely to be a highly self-destructive ordeal).
577. The term is suggested by the concept of an "inflationary psychology,"
which occurs when consumers expect inflation to continue and increase their
current spending to "beat" future price increases, thus worsening inflation.
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their resources to areas in which the risk of political interference is less. The potential costs of creating a control psychology are staggering and should figure prominently in any
decision to impose political export controls.
c.

Summary of Economic Costs

At least some economic costs of political export controls
were recognized by the Carter Administration.5 7 8 In September 1978, the President announced a series of measures to improve American export performance and to reduce export
barriers posed by American law and policy.57 9 Among these
was a directive to the agencies involved in export licensing "to
take export consequences fully into account when considering
the use of export controls for foreign policy purposes." 5 80 Administration representatives later indicated that care was being
taken to "insure, in those instances where controls are invoked,
that the foreign policy gain will outweigh the commercial
loss."581 New foreign policy controls did appear to slow following the President's statement, a change attributed by the Administration to increased sensitivity to export consequences
and foreign availability.5 82 Most of the controls in effect at the
time of the statement were expressly continued in force,583
however, and near the end of President Carter's term, significant new controls were imposed.584 In justifying these actions,
executive branch officials on occasion appeared to deal in an almost casual way with the mandate to take export consequences
fully into account.5 85 The Carter Administration also opposed
inclusion in EAA '79 of a requirement that economic costs be
5 86
It
considered before imposing foreign policy export controls.
appears, in short, that further legislative steps--even beyond
578. See, e.g., Senate EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 106, at 151-52, 182
(statement of C. Fred Bergsten).
579. United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY Comp. oF PRES. Doc. 1631,
1633-34 (Sept. 26, 1978).
580. Id. at 1633. This statement also indicated that "[w]eight will be given"
to foreign availability when considering controls. Id.
581. Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 189 (statement of Richard Cooper).
582. See Senate EAA HearingsPart III, supra note 116, at 26 (statement of
Frank Weil).

583. 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980); see note 799 infra.
584. See text accompanying notes 799-810 infra.
585. See generally House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 141-48
(statement of William Root).
586. House EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 119, at 9 (statement of William
Root); id. at 145-46 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

those taken in EAA '79-are needed to ensure that the full
range of economic costs is considered in any decision on political export controls.
2. Political Costs
The political costs of export controls result from a variety
of strains on international political relationships. It is obvious
that relations with the target nation and its allies will be
strained, 87 perhaps to the point of provoking economic, political, or even military retaliation.5 88 It is less obvious, though
perhaps more important, that relations with third countries
may also suffer when such nations are pressured to reduce foreign availability. The limited success of the United States in
obtaining cooperation from other governments has already
been examined; 89 the present point is that efforts to force such
cooperation have been politically costly90
At least as much animosity has been engendered during
587. Galtung, supra note 344, at 388-89; MacDonald, supra note 443, at 72.
588. See MacDonald, supra note 443, at 72.
589. See notes 393-405 supra and accompanying text. One commentator argues that before the moral duty to use trade controls in furtherance of human
rights is avoided because of foreign availability, the United States must exert
pressure on other nations for cooperation. See Brown, supra note 392, at 167-68.
Some members of Congress have taken a similar position, criticizing the Executive for failure to so negotiate. Selective pressure, however, may be more advantageous in the long run. Brown's formulation, that all bilateral and
multilateral efforts to secure leverage must be exhausted in every case, would
seriously strain America's relations with her major allies-and, based on past
experience, would produce little cooperation.
If pressure is not exerted out of regard for political costs, the impact of foreign availability on any proposed control must be considered. It should also be
remembered that in the case of controls like the South African military and police embargo (imposed on a broad range of items, including items widely available), negotiations sufficient to eliminate foreign availability are simply
impracticable.
590. See D. LosMAN, supra note 355, at 138. Recent efforts to obtain cooperation in sanctions against Iran, for example, caused serious strains in relations
with the EEC. See, e.g., Apple, Europe Expects Criticismfor Retreat on Iran
Sanctions, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, at 3, col. 1; Gwertzman, Muskie Will Raise
Iran Sanctions in Talks With Allies, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1980 at 1, col 6;
Gwertzrhan, Muskie Reminds Allies of Pledge for Sanctions on Iran, N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Another recent illustration of political tension
arose in November 1980, when United States Customs held up clearance of a
shipment of steel products from the Creusot-Loire Company of France. The ostensible reason was that the steel included Cuban nickel; the "real" reason was
said to be retaliation against Creusot-Loire for taking over a Soviet contract
which American firms had to give up when the technology embargo was imposed. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 333, at A-6 to A-7 (Nov. 18, 1980).
Maintaining cooperation among participating states has similarly been a major
problem in the use of multilateral economic sanctions. See, e.g., Taubenfeld &
Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 185, 195, 197-200.

1981]

EXPORT CONTROLS

past political trade control programs by American efforts to regulate two types of third country transactions without the cooperation of the host government: the reexport of United Statesorigin goods or technology to a target nation, and the export of
local-origin goods or technology to a target nation by local subsidiaries of American corporations.
a. Reexport Controls
Besides prohibiting exports from the United States of
items that the exporter knows are to be reexported, 5 91 the Reg592
ulations directly prohibit all reexports by foreign purchasers
3
unless specific approval is granted by the OEA59 or general authorization is given in the Regulations. 594 Because reexport
controls extend to parts, components, and other materials used
in foreign manufacturing, inclusion of a single American-origin
component may prevent the export from a foreign country of
95
an end product manufactured there by a local firm.5
Controls on the reexport of technical information have an
extra dimension of complexity because the Regulations attempt to control the disposition of some goods produced abroad
with the aid of American-origin data.596 American controls extend, for example, to exports from any country to a country in
Groups Q, W, Y, P, or Z of certain "direct products" of American-origin data 597 and certain commodities produced by a plant,
or a major component thereof, which was the direct product of
United States-origin data.5 98 Until recently, reexport controls
were primarily based on national security, but they are now a
part of many of the foreign policy controls described in Part [I7
of this Article. 599
591.
tion).

Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1(b) (1980) (goods); id. at § 379.8(a)(2) (informa-

592. See id. at §§ 374.1(a) (goods); id. at 379.8(a) (1) (information). "Reexport" includes transshipment or diversion of goods or information as well as
subsequent export from the purchasing nation. Id. at §370.2.
593. See id. at §374.3 (goods); id. at §379.8(c) (information).
594. See id. at §374.2 (goods); id. at § 379.8(b) (information).
595. See id. at §376.12. An example might be the extension of American
controls to the export from another country of a machine tool manufactured locally, but containing a United States-origin "numerical control device." See id.
at §376.11.
596. See id. at §379.8(a) (3).
597. Id. A "direct product" is defined for this purpose as the immediate
product, including a process or service, produced by use of the data. See id. at
§ 379.4(f) n.6.
598. See id. at §§ 379.8(a)(3), 379.4(f), 379.5(e)(1)-(2).

599. See, e.g., id. at §385.4(a)(1)-(4) (Republic of South Africa and
Namibia); id. at §379.4(f) (1)(i) (p) (petroleum equipment).
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Even American national security reexport controls caused
friction with both nonaligned nations 600 and members of
COCOM.601 COCOM members especially resented them because they either (1) implemented unilateral United States
controls exceeding the level of restraint agreed upon by
COCOM, or (2) duplicated the COCOM review process and the
national control systems maintained by members in accordance with their COCOM obligations. Implementation of unilateral controls fueled the longstanding dispute over the proper
product coverage of COCOM controls, while duplication implied distrust of foreign control systems. 602 COCOM members'
complaints were sharp enough to prompt the United States in
the late 1970s to seek ways of eliminating at least the duplicative aspect of its reexport controls, and in 1980 a partial step in
603
this direction was taken.
When the United States regulates reexports in support of
foreign policy controls, an issue similar to that raised by unilateral national security controls arises: American interference
with the trade of a nation that has not agreed to participate in
the American controls, that may strongly disapprove of them,
60 4
and that may even have specifically refused to support them.
Beyond an emotional reaction to American interference
600. See COCOM REPORT, supra note 393, at 55.
601. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 9-10, 15.
602. See id. Such distrust does appear to be the principal reason for maintenance of security reexport controls. Id. at 14.
603. President Carter stated that his Administration would "stop issuing a
separate U.S. reexport license in cases where [it had] already approved reexport of the same product as part of the COCOM process." PRESIDENT CARTER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS ON EXPORT DISINCENTIVES AND COMMERCE DE-

PARTMENT SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS (Sept. 9, 1980), reprinted in U.S. ExPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 324, at M-1, M-3 (Sept. 16, 1980).
604. Foreign resentment over some of the most recent foreign policy export
controls has been mitigated by implementing reexport controls in a much less
rigorous manner than has been the case with national security controls and
past foreign policy controls.
The April 1980 order prohibiting most exports to Iran under the President's
emergency authority, see note 810 infra, covered exports "from the United
States, or from any foreign country," but only when made "by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .... ." Exec. Order No. 12,205, § 1101(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980). Further, the order did not apply to foreign
subsidiaries of American corporations. See id. at § 1-102. See also 31 C.F.R.
§ 535.207(b) (1980). Thus, reexports by foreign purchasers, or even by American foreign subsidiaries, were not covered.
The regulations were later tightened, see 31 C.F.R. § 535.430 (1980), prohibiting the export of items to be incorporated in foreign-manufactured goods when
the "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States has reasonable
cause to believe that those goods are intended for export to Iran." This section,
however, still applies to exports from the United States to third countries, not
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and a desire not to lose export sales, foreign resentment of
American reexport controls is rooted in theoretical opposition
605
to the extraterritorial application of United States law.
American reexport controls, like some aspects of American securities and antitrust law, are seen as improper attempts to
subject foreign firms and nationals, residing and doing business
abroad, to legal sanctions 606 for violations of American regulations even though their conduct is not prohibited by local
law. 607 American claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe rules of conduct 608 have been sharply criticized abroad
even when limited by a requirement that the foreign conduct
have some effect on United States commerce 609 or that some
to reexports from those countries. The standard reexport prohibition was not
added to the regulations.
The 1980 restrictions on exports related to the Moscow Olympics, 45 Fed.
Reg. 21,612 (1980), appeared to cover any reexports, requiring validated licenses
or reexport authorization for the export or reexport of any commodity or technical data that the exporter or reexporter had reason to know was for a use in
any way related to the Olympics. The application of the provision, however,
was again limited to exports or reexports by persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." See id. (amending 15 C.F.R. § 385.2). Further, for the
purpose of this regulation only, the phrase 'person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" was defined to include United States citizens or resident individuals, United States corporations, and any permanent establishments of
foreign firms in the United States. Id. Thus, again, the reexport of a controlled
item by a foreign purchaser, or even by a foreign subsidiary of a United States
corporation, was not covered by the regulations.
On the other hand, the embargo on sales of grain to the U.S.S.R., implemented in January 1980, see note 803 infra, applied fully to the reexport by purchasers in other countries of American grain, see 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980)
(amending 15 C.F.R. § 376.5; amending and revising 15 C.F.R. §§ 386.7(a), 399.1),
as did the related controls on exports of phosphates used for fertilizers. See 45
Fed. Reg. 8293 (1980) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 399.2).
605. See, e.g., L STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 99899, 1047-49 (1976); Hacking, The Increasing Extra-TerritorialImpact of U.S.
Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1, 1-10 (1979).
606. See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1 (1980) (criminal, administrative, and civil sanctions); see also id. at § 388.3 (administrative and civil sanctions).
607. Cf. Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 866-67, 875-76 (the extraterritorial imposition of penalities may strain international legal principles). The
reexport regulations for commodities provide that reexport authorization by
the Office of Export Administration does not relieve any foreign person or firm
from the burden of complying with foreign laws. See 15 C.F.R. § 374.9 (1980).
The rules for technical data are similar, but also provide that no foreign law,
rule, or authorization relieves any person of responsibilities under the Export
Administration Regulations. See id. at § 379.8(d).
608. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 6-7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
609. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1968); ANTrrRUST DrVIsIoN OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GuiDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,309 [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
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conduct necessary to the violation take place within the United
610
States.
Reexport controls do not clearly fall within any of the internationally accepted justifications for extraterritorial jurisdiction
to prescribe rules of conduct, nor even within those justifications accepted in the United States. 61 ' For example, no conduct relating to a reexport transaction need take place in the
United States for the reexport prohibition to attach.6 12 A reexport ordinarily has no direct effect on American commerce; and
the effect of any single transaction on the foreign policy interests of the United States does not seem substantial. 61 3 The
United States might assert jurisdiction under the "protective
principle," arguing that reexports "threaten its security as a
state," but as to foreign policy controls that assertion seems exaggerated at best. In any event, reexports do not appear to constitute conduct "generally recognized as a crime" within the
American version of the protective principle. 61 4 Although for610. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972).
611. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, §§ 10-36; Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export AdministrationAmendments of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 741, 747-50 (1978) (discussing anti-boycott rules). See also Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 158, 180 (1980) (State Department generally follows the Restatement).
612. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, at § 17 ("Jurisdiction to Prescribe
with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest within Territory").
613. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, at § 18, provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule attaching legal consequences to conduct outside
its territory which causes an effect within its territory, if either (a) the conduct
and the effect are generally recognized as elements of a crime or tort, or (b) the
effect is substantial, direct, and foreseeable, and the rule prescribed is not inconsistent with the principles of justice recognized by states having reasonably
developed legal systems. Paragraph (b), dealing with acts "malum prohibitum," seems to be the only alternative applicable to foreign policy reexport
controls. Jurisdiction is normally based on an effect on commerce. See [1977] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,309, at 55,655. The Reporters' Notes to § 18, however, indicate that other effects-such as effects on the prescribing nation as a
whole--can also serve as a basis for jurisdiction to prescribe. The Reporters'
Notes illustrate this point with cases involving the inciting of sedition, disclosure of military secrets dangerous to armed forces, and the like. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 608, Reporters' Notes § 18, at 56. A reexport usually would not have
any effect on United States commerce-unless the original American exporter
participated in it and therefore could be penalized directly under the Regulations-and would not normally seem to have a "substantial" effect on the foreign policy interests of the United States comparable to the examples given in
the Reporters' Notes to § 18.
614. Section 33 of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, codifies the "protective
principle": a state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules attaching legal consequences to conduct abroad which "threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally
recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed
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eign importers are often required to make written representations or assurances regarding reexport-and thus can be said to
615
be subject to United States regulation as a matter of contract
the reexport regulations apply regardless of whether the
purchaser has signed a document that refers to or accepts
them. 616 As there is no generally accepted principle of international law governing the extent to which a nation has jurisdiction to prescribe legal consequences for the acts of foreign
persons abroad,617 restrictions on reexports will remain a
source of theoretical disagreement and political tension between the United States and its trading partners, especially to
the extent such restrictions serve only unilateral foreign policy
interests.
b.

Controls on Foreign Entities

Even more severe political tension has been generated by
American efforts to control local-origin exports by foreign firms
owned or controlled by United States persons. Such efforts created serious foreign policy problems during the 1960s, when the
United States continued its embargo of the People's Republic
of China after most other Western nations had come to treat
legal systems." This section was intended to provide a basis for jurisdiction to
prescribe when the effects of foreign conduct are not sufficient to invoke § 18.
See id., Comment c. The principle is restricted to recognized crimes, however,
to prevent untoward extensions of jurisdiction. See id., Comment d.
615. Most validated license applications for the export of goods require a
statement from the "ultimate consignee or purchaser" regarding ultimate destination and end use. See 15 C.F.R. § 375.2(a) (1980). It is a violation of the Regulations to divert goods outside of these representations. See id. at § 375.2(f) (2).
Many validated license applications for the export of technical data must be
supported by a similar statement from the foreign importer. Id. at
§ 379.5(e) (2). Some technical data may only be exported under General License GTDR with written assurances from the importer regarding reexport to
Groups P, Q, W, Y, and Z. See id. at § 379.4(f).
616. The ultimate consignee/purchaser statement is not required for validated license exports to Group T, see id. at § 375.2(a), nor is any representation
from the importer required for any general license export of goods. Importer
statements and written assurances are only required for exports of technical
data of the types specified in the relevant regulation. See id. at §§ 379.5(e) (2),
379.4(f). Destination control statements, warning that diversion contrary to
American law is prohibited, must be used in connection with all exports under
a validated license and under certain general licenses, id. at § 386.6(a), and the
Regulations purport to make it illegal for any person to divert the exported
goods once that person has received notice of the prohibition against diversion
to any country not authorized in that notice. See id. at § 386.6(i). The destination control statements, however, do not cover all the destinations subject to
foreign policy export controls, and they do not in any case constitute the agreement of the importer to the application of the American regulations.
617. RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, § 37, Comment a.
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that country no more restrictively than the U.S.S.R.18
The embargo of the People's Republic of China was implemented under the United States Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), promulgated under the extraordinary national
emergency powers granted to the President by the Trading
with the Enemy Act (TWEA).619 Substantially all the prohibitions of the FACR apply to "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," 620 a phrase defined to include any
"partnership, association, corporation, or other organization,
wheresoever organized or doing business, which is owned, or
controlled by" United States citizens, residents, or corporations.62 1 The FACR purported directly to prohibit these controlled foreign firms from trading with the People's Republic of
China, although, in both theory and practice, such a prohibition
could only be enforced against the American parents. 62 2 The
most celebrated attempt to interrupt a transaction by a foreign
subsidiary is undoubtedly the Fruehauf case, in which the
United States directed the Fruehauf Corporation of Detroit to
instruct its French subsidiary to cancel a sale of truck bodies
for export to the People's Republic of China, over the strong
protest of the French government. The diplomatic impasse was
only broken when the French courts intervened. 623
618. See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 867-69, 872-76. See generally
Corcoran, The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Controlled CanadianCorporation, 14 McGuL L.J. 174 (1968); Craig, Application of the Tradingwith the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on
Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARv. L. REv. 579 (1970); Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAw. 861
(1964).
Similar problems arose regarding Latin American trade with Cuba. Binder,
U.S. Seems to Ease Stand on Barring Cuba in Talks, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1974,
at 1, col. 6. See also A. Rovr'E, 1974 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 603-04.
619. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1-43 (Supp. 1I 1979); note 2 supra.
620. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1980).
621. Id. at § 500.329. The word "controlled" is not defined in the regulations,
but see Sommerfield, supra note 618, at 866-67.
622. The United States considers a corporation to be a national of the country under whose laws it is created. The theory on which controls over foreign
subsidiaries are based is that the United States has jurisdiction to prescribe
rules governing the conduct of its own nationals-in this case the foreign corporation's shareholders-and jurisdiction to enforce those rules within its territory. By regulating the owners of the foreign corporation, then, it can indirectly
control its activities. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 608, § 27, Comment d, illustration 1, Reporters' Notes. In practice, enforcement of such controls has been
directed at the American owners-the Treasury Department has directed them
to cause their subsidiaries to act as desired. See Berman & Garson, supra note
2, at 868; Corcoran, supra note 618, at 177. The regulations, however, are still
written to apply directly to the foreign corporation.
623. See generally Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1965] La Semaine
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Since 1977, Presidential authority to impose emergency
trade controls has derived from the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),624 which reaches jurisdictionally as far as the FACR.625 The IEEPA has thus far been invoked only twice. In 1979, President Carter declared a national
emergency with respect to the "situation in Iran" and ordered
all official Iranian assets blocked.626 The President's order and
the Treasury Department's implementing regulations 627 extended the freeze to all property of the designated official Iranian entities that was "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States or which [was] in the possession of or control of persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .
*.".."628
The
phrase "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
was defined exactly as in the FACR.629 The blocking of assets
was clearly intended to apply extraterritorially, because an announcement of Iran's intention to withdraw from American
banks all its official deposits, many of which were held in foreign branches and subsidiaries, was the immediate provocation
for the American action. 630 Subsequent trade sanctions against
Iran, however, did not have the same territorial reach.63 1 The
order banning exports to Iran, for example, applied generally to
exports "by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" regardless of the country of origin, 632 but exempted
from the ban any nonbanking corporations or other organizations organized and doing business under the laws of a foreign
country.6 33 The first use of IEEPA trade control authority thus
showed restraint in terms of extraterritorial application. A secJuridique II 14274 (his) (Cour d'appel, Paris), [1965] Gaz. Pal. II 86, 5 Int'l Legal
Material 476, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 92, § 3.31, at 83-86; Craig,
supra note 618.
624. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979); note 2 supra.
625. The President is authorized to regulate transactions "by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. 111 1979).
626. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). The Iranian controls were
extended under the National Emergencies Act. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,159 (1980).
627. See 31 C.F.R. Pt. 535 (1980). Exec. Order No. 12,170, supra note 626, delegated to the Treasury Department all powers available to the President under
the IEEPA.
628. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980); 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980).
629. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1980); note 621 supra.
630. See Gwertzman, U.N. Session Averted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1,
col. 6; Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1979, at 1, col 6.
631. See note 604 supra.
632. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.207(a) (1980).
633. See id. at § 535.207(b). Later amendments extended the embargo to all
technical data, including that which is already published, and to exports to
third countries when the exporter has reasonable cause to believe that the
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ond national emergency was declared in 1980, in response to
"subsequent events in Iran" (the seizure of American hostages) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.634 This declaration was used to support an import embargo and other
sanctions against Iran, but not any sanctions against the Soviet
Union or Afghanistan.635
Prior to December 1977, the export control statutes, unlike
the emergency statutes, did not authorize this form of extraterritorial control at all, empowering the President only to "prohibit or curtail ...
exportation from the United States, its
territories and possessions." 636 In 1977, however, as part of the
legislation limiting TWEA to times of war and enacting
IEEPA,637 Congress amended EAA '69 to permit the President
to cpntrol all exports of property "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States or exported by any person subject to the ju638
risdiction of the United States."
The legislative history of this amendment seems to reveal
confusion among the responsible members of Congress. It appears that the amendment was intended simply to supplement
the newly restricted TWEA by allowing the President to continue exercising the authority over foreign subsidiaries he had
previously exercised under that Act.639 The controls on exports
items sold are intended for resale to Iran. See id. at §§ 535.429, .430. Export
controls, however, were not extended to foreign subsidiaries.
634. Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980).
635. Id. at §§ 1-101 to -103, 1-106. Other political export controls relating to
the Afghanistan invasion-including the Olympics embargo and the controls on
exports of grain and phosphates, see notes 802-04 infra,-preceded the April
1980 declaration of emergency. Later controls on certain exports to the Kama
River truck plant and on exports to Afghanistan, see notes 808-09 infra, were
based only on EAA authority.
636. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403(b) (1976)) (expired 1979). It should be noted that EAA '69 was supplemented in the national security area by the Transaction Control Regulations, imposed under TWEA, which regulated exports by foreign subsidiaries of
strategic items. See note 2 supra.
637. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1625 (expired
1979); see note 2 supra.
638. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, § 301(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (expired 1979).
639. The principal House sponsor, Representative Bingham, stated that the
amendment was needed so that the President could continue to exercise the
power that he had been exercising under TWEA to contbl'transactions .byd.freign subsidiaries. Revision of Trading with the Enemy'Act: Markup Before thi
House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Bingham). The Senate Banking Committee similarly stated
that the amendment would authorize the President to control foreign subsidiary exports as previously had been done under the emergency provisions of
TWEA. S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
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by foreign subsidiaries that had been implemented under
TWEA, however, covered only exports to embargoed nations
and exports of strategic goods to Communist nations. Furthermore, these controls, including the FACR, were grandfathered
by the very same 1977 statute and are still in effect. 640 Thus,
the 1977 amendment of EEA '69 went much further than was
necessary simply to allow the President to continue doing what
he had been doing. In fact, its effect has been to broaden the
potential reach of peacetime, non-emergency foreign policy
controls to exports by foreign subsidiaries of all products and
data (not merely strategic) to all destinations (not merely the
embargoed nations and other Communist countries).
Admitting that the implications of the 1977 amendment
"may not have been considered adequately by the Congress at
the time the provision was adopted,"64 ' the Senate Banking
Committee later reported that it had considered deleting this
provision. The Committee noted that the Executive had not yet
utilized the new authority, so that no controls would be undone
if the provision were repealed, and observed that any controls
imposed under it would probably be challenged by foreign nations. 642 Yet the Committee did not recommend repeal, '"pending further study," principally to leave the executive branch the
flexibility to impose extraterritorial controls in cases in which
"the United States would wish to distance itself from especially
abhorrent acts of other Governments." 643 As of this writing, the
Executive's authority to impose extraterritorial controls under
the EAA remains unused.6 4 4
640.
641.

See note 2 supra.
S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 4-5.

642. Id. at 5.
643. Id.
644. None of the controls discussed in Part MIapplied to foreign subsidiaries, and neither have the foreign policy controls implemented more recently
against the U.S.S.R.
The regulations imposing an embargo on the Olympics, 45 Fed. Reg. 21,612
(1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d)), applied to exports by "persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," but the phrase was defined for
that purpose to "include" United States citizens and residents, American corporations, and permanent American establishments of foreign corporations. Id.
The release accompanying the regulations in the Federal Register stated that
the term "meant" these three categories, and did not merely include them
among others. Id. Remarks by government officials confirmed that foreign subsidiaries would only be covered if they were acting jointly with their American
parents. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 301, at A-1 (April 1, 1980).
When the grain embargo was imposed, the Agriculture Department requested American grain companies not to sell grain from third countries to the
Soviets until those countries could develop their own restrictive policies. See
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Extraterritorial controls were imposed by Congress as part
of the Uganda embargo, however, and a related move was made
by the Executive to expand the reach of other controls under
the EAA. The provision added to EAA '69 to implement the
embargo forbade the export to Uganda of most goods subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 645 Although the
temporary regulations went no further, 646 the more detailed
proposed regulations 647 -would have placed Uganda in Country
Group Z and would have prohibited not only exports and reexports of American-origin items, but also exports of non-American-origin goods and information by any "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," 648 as defined in an expansive
and detailed way. 64 9 To this extent, the proposed regulations
reflected congressional intent. Beyond this, however, the proposal would have added the same broad definition of "person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to the general
definitions in the Regulations and would have included a general policy statement describing the potential extraterritorial
effect of all export control regulations. 650 This proposed language appeared to be a tentative first step by the executive
branch toward greater extraterritorial export controls, and it
651
was strongly criticized as such at the time.
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 314, at A-5 (July 1, 1980). Foreign sales by the
companies themselves or by foreign subsidiaries, however, were not prohibited.
The controls imposed on high technology exports to the U.S.S.R. in January
1980 involved merely a tightening of licensing policy, the suspension and cancellation of certain licenses, and the addition of certain new categories to the
CCL; no change in the territorial coverage of the Regulations was made. In
fact, the Commerce Department issued a clarifying statement to the effect that
foreign subsidiaries would not be affected by the new controls unless they were
trading in American-origin products or data. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 302, at N-1, N-3 (April 8, 1980).
Use of the authority has been advocated to strengthen the South African
embargo. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 241, at 596-97, 600.
645. Bretton Woods Agreement Act-Financing Facility, Pub. L. No. 95-435,
92 Stat. 1051 (Oct. 10, 1978) (expired 1979).
646. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,304 (1978) (repealed 1979).
647. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,571 (1978).
648. Id. at 58,573 (proposed 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(c)).
649. Proposed 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(c) (1), would have defined the term as the
anti-boycott regulation had, 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(a)-(c) (1980), with the addition of
foreign corporations "controlled in fact" by individual American citizens and
residents. See 43 Fed. Reg. 58,573 (1978).
650. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,571-72 (1978). The statement of policy would have been
inserted after 15 C.F.R. § 370.3(a), the general prohibition of exports without a
general or validated license.
651. See Statement of Covington and Burling before the Industry and Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
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The Carter Administration stated its intention to impose
extraterritorial controls sparingly and only after weighing their
"foreign relations costs."652 Indeed, the foreign policy controls
imposed near the end of President Carter's term of office-even
given the emotional atmosphere of the Iranian crisis and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan---did not extend to foreign subsidiaries and other controlled foreign entities. 65 3 Yet the existence of broad authority for extraterritorial controls still causes
concern. The realities of the multinational corporation and the
lack of foreign government cooperation in American controls
seem almost to ensure that the authority will be used as American policy makers search for instrumental effectiveness or symbolic power. In addition, the conflict of the 1960s over exports
to the People's Republic of China has not been forgotten
abroad. 654 Any significant use of extraterritorial foreign policy
trade controls would almost surely lead to serious political tensionS.

3.

6 55

Systemic Costs

Systemic costs include those resulting from the effect of
extensive foreign policy export controls on the system of rules
governing international trade. The cornerstone of that system 656 -and of its major constitutive document, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)657-is the principle of
nondiscrimination among nations in trade matters. Political exNo. 241, at M-1 (Jan. 23, 1979). The proposed regulation apparently would not
have imposed any new validated license requirements, however, because the
operative licensing provision of the Export Administration Regulations, applying only to exports from the United States, would have been left unchanged. 15
C.F.R. § 370.3(a) (1980).
652. Amending the Trading with the Enemy Act: Hearing on H.R. 7738
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (statement of C.
Fred Bergsten).
653. See notes 604, 631-35, 644 supra.
654. See Hacking, supra note 605, at 5-6.
655. See Nash, supra note 611, at 180-83.
656.

STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE

COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDIEs 133

(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as GATT STuDIES]. See generally G.
CuRZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DipioMAcY 57-69 (1965).

657. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6,
T.IA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950) (original text) [hereinafter cited as
GATT]. The curfent text of the GATT appears in GATT, IV BASIc INSTRUmENTS
AND SELECTED DOcuMENTs (BISD) (1969). The nondiscrimination principle ap-

pears most clearly in Article I of GATT, entitled "General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment." See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT
255-57 (1969).
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port controls blatantly discriminate among nations in terms of

their right to purchase American goods and technology. They
may technically violate the terms of GAIT and are certainly
contrary to its underlying principles, although serious legal
consequences are unlikely. Of more importance, serious economic and political consequences may result if political export
controls create precedents for and expectations of broad deviations from the principle of nondiscrimination in trade.
Consider first the legal obligations of the United States
under GATT. Although the best-known manifestation of the
nondiscrimination principle is without doubt the Article I requirement of unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for tariffs,658 Article I also applies to all "duties and
65 9
charges" and all "rules and formalities" applied to exports.
Further, Article XI prohibits any restrictions on exports other
than duties and charges, and specifically prohibits export
licenses. 660 One might argue that Article XI is subordinate to
the EAA under the Protocol of Provisional Application by
which the United States has adhered to GATT, but the law appears to the contrary.661 The same argument cannot be made
658. GATI, supra note 657, art. I, 1 1. Unconditional MFN calls for nondiscriminatory treatment of imports from a given nation whether or not that nation makes related tariff concessions to the United States. Conditional MFN, by
contrast, calls for nondiscriminatory treatment only upon receipt of adequate
compensation. See GATT STuDiS, supra note 656, at 133-35.
659. GAIT, supra note 657, art. I, 1; see J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 499.
The MFN obligation of Article I applies only to trade with GATT signatories.
Not all of the Communist nations are signatories; the United States has either
not consented to or has suspended the application of GATT to its trade with
Communist signatories. The United States does have bilateral trade agreements that call for MFN treatment with several Communist countries.
660. GATr, supra note 657, art. XI, 1. Article XHI, which prescribes rules
for the administration of permissible quantitative restraints, establishes a nondisc6-iination rule applicable to any "prohibition or restriction" on exports to
GA
signatories. GATT, supra note 657, art. XIII, 1 1.
661. GATT has itself never come into force, since the minimum number of
states required by Article XXVI has never accepted it "definitively." J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 60-61. All nations which apply GATT do so provisionally, either through the original Protocol of Provisional Application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.LA.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1948), signed by the United States and 22 other nations, or through later protocols with similar language (former colonies becoming independent are deemed to apply the GATT through the protocols of the
sponsoring parent nation). The Protocol of Provisional Application provides
that signatory states will apply Part H of GATT "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Id. at § 1(b).
The Export Control Act was not enacted until 1949, Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch.
11, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969), and so was not "existing legislation" on its face.
Prior wartime export control authorities had been extended until that date.
See Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 792 n.2. The Second Decontrol Act of
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as to Article J.662 The exception provisions of GATT must
663
therefore be considered.
The "Security Exceptions" in Article XX1664 are most
closely applicable. Nothing in GATT is to be construed to prevent any signatory from taking any action that it considers necessary for the protection of its "essential security interests" if
such action (1) relates to '"issionable materials," (2) relates to
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, or to trade
in other goods when carried on, directly or indirectly, "for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment," or (3) is taken
in time of war or other international emergency. 665 These exceptions appear to permit virtually all current American national security controls. 666 Political controls on exports to
1947 authorized export controls to aid in carrying out American foreign policy,
see SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER THE SECOND
DECONTROL ACT OF 1947 at 1 (1947), and other wartime legislation gave even
broader power. Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712, as amended by Act of
June 30, 1942, ch. 461, 56 Stat. 463. One might argue that all subsequent export
control legislation relates back to these statutes and is thus "existing legislation." The prevailing interpretation of the Protocol, however, is that only
"mandatory" legislation (not mere "authorizing" legislation) can be saved by
the "existing legislation" clause. R. HUDEC, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 121-37 (1975); J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 108-10.
662. Article I is in Part I of the General Agreement and thus the "existing
legislation" clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application, see note 661
supra, does not limit its application. See J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 256.
663. Article XI permits temporary export restrictions to deal with critical
shortages of food or other essential products and restrictions necessary for the
application of standards, grading, and the like. GATT, supra note 657, art. XI.,
2. Article XX permits restrictions on imports and exports that are necessary
to protect life, health, and public morals; that relate to gold or silver or products
of convict labor, artistic or archaeological treasures, and the like; and that are
essential to assure adequate supplies of various materials, among other exceptions. All of the exceptions of Article XX are subject to the requirement that
restrictions not be applied in a manner constituting either "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where the same conditions prevail or
disguised restrictions on international trade. Id. at art. XX. Other exceptions
to the nondiscrimination principle deal with particular balance of payments situations. Id. at art XIV.
In the context of restrictions on access to supplies, the total of these exceptions has been said to make Article XI's ban on export licenses "virtually useless." C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 25.
664. GA'T, supra note 657, art. XX Article XXI(c) permits a Contracting
Party to act in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security. See note 2 supra.
665. GA'T, supra note 657, art. XXI(b). Article XXI(a) permits a Contracting Party to withhold information if it considers disclosure contrary to its
essential security interests.
666. Controls on the export of arms and nuclear material, as well as dualuse items "relating" to arms and nuclear material, seem clearly covered by the
first and second clauses; no one would argue that essential security interests
are not involved. Indeed, controls on dual-use items seem to have been contemplated by the drafters of GAT'. See J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 748.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

military entities (in South Africa, for example) might fall
within the language of the second clause if the quoted phrase is
taken to refer to foreign as well as domestic military establishments. Here, however, the matter of "essential security interests" is much less clear. The embargoes and other trade
controls instituted under the TWEA and the IEEPA667 might fit
under the "emergency" language of the third clause, though
again it is not clear that "essential security interests" are in6 68
volved.
None of the Article XXI security interest exceptions, however, appears to cover the American restrictions on exports to
civilian purchasers in Uganda, the embargo of police forces in
South Africa, the controls on petroleum equipment sales to
nonmilitary entities in the U.S.S.R., the embargo on sales to
consignees associated with the Olympics, or similar political
controls. Although these actions are probably violations of
GATT, no action has been taken against similar political trade
controls in the past. In one of the very few instances in which
GATT has even considered political trade controls, 669 Czechoslovakia argued in 1949 that the American export licensing program was a breach of the MFN obligation of Article I; the
United States defended on the basis of Article XXI, among
other grounds. 670 The "infant GATT had neither the capacity
nor the prestige to undertake a serious examination of U.S.
cold war measures," and the United States was found to have
breached no GATT obligation.71 Discussion among-the GATT
signatories in that case and in subsequent cases turned on the
point that "every country must have the last resort on ques6
tions relating to its own security." 72
667. See note 2 supra.
668. Article XXI is enormously flexible, however, because it allows each nation to judge what is necessary to its own security interests. GATT, supra note
657, art. XXI(b) (introductory clause). See also J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at
748-52.
669. The cases in which Article XXI has or might have figured are described in J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 749-51. No decisions referring to Article XXI appear in the periodic supplements to BISD since the date of
Professor Jackson's treatise.
670. J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 749-50.
671. R. HuDEc, supra note 661, at 68. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at
749.
672. J. JACKSON, supra note 657, at 749. This statement was balanced with
the admonition that contracting parties should not take any step that might undermine the General Agreement. Id. Ghana's objections to the accession of
Portugal to GATT were partly based on this argument. Ghana saw the situation in Angola, then a Portuguese colony, as a threat to its security. Id. at 750-

51.
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Indeed, if history is instructive, it is unlikely thaf the question whether United States political trade controls comply with
Article XXI will ever be squarely faced in GATT. In 1951, the
American suspension of MFN treatment for European Communist nations again came before GATT, once more on a complaint by Czechoslovakia; the signatories simply "declared,"
without citing any provision of the agreement, that both nations were "free" to suspend their obligations toward each
other.67 3 The best interpretation of this declaration seems to be
that the signatories recognized afait accompli they were powerless to influence. As one national representative put it: "The
General Agreement [is] a technical instrument to deal with
technical trade problems"; the political issue before the signa674
tories "was of a different order altogether."
Even if American controls can almost certainly withstand
or escape scrutiny under GATT,675 the harm they may cause to
the international trading system should be considered as a cost
of their utilization. The framers of GATT, particularly the
United States delegation, 676 believed that an open and nondiscriminatory world trading system 67 7 would allocate resources in
the most efficient manner and contribute to increased world
prosperity: 'raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources
of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods." 678 Some also believed that open and nondiscriminatory
trade was the best path to political cooperation and world
peace. 67 9 Today, both goals remain as important as ever;68 0 and
673. Id. at 749-50.
674. Id. at 750 (quoting GATr Doc. C.P.6/S.R. 13, at 4 (1951)).
675. In the context of American controls, as in that of developing nations'
restrictions on access to raw materials, "no effective framework of rules and institutional arrangements to deal with the trade policy problems arising from
export controls has ever existed, and none exists today." C. BERGSTEN, supra
note 131, at 4. Bergsten points out that GATT has taken no action against participants in the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, which he sees as a clear violation of
Article L Id. at 26.
676. See Y. DAm, THE GATr: LAW AND INTERNATlONAL EcoNOMic ORGANIZATION 12 (1970).
677. The two related goals can be seen in the Preamble to GATT', which recites the intention of the Contracting Parties to reach their stated goals
through arrangements "directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATr, supra note 657, Preamble, 3.
678. Id. at 12.
679. See F. DAM, supra note 676, at 12. h.
680. The importance of peace is obvious. -On the continued importance of
economic efficiency, see id. at 6. Professor Dam quotes Ragnar Nurske's apho-
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while some of the earlier hopes for the results of free international trade now seem naive,6 81 many continue to believe that
free trade can make valuable contributions to both peace and
prosperity. 82 The United States has at least formally continued to adhere to its belief in the principle of nondiscrimination.683
It is true that the principle of nondiscrimination is riddled
685
684
with exceptions, in GAT itself, in United States practice,
and in the practice of other states. Indeed, the principle often
seems to be under attack from all sides,686 as developing nations call for preferential treatment, 687 as OPEC inspires narism: 'The world is not rich enough to be able to despise efficiency." .Id. at 9
(quoting Nurske, InternationalTrade Theory and Development Policy, in EcoNOMIC

DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA 234 (H. Ellis ed. 1961)).

681. See, e.g., George Ball's dismissal of the idea that trade leads to peace,
in Senate Foreign Policy Hearings,supra note 119, at 12, and Professor Dam's
statement that modern economic research has shown some of the premises of
GATT to be economically simplistic. K. DAM, supra note 676, at 5-7.
682. See, e.g., House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 42, 48 (statements of Dimitri Simes, Marshall Goldman) (both Soviet experts believe that
the best hope for American-Soviet relations is to involve the U.S.S.R. in the
"matrix" of world trade); K. DAM,supra note 676, at 8-9; Baldwin & Kay, International Trade and InternationalRelations, in WORLD POLrICs AND INTERNATONAL ECONOMICS 99, 130-31 (C. Bergsten & L. Krause eds. 1975).
683. The Trade Act of 1974, for example, echoed the language of GATT when
it authorized American participation in the Tokyo Round trade negotiations in
order to "foster economic growth ... and full employment ... and to
strengthen economic relations between the United States and foreign countries
through open and nondiscriminatory world trade." Trade Act of 1974, § 2, 19
U.S.C. § 2102 (1976) (amended 1979). Cf.Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 1(c),
19 U.S.C. § 2502(2) (Supp. ITI 1979) (goal of fostering "the growth and maintenance of an open world trading system").
684. Examples in GATr, supra note 657, include art. I, 1 1-2 (historical
preferences); art. XXIV (customs unions and free trade areas); art. XXV, § 5
(waivers). See note 663 supra. In addition, the nontariff trade barrier codes
emerging from the Tokyo Round also provide for non-MFN treatment of nonsignatories. See Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional
Most-Favored-NationPrinciple, 12 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 59, 68 (1980).
685. For example, the Trade Act of 1974 requires the President to continue
to deny nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to most Communist nations, Trade
Act of 1974, § 401, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1976) (amended 1979); provides a special
form of import relief for imports from Communist countries, id. at § 406, 19
U.S.C. § 2437; and provides for discriminatory treatment of nations that do not
observe reciprocity. Id. at § 126, 19 U.S.C. § 2136.
686. See Kramer, Changing Principles Governing InternationalTrade, 8 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 227, 227-32 (1974).
687. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, [ 4(n),
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Establishment of a New International Economic Order]; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA.
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, arts. 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Charter of Economic Rights and Duties]. One product of
the pressure applied by the developing nations, the Generalized System of
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tions controlling raw materials to pursue their political ends
through the use of economic power,68 8 and as calls for protectionist policies are regularly made.
Yet there is hope-and this may be the most that can be
hoped for-that an open, nondiscriminatory trading system carries with it sufficient economic and political benefits that it will
continue to be accepted as the framework for the bulk of world
trade even while various specialized areas of divergence are established.689 National security trade controls, for example, are
universally recognized in theory and practice; 690 nondiscrimination can easily coexist with the kind of controls permitted by a
moderate interpretation of Article XXI.691 Similarly, the nondiscriminatory trading system can accommodate such rela-

tively minor exceptions as those for public health measures

and the protection of artistic treasures. 692 It can surely survive
the occasional use of multilateral sanctions. 693 It now appears
that the system can accept, with some strain, significant discrimination in favor of developing nations. 694 A significant degree of regionalism is also being digested.695
These particularized developments are significant, but
more worrisome is the apparent growth of a belief among developed and developing nations alike that the open, nondiscriminatory trading system has, over its thirty-plus years,
produced an unacceptable level of economic interdependence 69 6 -a state of affairs in which nations are so strongly afPreferences, was adopted by the United States in 1974. See Trade Act of 1974,
§§ 501-505, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1976) (amended 1979).
688. See C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 10-14.
689. Cf. Baldwin & Kay, supra note 682, at 117 (economic and political benefits of a minimum set of rules covering state conduct and responsibilities).
690. See, e.g., C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 27; P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMicS
652 (l1th ed. 1980).
691. See notes 664-68 supra and accompanying text. See also Berman &
Garson, supra note 2, at 890.
692. See GATT, supra note 657, art. XX, 11(a)-(f). This statement assumes
that the proviso in Article XX is enforced.
693. Cf. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 147-48 (1971)
(exceptions on international public policy grounds).
694. See K. DAM, supra note 676, at 247-48; Note, PreferentialTreatment: A
New Standardfor InternationalEconomic Relations, 18 HARV. INT'L L. 109,
120-22 (1977); note 687 supra and accompanying text.
695. See, e.g., K. DAM, supra -note 676, at 274-95; J. JACKSON, supra note 657,
at 575-623; Baldwin & Kay, supra note 682, at 113-16.
696. Economic interdependence is a necessary product of an open trading
system. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIOSS § 1.1, at 1-4 (1977); The Outlook for International Trade and the Management of Interdependence, Speech of Mr. Olivier Long, Director General of
GATT, Foreign Trade Day of the Wholesale and Foreign Trade Association in
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fected by external events that national governments can no
longer control their own economies. 697 The growth of this belief threatens the foundations of the system, and no other
deviation from the nondiscrimination principle seems more
likely to accelerate its growth than the peacetime use of political export controls. Political trade controls affecting the entire
range of commercial products and a growing number of target
nations highlight the risks of economic interdependence, even
for trade in peaceful goods, and equate economic interdependence with political weakness. 698 They tend to create a "control psychology" on a world scale.
Contributing to such a development would be shortsighted
and self-defeating. The natural reaction of trading nations
would be to increase their economic self-sufficiency and to reorient their trade to the nations least likely to interrupt it for
political motives. 699 The result would almost certainly be a reduction in economic efficiency and world standards of living,
especially to the extent that policies of economic self-sufficiency were pursued.00 Political communication would be reduced and international conflict would be nurtured.O1 The
possibility that multilateral economic sanctions could become
an effective tool of international law enforcement would all but
disappear. 70 2 To be sure, these catastrophic results will not occur merely because one more computer sale is prohibited. A
widespread perception, however, that the foremost defender of
the nondiscrimination principle has abandoned it in the hope
of reaping short-term foreign policy benefits would prompt
others to follow suit, impairing the future vitality of the trading
system.
At the very least and quite ironically, an expanded commitHamburg, Germany (June 21, 1979). It has been said that GA[T? was the product of '"post war revulsion against the excesses of national separatism." H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 605, at 1149.
697. J. SPERO, THE PoLrrIcs OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 27-28,
72-73 (1977); see Cooper, National Economic Policy in an Interdependent World
Economy, 76 YALE L.J. 1273, 1273-75 (1967).
698. See Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 405, at 194.
699. See Galtung, supra note 344, at 412-13; notes 356-57, 415-25 supra and
accompanying text. Cf. Doxey, supra note 430, at 161-62.
700. Cf. Baldwin & Kay, supra note 682, at 130-31 (disruptive effect of "inward-looking approach"); Erb, Controlling Export Controls, 17 FOREIGN POL'Y
79, 83 (1974) (comparison of export controls with import controls of the 1930s);
Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at col. 1 (reviewing contribution of economic nationalism to Great Depression).
701. Baldwin & Kay, supra note 682, at 117, 130-31.
702. Cf. notes 405, 415, 443 supra and accompanying text.
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ment to foreign policy export controls would weaken the ability
of the United States to attain one of its principal foreign policy
goals: international access to supplies, a goal that depends on
international control of discrimination in trade.7 03 During the
Tokyo Round, the developed nations pressed for negotiations
on this issue, but discussions foundered on the developing nations' concern over the control of natural resources as an attribute of sovereignty.70 4 The participants did agree on an
7 05
Understanding Regarding Export Restrictions and Charges,
calling for GATT to "reassess" the provisions on export controls "as one of the priority issues" following the conclusion of
the negotiating round. Negotiations on this issue will be difficult, and the adoption of firm rules in the near future is doubtful. 06 The issue is of extraordinary importance to the
developed world, however, and the American negotiating position would be significantly strengthened by a record of diligent
support for the principle of nondiscrimination.
V. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979
With the passage of EAA '79, Congress has attempted for
the first time to limit presidential authority to control exports
for foreign policy purposes. Bills introduced in both the House
and Senate would have imposed even stricter limits than the
Act,7 07 but the Carter Administration opposed the most restrictive proposals as undue interference with its conduct of foreign
policy.7 08 The final legislation thus represents an effort to reconcile the desire of many in Congress to restrain the use of
703. Negotiation of agreements providing assured access to supplies was a
"principal United States negotiating objective" during the Tokyo Round. Trade
Act of 1974, § 108(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2118(a) (1976).
704. See GATT, THE TOKYO RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

108 (1979). On the issue of sovereignty over natural resources, see, e.g., Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963); Establishment of a New International Economic Order, supra note 687, %4(e); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties,
supra note 687, art. 2, T 1.
705. Group "Framework," GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2, pt. 5, at 5/1, reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
96TH CONG., IST SESS., MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
CODES AGREED TO IN GENEVA, SwrrzERLAND, APRIL 12, 1979, at 390 (Joint Comm.
Print 1979).
706. See C. BERGSTEN, supra note 131, at 25-32.
707. This is particularly true of the bills offered by the principal sponsors,
Senator Adlai Stevenson and Representative Jonathon Bingham. See note 10
supra.
708. See, e.g., House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 685-87 (state-

ment of Stanley J. Marcuss).
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controls with the desire of the executive branch to maintain its
flexibility.
Three dimensions of the Act's approach to foreign policy
controls are important: first, foreign policy controls are treated
separately from national security controls; second, a statutory
tone skeptical of foreign policy controls is established; and
third, various substantive provisions attempt to restrict executive discretion. Analysis demonstrates, however, that, for all of
its innovation, EAA '79 ultimately fails to impose any effective
restraint on the Executive.
A.

SEPARATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POUCY

CONTROLS
Separate treatment of the two principal types of controls
can be traced to Representative Bingham's original House
bill.709 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs found that
"the distinction between these two types of control has not
been adequately made in the past," even by the executive
branch, and felt that the two types "have different purposes
and should be governed by different criteria and procedures." 71 0 Accordingly, national security and foreign policy
controls are treated in distinct provisions of EAA '79-sections
five and six, respectively. Each section authorizes the President to prohibit or curtail exports of goods, technology, and
other information in order to carry out specified policies. For
example, section six approves three policies in terms virtually
identical to prior law: the use of export controls to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States, 7 1 ' the access
to supplies policy,712 and the anti-terrorism policy.713 Sections
five and six then establish separate substantive and procedural
rules tailored to each type of control. The Act also requires the
Commerce Department to maintain, as part of the CCL, a separate listing of foreign policy controls that shows the items controlled and the countries to which controls apply.7 1 4 A unified
709. H.R. 2539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 5, 6 (1979), reprinted in House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 813-53. Separation was adopted in the final
House bilL H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 5, 6 (1979). The Senate bill did
not separate the two types as completely. S. 737, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
The Conference Committee adopted the House approach. H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
96-482, supra note 10, at 5-15.
710. H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1979).
711. EAA '79, § 3(2) (B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (B) (Supp. 1I 1979).
712. Id. at § 3(7), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(7).
713. Id. at § 3(8), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8).
714. Id. at § 6(k), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(k). The items controlled are to be
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CCL may be maintained so long as foreign policy controls are
clearly identified, enabling exporters to distinguish them from
7 15
national security controls.
Public identification of foreign policy export controls is an
essential first step in any attempt to circumscribe their use.
Before EAA '79, merely to determine what foreign policy controls were in force required careful study of the CCL, the Regulations, the periodic reports of the Commerce Department, and
any public statements by the State and Commerce Departments,7 16 as well as a certain amount of guesswork. Now foreign policy-based validated license requirements can be
identified as such, although there remains an element of mystery about certain licensing policies that involve foreign policy
considerations.
Despite this welcome change, it will not always be easy to
distinguish foreign policy controls from national security controls, because some controls imposed under the Act combine
characteristics of each. The best examples are anti-terrorism
and regional stability controls (particularly those aimed at a
strategic area like the Middle East), and nuclear nonproliferation controls. 71 7 In these and other cases, the statutory scheme
invites the Executive to choose one or the other characterization, either to avoid or to take advantage of particular statutory
provisions. For example, by characterizing a control as national security-based, the Executive can avoid certain consultation, negotiation, and reporting requirements. Some members
of Congress charged that the Carter Administration did just
this in characterizing certain controls imposed on exports to
the Soviet Union, in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, as
7
national security-based. 18
identified by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
Commerce. Disputes between them are to be resolved by the President. Id.
715. EAA '79, §§ 5(c), 6(k), 50 U.S.C. §§ 2404(c), 2405(k) (Supp. HI 1979). See
H.R. CoNr. REP. No. 96-482, supra note 10, at 47. The CCL issued as of June 25,
1980 identifies foreign policy controls separately. See 45 Fed. Reg. 43,010 (1980).
716. The committees attempting to draft new export control legislation had
to rely on testimony from those agencies to learn what controls were in effect.
See, e.g., Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 64-66, 191 (statement
of Richard Cooper).
717. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 646 (statement of
William Root); id. at 687-91 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
718. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 290, at A-2 to A-3 (Jan. 15, 1980)
(Sen. Stevenson and Rep. Bingham reported to have objected to characterizing
post-Afghanistan technology controls as national security controls; congressional "sources" reported to have suggested it was done to avoid reporting
under EAA '79, § 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. 11 1979)).
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Alternatively, some controls can be characterized as based
19
on both foreign policy and national security considerations.
Every item appearing on the CCL for reasons of national security, for example, has also been made subject to parallel validated license requirements in certain circumstances for two
foreign policy purposes: nonproliferation and opposition to terrorism.20 To the extent that the Act permits such overlaps, 721
much of the clarity it seeks will be lost.722 Indeed, a new layer
of confusion will be added, because the Act does not indicate
whether the substantive and procedural rules of section five,
723
section six, or both, apply to dual-purpose controls.

B.

STATUTORY ToNE

EAA '79 contains a number of congressional findings, statements of policy, and other hortatory provisions that do not actually limit the authority delegated under the Act, but that do
express Congress' desire to "emphasiz[e] the importance of exports to the United States economy and confm[e] the use of export control authority to instances where controls are
724
essential."
The congressional findings show most clearly how these
provisions change the tone of prior law. In EAA '69, a single
finding expressed concern that "unwarranted" controls could
have damaging. effects on the United States economy.725 EAA
'79 elaborates similar concerns in three paragraphs at the outset of the findings and specifically notes the economic costs of
uncertainty in control policy.726 The congressional declarations
of policy set the same tone, providing that controls should be
719. Before EAA '79, some items on the Commodity Control List were said
to be controlled for more than one reason. See House EAA Hearings Part I,
supra note 21, at 687-91 (statement of Stanley Marcuss). Some were said to be
controlled for export to Libya for several reasons. Id. at 646 (statement of Wlliam Root).
720. See notes 115, 168 supra.
721. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 727 (statement of
Victor Johnson).
722. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 291, at A-4 to A-5 (Jan. 22, 1980)
(describing confusion over whether the grain embargo of the U.S.S.R was a foreign policy or national security control; Administration officials had claimed
both foreign policy and national security justifications for the President's embargo order).
723. See House EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 21, at 687-91.
724. S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 282, at 3.
725. EAA '69, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 2(3), 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401(3) (1976)) (expired 1979).

726. EAA '79, §§ 2(1)-(3), 2(6), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(1)-(3), 2401(6) (Supp.
I 1979).
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used "only to the extent necessary" to carry out the policies of
the Act and then "only after full consideration of the impact on
the economy of the United States, '72 7 stating that uncertainty
7 28
in control policy should be minimized.
Potentially the most far-reaching of the hortatory provisions is the declaration of policy in section 3(10). This provision declares that exports should not be controlled except
when necessary to further "fundamental" national security, foreign policy, or short supply objectives and then only when controls will "clearly" further such objectives.7 29 Section 3(10)
represents the first attempt in American export control law to
address the homogeneity of the term "foreign policy." Most of
the controls of the 1970s could probably have been imposed
even if this section had been operative.7 30 Nonetheless, the
provision suggests that future export controls should be confined to situations in which the foreign conduct addressed (a
human rights violation or act of terrorism, for example) is in
some way of fundamental concern to United States policy. Section 3(10) also appears to require the Executive to establish
that a proposed foreign policy control will "clearly" further its
intended objective. Together, the two prongs of section 3(10)
imply that, before a control is implemented, the Executive
must (1) define the objective of the control, (2) find the objective to be fundamental, and (3) determine that the proposed
control will clearly further the objective. Rigorous application
of this analytic process would go far to prevent the development of the control psychology alluded to earlier. 731 Unfortunately, an expansive reading of section 3(10) is undermined by
statements in its legislative history indicating that the subsec732
tion was not intended as a substantial change from prior law.
In any case, hortatory provisions like the findings and policies of EAA '79 are easily disregarded by an Executive not sympathetic to the principles expressed. "Disregard" is not even
727. Id. at § 3(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2). The word "only" in the first
phrase quoted was added by the Act.
728. Id. at § 3(1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1).
729. Id. at § 3(10), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(10).
730. For example, EAA '69 specifically approved anti-terrorism and access
to supplies controls, while § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act made the promotion of human rights abroad a "principal goal" of American foreign policy.
731. See text accompanying note 577 supra.
732. See House EAA HearingsPart II, supra note 119, at 117-18 (statement
of Rep. Fascell) (§3(10) was proposed by its drafter, Representative Fascell, as
a "reassurance amendment" that "does not change the substantive or basic objective of the bill.").
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necessary; the language of these provisions is sufficiently vague
to be rendered ineffective through interpretation. As Professor
Huszagh of the University of Georgia School of Law stated in
testimony before the House, provisions like section 3(10) may
bring about a "substantial philosophical reform," but are unlikely to create a successful "administrative reform." 733 The
policies implicit in section 3(10) and other such provisions are
not integrated into the substantive provisions of the Act; the
identity and attitudes of the controllers are not affected by the
Act; and there is no provision for review of export control decisions by any institution outside the executive branch. 734 There
is thus little reason to expect any significant results from the
hortatory provisions of EAA '79, reform-minded as they may be.
C.

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

The substantive limitations on executive authority, found
principally in sections four and six of EAA '79, fall into six categories: (1) a general limitation based on foreign availability;
(2) a list of factors that must be considered in any decision to
impose, expand, or extend controls; (3) a requirement that reasonable efforts be made, before imposing controls, to achieve a
desired foreign policy goal through negotiation or other means;
(4) various consultation and reporting requirements; (5) automatic annual expiration of controls unless extended by the
President; and (6) certain miscellaneous provisions.
1. Foreign Availability
Section 4(c) of the Act extends the foreign availability provision that formerly applied only to national security controls
to foreign policy controls. 7 3 5 The President thus may not impose controls for foreign policy purposes on exports of items
that he determines to be available "without restriction," in "significant" quantities, and of "comparable" quality, from foreign
733. House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 294.
734. The original Bingham bill, H.R. 2539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e) (1979),
would have permitted a congressional veto of new foreign policy controls by
concurrent resolution. This provision was opposed by the Administration, see
House EAA Hearings Part 1, supra note 21, at 685 (statement of Stanley
Marcuss), and was withdrawn by Representative Bingham himself. See id.
(statement of Rep. Bingham). The provision was later restored by the subcommittee, id. at 770-73, and adopted by the House. See H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 6(e) (1979). The measure was dropped in conference, H.R. REP. No. 96482, supra note 10, at 46, except for certain controls on agricultural commodities. EAA '79, § 7(g) (3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g) (3) (Supp. DI 1979).
735. See text accompanying notes 358-66 supra.
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sources, unless he finds that adequate evidence has been
presented demonstrating that the absence of controls would
prove detrimental to American foreign policy.73 6 The foreign
availability provision governing national security controls, how73 7
ever, is tightened by the Act, as discussed below.
Both the House and Senate reports on EAA '79 recognized
that some foreign policy purposes can be served by export controls in spite of foreign availability 73 8 -generally, those justified
by the symbolic rationale.7 3 9 Both reports indicated, however,
that national security controls, the only purpose of which is to
deny access to controlled items, are substantially vitiated if the
items are available from other sources. 740 Congress' differing
perception accounts for the continuing difference between the
two types of controls in the treatment of foreign availability.
Yet neither the Act nor the reports distinguish between instrumentally motivated foreign policy controls and those with symbolic purposes, despite the fact that instrumental foreign-policy
controls are impaired by foreign availability in virtually the
same degree as national security controls. As a result, the Act
fails to require that adequate weight be given to foreign availability in the context of instrumental foreign policy controls.
The failure to distinguish the two forms of political control
also affects other foreign availability provisions in the Act.
When a foreign policy control is imposed, for example, the
President must take "all feasible steps" to initiate and conclude
negotiations for foreign cooperation.7 41 Yet the provision fails
736. EEA '79, § 4(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c) (Supp. I 1979).
737. See note 745 infra and accompanying text.
738. See S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 8-9; H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
739. The House report mentions the "thumbscrew" hypothetical, H.R. REP.
No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979); the Senate report cites State Department testimony to the effect that the United States might wish to "distance"
itself from acts of a foreign nation even in the face of foreign availability. S.
REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 8.
740. H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
741. EAA '79, § 6(g), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(g) (Supp. I 1979). Congressional
concern on this point stems in part from testimony by the Administration that
other industrial nations had not been asked to cooperate with controls like the
Uganda embargo and the restrictions on sales of petroleum equipment to the
U.S.S.R. See Senate EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 106, at 208-11 (statement
of Richard Cooper).
As mentioned previously, it might be counterproductive to require the Executive to negotiate over foreign availability in every case. Although the language "take all feasible steps" comes perilously close to just such a
requirement, there is sufficient flexibility in the phrase to allow the Executive
to avoid negotiations when they would have adverse foreign relations consequences.
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to distinguish instrumental from symbolic controls, even
though only the former may require successful negotiations
over foreign availability to be effective. Negotiation may thus
be required, with its possible political costs, when it is unnecessary.742 On the other hand, even when negotiations do not
eliminate foreign availability or are not pursued for reasons of
foreign relations, the Act permits instrumental controls to be
implemented.
Additionally, although the basic foreign availability standard in section 4(c) of the Act applies to both foreign policy
and national security controls, 743 the national security provisions of section 5 more precisely define the degree of foreign
availability that should inhibit controls. 74 4 Section 5(f) provides that a validated license requirement should be terminated (or a license granted), subject to the possibility of a
presidential override, if the target nation can obtain items in
sufficient quantity and quality that the control (or license denial) would be "ineffective in achieving [its] purpose."745 The
same test would be useful for instrumental foreign policy controls and might lead to more sophisticated foreign availability
analysis. The "effectiveness" criterion, however, is not used in
the foreign policy context, because no distinction between instrumental and symbolic controls is drawn.
The legislative history of EAA '79 demonstrates that the
742. Negotiations might be pursued to prevent other nations from reaping
the benefits of trade that the United States decides to forego, but this will normally be a futile effort.
743. EAA '79, § 4(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c) (Supp. 11 1979); see text accompanying note 735 supra.
744. EAA '79, § 5, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (Supp. III 1979).
745. Id. at § 5(f), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f). Section 5(f) requires the Secretary of Commerce to review on a continuing basis the foreign availability of all
items subject to validated license controls for national security purposes and to
suspend or terminate such controls if the controlled items are found to be
available "in fact" in sufficient quantity and quality to make the controls "ineffective in achieving their purpose." EAA '79, § 5(f) (1), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2404(f) (1) (Supp. m 1979). This provision was designed to remove American
controls before foreign competitors have captured a market. H.R. REP. No. 96200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1979). Similarly, the Commerce Department must
issue a validated license required for national security purposes if it determines that the items to be exported are in fact available to the purchasing
country from outside the United States, and must then consider whether to terminate the validated license requirement completely. EEA '79, § 5(f) (2), 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (2) (Supp. IM 1979).
Even these provisions, however, continue to permit validated license requirements and license denials in the face of foreign availability if the President determines that the absence of controls would be detrimental to national
security. Id. at § 5(f)(1)-(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (1)-(2).
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drafters were extremely sensitive to the Carter Administration's arguments that an emphasis on foreign availability might
unduly restrain executive flexibility in implementing foreign
policy. The State Department, for example, voiced concern that
a foreign availability provision applicable to foreign policy controls would limit its flexibility to respond to "extreme acts" of
other nations. 74 6 The Senate Banking Committee report concluded that the Department's concern was "unwarranted," noting that members of the committee agreed that foreign
availability should not necessarily be given as much weight in
foreign policy cases as in national security cases (even though
the foreign availability provision, section 4(c), makes no distinction between them). 747 The report also stressed that section 4(c) would require the Executive only to determine
whether foreign availability exists, and in appropriate cases to
attempt to eliminate it through negotiations; it would not prevent the President from using foreign policy controls in spite of
foreign availability. 74 8 The Committee's intention was only to
require the President to learn whether controlled items were
available elsewhere, not to limit his actions once that information has been gathered. 749 It is essential that the President determine the extent of foreign availability; and under the Act
foreign availability must be "considered" in deciding whether
to impose foreign policy controls. 5 0 Even so, the Act does little
to reflect the impact of foreign availability on the effectiveness
7 51
of instrumental controls.
2. Decision Factors
Central to the reforms under EAA '79752 is a list of factors
that must be considered before the President can impose any
foreign policy export control: (1) the probability that the proposed control will achieve the intended foreign policy goal in
light of such factors as the foreign availability of the items pro746. S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 8.
747. Id. at 9.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 8-9.
750. See text accompanying notes 752-56 infra.
751. On the positive side, the Act requires the OEA to establish the capability to investigate and monitor foreign availability, and requires other agencies
involved in the control process to share information with the OEA. EAA '79,
§ 5(f) (5)-(6), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f) (5)-(6) (Supp. 11 1979).
752. Similar provisions were included in the bills passed by both houses. S.
737, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (2) (C) (1979); H..L 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

§6(b) (1979).
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posed for control; (2) the compatibility of the proposed control
with other foreign policy objectives of the United States and
with overall United States policy toward the proposed target
nation; (3) the reactions of third countries to the proposed control; (4) the likely effects of the proposed control on the export
performance of the United States, on its competitive position in
the international economy, on its international reputation as a
supplier of goods and technology, and on individual American
companies and their employees and communities, including
the effects of the controls on existing contracts; (5) the ability
of the United States to enforce the proposed control effectively;
and (6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing the
7 53
control.
This list is thoughtful, and it includes most of the considerations of effectiveness and cost discussed in Part IV of this Article. Two aspects of effectiveness are addressed in factors one
and five. The enforceability of controls (factor five) is in most
respects a mechanical matter, but sympathetic consideration of
this issue should lead to continued restraint in efforts to control
reexports, exports by foreign subsidiaries, and transactions between persons within a target nation. Consideration of the
probability that a proposed control will achieve its intended
foreign policy purpose (factor one) is essential. The Act, however, does not require the Executive to spell out its objective,
or even to state whether it is essentially instrumental or symbolic. 754 Without any requirement that the goal of a proposed
control be stated, it is virtually meaningless to require the Executive to assess whether the control will be effective in reaching its goal.
The focus of factors one and five on foreign availability and
enforceability indicates that the drafters were contemplating
instrumental controls. The Administration had argued, however, that considerations of effectiveness were less important in
the case of symbolic controls; if Congress required such factors
to be considered in all cases, flexibility in the use of symbolic
controls might be lost.755 Here again, Congress attempted to
accommodate the use of symbolic controls by permitting the
Executive to disregard considerations of effectiveness, but al753. EAA '79, § 6(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. I1 1979).
754. This is true even though Congress noted that the goals of foreign policy
controls had often been questioned as unclear. See HR& REP. No. 96-200, supra
note 479, at 5.
755. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 686 (statement of
Stanley Marcuss).
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lowed it to disregard them when considering instrumental controls as well. The Senate report, for example, carefully notes
that the "decision factors" listed in the Act are not criteria that
must be met by any proposed control, but are only factors to be
considered; having once considered them, the President is free
in all cases to disregard any of them. 7 56 Further, no attempt is
made in the Act to require the Executive to consider whether
symbolic controls will be effective on their own terms as expressions of American disapproval or moral outrage over foreign actions.
The Act requires consideration of the costs of controls to
the United States in both economic terms (elements of which
are summarized in factor four) and political terms (included in
factors two and three). Political costs, however, are not fully
recognized; in particular, the larger issue of impairing the open,
75 7
nondiscriminatory trading system is disregarded entirely.
The Act also fails to require the Executive to weigh the economic and political costs of a proposed control against the importance of its objective and the ability of the control to achieve
that objective. Such a comparison would be difficult in any
event because the Act does not require a clear statement of objective; even in the report that must be submitted after imposing a foreign policy control,7 5 8 the President does not have to
state the purpose of the control or balance its anticipated results against its costs.
The House bill would have been a substantial improvement
in this regard. While the decision factors in that bill were similar to those ultimately included in the Act, the information to
be reported to Congress after imposition of a control would
have been more extensive and better organized. The President
would have been required, first, to give reasons why he had imposed the control, the purposes sought to be achieved, and the
conditions under which the control would be removed, and second, to specify how consideration of the factors set out in the
756. The President may deem certain factors irrelevant, but even if he admits their relevance § 6(b) "would not preclude the President... from imposing or maintaining export controls regardless of his conclusions with respect to
the factors listed." S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 8-9. See also House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 727-28 (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("We
want to make perfectly clear that, while we want the administration to consider
these points, the administration then can impose the control anyway.").
757. A sympathetic administrator could consider the issue under the rubric
of "foreign policy" in factor two, but the issue was rarely discussed in Congress, and it is fair to say that it was not intended to be covered in the Act.
758. EAA '79, § 6(e) (1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (1) (Supp. 1I 1979).
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bill, including cost factors, had led the Executive to determine
that "on balance" the control would further the foreign policy
interests of the United States. 7 59 One may quarrel with specific
language in the bill, but it was superior to the Act in requiring
the Executive to state its objective and balance the costs of a
760
control against the value of that objective.
3. Exhaustion of Other Means
EAA '79 requires the President to determine, before
"resorting to" the use of controls, that "reasonable efforts" have
been made to achieve the relevant policy goal through negotiations or other means.7 61 The use of the phrase "resort to" connotes a view of export controls as a foreign policy tool of last
resort, to be used only when other methods are not available or
have proven ineffective.
As with the access to supplies and anti-terrorism policies,
this provision is laudable. Certainly when an instrumental export control is proposed, the Executive should be required to
attempt negotiation with the target state before turning to as
hostile and coercive a tool as trade sanctions. Given the political and economic costs and long term disruption resulting
from export controls, it also seems reasonable to require that
less costly coercive steps, such as disqualification from military
or economic assistance, be implemented before exports are
controlled. This is not to say that export controls should never
be used, but rather that less coercive and less costly methods
should be attempted, or at least fully considered, first.
When a symbolic purpose is advanced for a proposed control, it seems all the more reasonable to require the exhaustion
or full consideration of less hostile and less costly means of expression before private economic transactions are interrupted
to signal national displeasure. At times, the government of the
United States may well determine-for the sake of its reputation in the world community or its own self-esteem, or simply
because it believes it right-to prohibit some forms of economic
intercourse with another nation or certain of its institutions.
These may well be morally sound and politically defensible decisions. The question is one of degree and frequency. Because
759. H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e) (1)-(2) (1979).
760. This provision was modified in conference. H.R CoNF.REP. No. 96-482,
supra note 10, at 46.
761. EAA '79, § 6(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(d) (Supp. Ell 1979). The Senate
bill would have required the President only to "consider" other means. S. 737,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (2) (C) (i) (1979).
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of the sheer number of regimes, practices, and events with
which some influential element within the United States might
wish to express displeasure, it is simply wise and prudent policy to avoid overly rapid or excessive use of controls on private
transactions as the instruments of expression-particularly
given the economic and political costs not only of individual
trade controls but of the practice of restricting trade. Morever,
treating trade controls as the last or a later resort, reserved for
egregious cases, would render them more effective symbols
when they are called upon in that capacity.
Finally, it should at least be noted that many export controls-total export embargoes and controls on food exports, for
example-impose hardship on the populations of target nations, often the very people who are the victims of the conduct
the United States seeks to protest.

62

This fact also counsels

restraint in the use of trade controls.
The "reasonable efforts" language of the Act stops far short
3
of actually making export controls the measure of last resort.76
To underscore the President's flexibility, the Act allows him, in
the report submitted after a control is imposed, to give reasons
for not having attempted negotiation or other alternate methods rather than describing their results.764

4. Consultationand Reports
The Act mandates that, before any foreign policy control is
imposed, the Secretary of Commerce must consult with "appropriate" American industries with respect to foreign availability,
762. See note 450 supra.
763. The Administration opposed even the flexible requirement of prior negotiation in § 6(d) on the ground that it did not take account of situations in
which fast action would be necessary to prevent an export harmful to United
States policy. Spokesmen for both the State and Commerce Departments invoked the same example: an item useful in nuclear processes which, if exported, could violate the United States nonproliferation policy. See House EAA
HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 648 (statement of William Root); id. at 687
(statement of Stanley Marcuss). This example appears to confuse the imposition of new validated license requirements with licensing policy. Most sophisticated products and technology with nuclear applications are already subject to
validated license requirements, and nothing in the Act purports to require negotiation before a license is denied. Negotiation is only required before new
controls are imposed-to take a hypothetical case, before anti-terrorism controls are extended to Chile. Such a policy decision would rarely have the same
urgency as a last-minute effort to prevent a particular export of dangerous
goods. If it did (for example, when foreign policy controls applicable to the
U.S.S.R. were quickly extended to Afghanistan), § 6(d) clearly allows the President to act swiftly.
764. EAA '79, § 6(e) (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (2) (Supp. 1I 1979).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

the economic effects of controls, and other matters.765 There
seems to be nothing in the Act that prevents the Secretary
from determining that no industry is appropriate, in circumstances, for example, when prompt action is perceived to be required, 766 although the legislative history tends to indicate that
767
a total failure to consult would be improper.
The Act also requires the President to consult with Con7 68
gress "in every possible instance" before imposing controls.
It was largely this provision that persuaded the conference
committee to drop a concurrent resolution veto procedure that
had been adopted by the House.7 69 The Act, however, does not
define "consultation" or impose any immediate sanction for
failure to consult; nor do the reasons for such a failure have to
770
be stated.
Under the Act, whenever new controls are imposed or existing controls are extended or expanded, the President must
immediately notify Congress and submit a report.7 71 The report must specify the President's conclusions on the decision
factors enumerated in the statute; state the results of negotiations or other alternate measures, or the reasons for not attempting them; and indicate how the controls will further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States. Several
shortcomings of this report have been analyzed above.
Finally, the Act requires an annual report on the export
control program. 772 Along with general information and various
data on other types of export controls, the report must include
"detailed information" on the effectiveness of any export controls imposed under section six "in furthering the foreign policy of the United States." 773 Past Commerce Department
export control reports were criticized by the General Account765. Id. at § 6(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c).
766. The Commerce Deparment opposed the consultation requirement on
the same basis as it opposed the requirement of prior negotiation. House EAA
HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 687 (statement of Stanley Marcuss); see note
763 supra. The same analysis is applicable here.
767. See House EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 21, at 728 (statement of
Victor Johnson).
768. EAA '79, § 6(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. 111 1979).
769. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 96-482, supra note 10, at 46.
770. See EAA '79, § 6(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. Il 1979). The
House Conference Report, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-482, supra note 10, at 46,
states that if consultation is not satisfactory Congress will reconsider the veto
provision.
771. EAA '79, § 6(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. I 1979).
772. Id. at § 14, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413 (Supp. 1I 1979).
773. Id. at § 14(a) (11), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413(a) (11).
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ing Office for not specifying the goals of foreign policy controls
or assessing their effectiveness. 7 74 Although EAA '79 requires
an assessment of effectiveness, the assessment can be made in
general terms, without reference to a stated objective for each
775
control, so that it may be of little value.
5. Automatic Expiration
The Act provides that all foreign policy export controls automatically expire one year after imposition unless the President extends them. Each extension is limited to a one-year
period, but a control can be extended an unlimited number of
times.776 To extend any control, the President must again consider the decision factors spelled out in section six. The requirements of prior negotiation and prior consultation with
industry and Congress are not applicable to extensions, 777 but
a subsequent report must be filed with Congress.
President Carter extended most controls then in force on
December 29, 1979, making a blanket determination that the absence of all controls extended would be detrimental to United
States foreign policy notwithstanding foreign availability.7 78 All
of these controls, and all new controls imposed during 1980,
have since been extended through 1981.779
The automatic expiration provision was intended to force
774. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT 1979, supra note 363, at 18, 31; c.
House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 259 (statement of J. Kenneth
Fasick) ("However, the discussion on controls for foreign policy purposes in
this report is brief and we believe inadequate because it does not discuss: one,
the specific foreign policy goals that trade controls are supposedly designed to
serve, nor two, whether they are serving these goals well or poorly.").
775. EAA '79, § 14(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413(b) (Supp. 111 1979), requires certain information on controls other than or more stringent than "multilateral
controls." This provision appears to have been aimed at national security controls exceeding COCOM levels, but as drafted it seems to apply to foreign policy controls, most of which are unilateral.
776. Id. at § 6(a) (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (2). Controls in effect on the
adoption date of the Act were to expire on December 31, 1979, or one year after
implementation, whichever was later.
777. Section 6(a)(2) permits extensions "in accordance with subsections
(b) and (e)." Id.
778. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1595-96 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 368). The
following controls were extended: (1) crime control and detection devices, (2)
the South African military and police embargo and certain other controls on exports to South Africa, (3) certain anti-terrorism controls on exports to Libya
and other Middle East nations, (4) one regional stability control on exports to
Libya, (5) controls on exports of petroleum equipment to the U.S.S.R., (6) all
IEEPA embargoes (North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba), and (7) all
nonproliferation controls. Id. at 1596-97.
779. 46 Fed. Reg. 1665 (1981).
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the Executive regularly to review all continuing controls under
the same criteria applicable to new controls.7 8 O The intent is
laudable, but the criteria continue to suffer from the same
weaknesses described above. 78 1 As President Carter's blanket
determination on foreign availability demonstrates, presidential extensions are likely to be little more than formalities.
6. Miscellaneous Provisions
The President is not authorized under the Act to control
exports of medicine or medical supplies for foreign policy pur-

poses. 782 In addition, two provisions restrict controls on the ex-

port of food: a policy statement favors minimizing such
restrictions 783 and, more importantly, a provision buried in the
"short supply controls" section of the Act allows Congress to
overrule by concurrent resolution any control imposed on agricultural exports for either foreign policy or short supply purposes. 784 The Act further declares the intent of Congress that
the Executive branch should not impose foreign policy controls
on any export the principal effect of which would be to meet
basic human needs;7 85 this language appears to cover virtually
all food exports. Yet despite its expressed concern with basic
human needs, Congress was unable to terminate the grain embargo of the U.S.S.R. imposed early in 1980.786

The Act specifically authorizes continued controls on the
export of crime detection equipment but authorizes the President to exempt nations whose conduct is consistent with the
United States human rights policy.7 87 Also included in the Act
780. S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 31, at 8.
781. See text accompanying notes 752-60 (decision factors), 771 (report)
supra.
782. EAA '79, § 6(f), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f) (Supp. 11 1979). The House bill
would have withheld authority to control food as well, stating that export controls should not be applied to exports which would meet "basic human needs."
H.R. 2539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(g) (1979). In conference, authority to control
food exports was restored. H.R. CoNF. REP. 96-482, supra note 10, at 14, 46.
783. Id. at § 3(11), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(11).
784. Id. at § 7(g) (3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g) (3).
785. EAA '79, § 6(f), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f) (Supp. DI 1979).
786. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 317, at A-7 (July 29, 1980). A
move to cut funding for the grain embargo was defeated in the House by a vote
of 279 to 135. Id. Those opposed to the funding cut stated "that it would have
had little practical effect, but would have been embarrassing to the Administration in its stance against the Soviet Union." Id. The congressional veto power
under EAA '79, § 7(g) (3) was unavailable, since the grain embargo was imposed by the President as both a national security and a foreign policy measure. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA). No. 292, at M-1 to M-3 (Jan. 29, 1980)
(presidential report to Congress on Soviet grain embargo).
787. EAA '79, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j).
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is a special anti-terrorism provision that arose out of concern
with certain prior sales of aircraft and other vehicles to Libya
and Syria. 788 The Commerce and State Departments are required to notify a named committee in each house before approving any license for certain major exports to any nation that
the Secretary of State determines to have repeatedly supported
terrorism. 89 Because of the Secretary's power over such determinations, the executive branch can in essence decide whether
to notify the appropriate committees in advance; not surprisingly, controversy has already arisen over executive branch
conduct under this provision.90
EAA '79 attempts to remove the National Security Council
from any major role in export controls 7 9 1 and to involve more
directly the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Defense,
along with other relevant agencies, in the decision-making process. 7 92 The Act exempts from the restrictions on foreign policy controls all controls imposed to fulfill "obligations of the
United States pursuant to treaties ... or ... other interna793
tional agreements."
Finally, the Act continues the President's authority to control exports of all items "subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... .,,79 The problem of extraterritorial application is thus destined to continue.
VI.

APPROACHES TO REFORM

Congress must not be content with the foreign policy provisions of EAA '79. By attempting simultaneously to restrain executive discretion and protect executive flexibility, the Act
creates little more than hortatory restrictions and an additional
administrative burden. The Act's requirements of negotiation,
consultation and reporting, its "sunset" feature, and its other
788. See HR. REP.No. 96-200, supra note 479, at 8.
789. EAA '79, § 6(i), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(i) (Supp. 1I 1979) as amended by
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-533, § 111, 94 Stat. 3131; see note 169 supra. This is the only case where consultations regarding individual licenses are required.
790. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 322, at A-6, A-7 (July 29, 1980) (propoed sale of Boeing aircraft to Iraq); id. at No. 313, at A-3 to A-5 (June 24, 1980)
(proposed sale of engines to Iraq); id. at No. 306, at A-1 to A-3 (May 6, 1980).
791. EAA '79, § 4(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(e) (Supp. I1 1979); see note 31
supra.

792. See EAA '79, §§ 6(a)(1), 6(a)(4), 10, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2405(a) (1)-(a) (6),
2409 (Supp. 1I 1979).
793. Id. at § 6(h), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(h).
794. Id at § 6(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (1).
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substantive provisions, however, create the illusion that boundaries on executive discretion have been erected. This illusion
may be gaining time for a control psychology to become more
7 95
firmly rooted.
Although the Carter Administration began to recognize
some of the economic and political costs of export controls and
some of the constraints on their effectiveness, 79 6 it continued
generally to believe that the Executive should be allowed flex797
ibility in the use of export controls as tools of foreign policy,
7 98
free of legislative interference.
Developments since the passage of EAA '79 confirm that a
determined Executive can continue to curtail exports extensively in spite of the restraints now incorporated in the Act.
The major developments, some of which have been referred to
previously, have been:
(1) Most controls in effect when EAA '79 was adopted,
and all controls imposed subsequently, have been extended beyond the dates on which they would have expired under the
Act.7 99
(2) Anti-terrorism and nonproliferation controls were extended to all items requiring a validated license for national security purposes. 00
(3) The partial embargo of South Africa was extended by
requiring a validated license for all computer exports to most
8
South African government agencies. '
(4) A number of controls were instituted in response to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They included (a) a prohibition of most exports in any way related to the Moscow Olympics;8 0 2 (b) an embargo on sales of grain, meat, and certain
other agricultural products to the U.S.S.R.;803 (c) a related em795. See note 577 supra and accompanying text.
796'. See notes 376, 578-80 supra and accompanying text.
797. See, e.g., House EAA Hearings, Part I, supra note 21, at 648-49 (statement of William Root); id. at 686-87 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
798. See, e.g., House EAA Hearings PartI, supra note 21, at 623 (statement
of Frank Weil); id. at 686-87 (statement of Stanley Marcuss).
799. 46 Fed. Reg. 1665 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (1980). All controls in effect
at the end of 1980 were extended for one year, even though many of them had
been in effect less than a year, to attain "consistency" and public participation
in future reviews. 46 Fed. Reg. 1665 (1981).
800. See notes 115, 168 supra and accompanying text.
801. See note 241 supra.
802. 45 Fed. Reg. 21,612 (1980).
803. Id. at 1883, 8289. Validated license requirements were at first extended
to virtually all agricultural products. The original understanding was that no
licenses would be granted for exports of any commodity other than wheat and
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bargo on exports of phosphates (used for fertilizer) to the
U.S.S.R.;804 (d) some new national security-based validated license requirements, 805 a tightening of licensing policy on many
existing controls, 806 and the suspension and revocation of certain outstanding validated licenses;80 7 (e) the extension of national security and foreign policy controls applicable to the
U.S.S.R. to Afghanistan808 and (f) controls on certain exports
809
to the Soviet Kama River truck plant.
(5) Finally, a range of economic sanctions, including an
export embargo, were applied against Iran. These controls
were instituted under the emergency provisions of the IEEPA
rather than under EAA '79.810

The Reagan Administration may change the direction of
American foreign policy in important ways, but it would be a
mistake to conclude that these changes will mean the end of
the problems identified in this Article. There are strong indications that the new administration will not pursue the human
rights policy with the enthusiasm of its predecessor, and trade
corn; licenses for exports of wheat and corn would be issued to an aggregate
limit of 8 million metric tons for the period of October 1, 1979 to September 30,
1980. Id. at 1883 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. 376.5). Subsequently, a three-tier
licensing system was established: (1) certain commodities that could contribute to the Soviet Union's grain and livestock capacity remained subject to validated license requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 8292 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
Part 376, Supp. No. 2), and the general policy was to deny all licenses except
those for wheat and corn exports not to exceed 8 million metric tons; (2) other
commodities remained subject to validated license requirements, but licenses
would be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of several specified criteria, including whether the export could be used as animal feed or diverted to
other uses that would undermine the grain and livestock controls, 45 Fed. Reg.
8292 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Part 376, Supp. No. 3); (3) all remaining
agricultural commodities were returned to general license status, but with an
additional reporting requirement to permit monitoring by the OEA. 45 Fed.
Reg. 8291 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Part 376, Supp. No. 1). President
Reagan terminated the embargo on April 24, 1981. See Weisman, Reagan Ends
Curbs on Export of Grain to the Soviet Union, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1981, at 1,
col 7.
804. 45 Fed. Reg. 8293, 24,458 (1980).
805. Id. at 29,568.
806. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 302, at A-13, M-1 (April 8, 1980); U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 300, at A-3 (Mar. 25, 1980); U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY

(BNA) No. 290, at A-1, M-1 (Jan. 15, 1980).
807. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 290, at A-1, M-1 (Jan. 15, 1980) (suspension); note 536 supra (revocation).
808. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,415 (1980).
809. Id. at 30,617.
810. Exports were prohibited in April 1980. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed.
Reg. 24,099 (1980). The prohibition was expanded in May 1980. See note 604
supra. Prohibitions on trade with Iran were terminated by Exec. Order No.
12,282, 46 Fed. Reg. 7925 (1981).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:739

controls implementing the policy will surely decline.8 1 ' On the
other hand, the Reagan Administration appears committed to
linking trade with political and military issues in the East-West
arena, apparently on an instrumental basis.812 Most dramatically, the President initially refused to terminate the Soviet
grain embargo despite campaign rhetoric to the contrary. Further predictions are more uncertain. Secretary of State Haig
has said opposition to international terrorism may take the
place of human rights in American foreign policy;813 broadly interpreted, the anti-terrorism policy could support extensive
controls. Issues of access to supplies may well arise in the
coming years. The relevant policy in EAA '79 is a broad and
untested source of executive export control authority. Geopolitical concerns may lead to an expansion of regional stability
controls. Promotion of human rights abroad is still by statute a
principal goal of United States policy; domestic and international pressure will not permit the Reagan Administration to
abandon the policy. New foreign policy issues, as revolutionary
as human rights, may in time emerge. Changes of administration and substantive foreign policy, in short, do not necessarily
lead to restraint in the use of trade controls as tools of national
policy, and there remain numerous policy areas where an active Executive may wish to draw upon its authority under EAA
'79.
The longer export controls remain a significant instrument
of American foreign policy, the more difficult it will be to reverse the prevailing psychology. Congress must act soon to install a legislative mechanism that will permit the use of export
controls in the relatively few situations in which they are appropriate, but will block their growth into an all-purpose, ultimately self-defeating response to the range of foreign
developments of which the United States, or powerful factions
within it, might disapprove.
Three approaches are realistically available. They are, in
order of diminishing degree of executive discretion: (1) revising EAA '79 to tighten its restraints on the exercise of delegated authority; (2) requiring Congress to approve, or
permitting it to disapprove, new foreign policy controls; and (3)
811. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1981, at A4, col. 1 (reflecting views of Ernest W.
LaFever, nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).
812. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 18, col. 1.
813. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1981, at A10, col. 6 (transcript of news conference of Secretary Alexander M. Haig).
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repealing the delegation of executive authority to control exports for foreign policy purposes. Since no single approach appears capable of solving all of the problems analyzed in this
Article, the discussion that follows will focus on the strengths
and weaknesses of each, and will explain why the author has
come to favor repeal.
A. TIGHTER STATUTORY RESTRAINTS
Perhaps the most easily attainable alternative is the
amendment of EAA '79 to strengthen its restrictive provisions.
Amendment might take place upon the expiration of the Act in
1983 or even sooner if Congress were to conclude that the Act
in its present form is unable to restrain the growth of foreign
policy export controls.
Although some provisions of the Act could be usefully
tightened-several possible revisions are suggested below-this
approach has serious flaws. First, both the theoretical analysis
in Part IV of this Article and the discussion of EAA '79 in Part
V demonstrate that, in theory at least, an effective restraining
statute would necessarily require the President to characterize
any proposed political control as either predominantly instrumental or predominantly symbolic. Characterization of the
control is necessary so that appropriate patterns of decisionmaking can be prescribed by the statute. Without such characterization, a statute must regulate all political controls under
the same criteria, by either (1) imposing criteria lenient
enough to permit symbolic controls, and thus failing to require
adequate attention to considerations of effectiveness when instrumental controls are proposed (the weakness of EAA '79), or
(2) requiring rigorous effectiveness analysis for all controls, in
essence making symbolic controls impossible. At the same
time, a requirement that a control be characterized as symbolic
or instrumental would force the President to formulate the objective of the control; this would make effectiveness analysis
more meaningful.
Under a statute that required characterization, the President might state, for example, that the objective of a proposed
control was to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops
from Afghanistan or to deter further Soviet aggression. 814 Such
a control would be instrumentally motivated, and the statute
would accordingly require the Executive to analyze the likely
814. See, e.g., U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 292, at M-1 to M-3(Jan. 29,
1980) (presidential report to Congress on Soviet grain embargo).
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effectiveness of the control and make a determination of effectiveness. The factors to be considered might include: (1)
whether, or to what degree, the control is likely to be effective
in denying the controlled items to the target, in light of such
matters as foreign availability, import substitution, and enforceability; and (2) whether the control is likely to produce the
desired change in the target nation's behavior, in light of the
anticipated impact on its economy, its political situation, its
ability to absorb costs, its capacity for retaliation, and the like.
Alternatively, the Executive might state that the purpose of
a proposed control was, for example, to disassociate the United
States from the forcibly repressive elements of South African
society, or to demonstrate American opposition to torture.
Such a control would be symbolic, and much of the foregoing
effectiveness analysis would be unnecessary. Instead, the Executive might be required to assess the importance of a symbolic gesture on the issue at hand and to estimate the
effectiveness of the proposed control as a symbol of the American position.
Although the separation of instrumental and symbolic controls is crucial to analysis and to the structure of an ideal statute, it may be too pure a dichotomy to serve as a practical
framework for legislation. The instrumental and symbolic rationales are essentially forms of motivation for the use of controls; they do not necessarily correspond to particular controls.
Most controls probably partake of both rationales: for example,
the purposes of the controls imposed in response to the Afghanistan invasion surely include (1) the primary objectives of
imposing economic costs on the U.S.S.R. for instrumental, punitive, and deterrent reasons; (2) the secondary, symbolic objective of demonstrating American opposition to aggression; and
(3) the tertiary, symbolic objective of demonstrating strength
and resolve to the American electorate. A statute drafted to
deal with such a complex of purposes would almost certainly
be forced to err on the side of leniency in the same way as EAA
'79. A requirement that all the purposes of a proposed control
be spelled out might also be unwise: a statement of instrumental intent could stiffen resistance in the target nation, while a
statement of mere symbolic intent could weaken the control in
the eyes of its domestic advocates, the target nation, and other
nations.
A second problem with simply revising the EAA format relates to the treatment of costs. A strengthened statute would
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necessarily require the President first to make a complete assessment of the costs of any proposed control-whether instrumental, symbolic, or some combination of the two-and then to
determine that the anticipated value of the control to American
foreign policy outweighed those costs. This change would in
theory lead to a more rigorous weighing of costs against anticipated benefits than is required by EAA '79. In fact, however,
even such a provision would necessarily permit such a wide
range of judgment on the part of the Executive that it might be
simply an exercise in futility. If no outside review of executive
branch decisions were possible, the Executive could basically
continue to do as it pleased.
If effective provisions for characterization of controls and
weighing of costs were not feasible, the other improvements
that might be suggested would be trivial. Among the possible
changes are the following:
(1) The restrictive aspects of sections 3(2) (B) and 3(10)
might be incorporated into the substantive portion of the statute, which would thereby provide that no foreign policy control
could be imposed unless the President had determined that the
control was necessary to further "significantly" a "fundamental" objective of American foreign policy and that it would have
a reasonable likelihood of doing so effectively.
(2) The Executive might be required to determine, before
imposing any political export controls, that all less restrictive
or less costly methods of achieving its objective had either
been found inappropriate in the circumstances or been tried
and found insufficient. This would strengthen the "reasonable
efforts" language of EAA '79.
(3) An abbreviated form of the original decision process
might be required prior to a decision to extend a control about
to expire under the Act's sunset provision.
(4) The Executive might be required to publish a statement of licensing policy for every new control-indeed for all
current controls as well-and to revise the statements as necessary. Licensing policy is an issue almost totally neglected by
EAA '79.815 Most statements of licensing policy issued under
such a provision would probably contemplate case-by-case determinations, but the statements could nonetheless spell out
815. But cf. EAA '79, § 6(a) (3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (a) (3) (Supp. IHI 1979)
(Secretary of Commerce must notify applicant whose license is denied of reasons for denial and how export could be modified to be compatible with con-
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the criteria that would be applied in licensing decisions as well
as the foreign policy developments that would permit the control to be terminated. This would provide as much predictability as is realistically possible within the present framework.
In sum, while revision of the Act might be the approach to
reform most appealing to Congress, it is wishful thinking to expect that tinkering with the format of EAA '79 will effectively
restrain the Executive. Statutory prescription of a decisionmaking process is simply too mechanistic an approach to a
complex political decision.

B. PARTICIPATION BY CONGRESS
One political mechanism for restraining executive action
was enacted as part of EAA '79: if the President restricts any
agricultural exports under the foreign policy authority of the
Act, Congress may, within thirty legislative days, disapprove
the President's action by concurrent resolution; upon the adop8 16
tion of such a resolution the control ceases to be effective.
The House bill would have permitted congressional disapproval
of all new foreign policy controls. 817 It would have established
an expedited parliamentary procedure allowing consideration
of the disapproval resolution by the appropriate committees
and by both houses within sixty days. In conference, the congressional veto power was limited to foreign policy and short
supply controls on agricultural products, but the conference report on EAA '79 indicated that if consultation by the Executive
under the Act proved to be inadequate, Congress would "give
further consideration to a congressional veto mechanism in
subsequent legislation." 818
A congressional review and veto procedure for all foreign
policy controls would have several advantages as a method of
restricting executive discretion. With the courts immobilized
by the terms of EAA '79819 and by the political questions doctrine and similar policies of judicial restraint,8 20 at least some
816. Id. at § 7(g) (3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g) (3). A concurrent resolution
does not require the signature of the President and is not subject to veto.
817. H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e) (1979).
818. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-482, supra note 10, at 46.
819. EAA '79 exempts virtually all functions under the Act from the Administrative Procedure Act, including the APA's judicial review requirements.
EAA '79, § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a) (Supp. 111 1979).
820. See Daedalus Enterprises, Inc. v. Kreps, No. 78-893 (D.D.C. May 18,
1978), aft'd, No. 78-1442 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 1978); Note, Accountability and the
Foreign ComriercePower: A Case Study of the Regulation of Exports, 9 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 577, 610-16 (1979).
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independent institution would review decisions of the executive branch against the criteria specified in the statute. Further, congressional review would allow the very body that has
established those criteria to determine compliance with them
and to invalidate action that exceeded their boundaries. It
would permit an essentially political decision to be reviewed by
a political body-one able to hear the views of affected interests and to weigh the complex factors involved in a control decision.8 21 Finally, a congressional veto procedure would
simplify the drafting of statutory criteria, because more general
guidelines could be written into the EAA than might be acceptable absent review.
A congressional veto provision in the EAA, however, might
create more problems than it would solve. Most importantly,
the constitutionality of such a provision is subject to serious
question. 822 Although a number of congressional veto provisions are currently in effect,823 building such a controversial
and constitutionally dubious device into the EAA would run
counter to one of the main objectives of revising the Act in the
first place: to provide greater certainty to those engaged in ex824
port trade.
A congressional veto would also add an unwarranted element of complexity to the control process. Even business
groups opposed to the use of foreign policy controls have decried the additional delay and confusion the procedure might
produce.8 25 The negative form of veto incorporated in the
House bill and most other current statutes 826 would be the
most disruptive of all. A negative veto procedure would permit
a new control to be promulgated and enforced for many weeks
while the American foreign policy apparatus, American exporters, and foreign buyers remained unsure whether it would be
overturned by Congress. If it were overturned, two changes of
control policy, not merely one, would take place within thirty or
821. See H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
822. See L HENKrN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrTUTION 120-23 (1972).
For a current review and analysis of the arguments and authorities on the constitutionality of the various congressional veto mechanisms, see Nathanson,
Separation of Powers and Administrative Law-An Intellectual Odyssey, 75
Nw. U. L. REV. 000 (1981) (forthcoming).
823. Professor Jackson notes 19 provisions of various types in effect as of
1977. J. JACKSON, supra note 696, at 147 n.15 (1977).
824. EAA '79, § 3(1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1) (Supp. 11 1979).
825. See House EAA HearingsPartI, supra note 21, at 206 (statement of Joseph Karth).
826. See J. JACKSON, supra note 696, at 147 n.15.
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827

Moreover, the legislative veto might not be a realistic limitation on the Executive. 828 Congress would be likely to exercise the veto only infrequently, because of the difficulty of
assembling a congressional majority to overturn a control that
directly affected only a limited segment of the economy. Congress might also be reluctant to overturn an executive judgment on foreign policy that was already communicated to
foreign governments, because of the resulting disruption of di829
plomacy.
Even if Congress did exercise its veto, considerable damage might already have been done. It is widely believed, for example, that the short supply controls imposed on soybean
exports in 1973 led to considerable loss of faith in the United
States as a reliable supplier of agricultural products even
though the controls were quickly terminated.8 30 Such shock effects cannot be totally abated by subsequent reversal of a control.
In sum, despite the advantages of having a second branch
of government participate in export control decisions as a
check on the Executive, the legislative veto, even if constitutional, seems to be an unworkable response to the problems
identified in this Article.
C.

REPEAL OF DELEGATED

AuTrHorry

If the EAA's delegation of authority to control exports for
foreign policy purposes were repealed, the President's authority under the EAA would be limited to national security and
short supply controls. National security authority might be
redefined-in the statute or by executive interpretation-to encompass certain regional stability, nonproliferation, and similar
controls. Political export control authority would remain avail827. A positive veto procedure-requiring, for example, congressional approval within 60 days before a new control can be effective-could ameliorate
some of these problems. If Congress disapproved of a control, it would avoid
actual changes in control policy. It could assuage some of the uncertainties of
dealing with a control already in effect but still subject to reversal by Congress.
So long as the normal requirements for enactment of legislation were not followed, however, the constitutional problems would likely remain. See L. HENKmN, supra note 822, at 121-22. It is proposed below that actual legislation be
required to implement a new control.
828. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 291 (statement of Arthur Downey).
829. See L, HENKIN,, supra note 822, at 122-23.

830. See UNrrED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 145-46 (1979).
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able to the Executive in two situations: (1) when the Security
Council mandates economic sanctions (under the United Nations Participation Act);831 and (2) when the President declares
a national emergency (under the IEEPA and the National
Emergencies Act).832 In other situations, the Executive would
be required to request statutory authority for political controls.
This approach is at the same time the most thorough and the
8 33
most sensible.
The nondelegation approach has several advantages. First,
its allocation of roles to the Executive and Congress fits neatly
into the constitutional framework, unlike the legislative veto.
Foreign policy would in the first instance be made primarily by
the President. If the executive branch wished to further its policies through the regulation of exports-that is, of foreign commerce-it would have to seek permission from Congress. Once
the requested authority had been granted, controls would be
communicated to foreign nations and administered by the President, "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations,"8 34 without congressional interference.
Second, unlike the other approaches mentioned, the
nondelegation approach would be relatively simple to effectuate and its procedures are familiar and workable.
Third, this approach recognizes that Congress is a more effective forum than the executive branch for assembling and exposing all the interests that would be affected by a proposed
export control. Those interests that are affected economicallybusiness, labor, and their representatives in state and local government 83 5 -have advanced strong views in past congressional
831. See note 2 supra.
832. See note 2 supra.
833. Repeal of foreign policy export control authority has been suggested by
others. It was recommended in 1967 by Harold Berman and John Garson in
their leading article on export controls. Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 88283. The variety of foreign policy controls described here had not yet developed.
The authors' recommendation was made in the context of the controls on East-

West trade that then dominated the control program. More recently, repeal
was recommended during House hearings on EAA '79 by Arthur Downey, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade and staff
member of the NSC and the State Department. See House EAA HearingsPart
I, supra note 21, at 252, 254, 290-91, 294-96. Mr. Downey's recommendation was
not incorporated in any of the bills submitted to Congress, however, and did
not receive extensive consideration.
834. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
See generally L. HENmN, supra note 822, at 37-65.
835. The National Governors Association has testified on export legislation
and prepared a bill, H.R. 3154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), submitted by Representatives Gibbons and Conable, containing a complete proposed Export Ad-
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hearings. Under the nondelegation approach, they would have
a more timely opportunity to provide Congress with information on economic costs, foreign availability, and similar matters
and to present their views on a control's importance to United
States foreign policy. Interests favoring a particular political
control would also participate, as they have in recent hearings,
arguing for the importance of controls on crime detection devices and on exports to South Africa and Uganda. Congress
would continue to benefit as well from testimony and written
submissions from former government officials, academicians,
and other concerned independent parties. Under the statutory
approach, these views would be received before controls are
implemented. The voluminous hearings held in recent years on
EAA '79, on export policy, and on particular foreign policy controls leave a clear impression that all implications of a proposed control would be throughly aired before Congress
reached a decision.
Fourth, controls enacted by Congress upon the President's
recommendation might be more effective than those imposed
by the Executive alone. Within the United States, broader popular support might result, especially among those adversely affected, if the whole machinery of government had been
mobilized to implement a control after all interested views had
been heard. Symbolic controls, in particular, might carry more
force abroad and create greater moral and emotional satisfaction when implemented by joint action of Congress and the
President.
Fifth, with judicial review unavailable, the representative
branch of government seems the most appropriate locus for a
political decision that will impose direct, adverse economic consequences on a particular group of persons in the hope of obtaining less definable benefits for the whole of society. In
Congress, the affected interests can state their positions and
their representatives can participate in debate and vote. 836 The
representative character of the decisionmaking institution is
particularly important because the United States generally
does not compensate persons adversely affected by export conministration Act of 1979. See Senate EAA HearingsPartII, supra note 250, at 25 (statement of Gov. William Clements, Jr.); House EAA HearingsPartI, supra
note 21, at 586-87 (statement of Frederick Huszagh).
836. Legislative representatives are currently involved primarily through
sporadic intervention in particular control and licensing decisions. See Note,
supra note 820, at 605; note 119 supra. But see note 855 infra.
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trols for their losses. 83 7 Compensation only takes place ad hoc,
a cynic might say, when the affected interests are unusually
powerful, well-organized and vocal. 838 With little chance of ex
post compensation, it is essential that affected interests have a
voice ex ante in decisions on new controls, even though their
position will not always prevail.
Sixth, because the President currently has greater peacetime, nonemergency power to restrict exports than to control
imports or other private economic activities, the costs of conducting foreign policy fall disproportionately on United States
exporters. Perhaps the broadest delegation of authority over
imports, for example, permits the executive branch to "adjust"
imports of any article which it determines to be imported in
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten the
national security. 839 Because this provision requires a finding
of a threat to the national security, it cannot support as wide a
range of import controls as that effected against exports under
the foreign policy section of the EAA-to date it has been used
only to restrict petroleum imports.840 As the law now stands,
the Executive is tempted to look first to export controls when
seeking a foreign policy action simply because authority is
readily available.
It should also be noted that Congress has refused to dele837. A relevant comparison is the trade adjustment assistance program
that, as enacted in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, was intended to compensate firms, workers and communities adversely affected by increased imports
resulting from tariff concessions negotiated by the government. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1801 (1976)). Since passage of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§§ 222, 251, 271, 88 Stat. 1978 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2272, 2341, 2371
(1976)), a link to a tariff concession need no longer be demonstrated for eligibility.
8P8. An obvious example is the government's willingness to assume,
through the Commodity Credit Corporation, the contracts of United States
grain exporting companies affected by the grain embargo of the Soviet Union in
order to maintain grain prices. See U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 293, at A14 (Feb. 5, 1980). The estimated cost to the government of the contract assumption program was $2.5 billion. Id.
839. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. I1 1979), first added by § 7 of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. I No. 86-169, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, and reenacted in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872,
as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978. For
recent regulations regarding proceedings under this statute, see 45 Fed. Reg.
55,711 (1980) (amending 15 C.F.R. Part 359).
840. See UNITED STATES CABNmT TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, THE
OIL IMPORT QUESTION §§ 106-109 (1970) (U.S. Sup't Docs.), reprintedin J. JACKSON, supra note 696, at 947-49.
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gate under EAA '79 authority to impose a trade embargo 841 on
the ground that an embargo is an act "of the gravest importance," an act of "economic warfare." 842 Trade controls short of
an embargo, however, also carry serious foreign policy implications. Who can doubt the consequences for American relations
with South Africa, for example, of the prohibition on exports to
its military and police forces? Yet the Executive is authorized
to impose such a prohibition on exports but does not have authority to institute an embargo of a small country with which
the United States has little trade. In short, repealing the foreign policy authority of EAA '79 would rationalize American
trade policy by requiring congressional authorization for most
major political trade controls imposed in nonemergency situations.
A number of objections to the repeal of foreign policy export control authority can be voiced. First, Professor Huntington and those sharing his views on executive power might
argue that repeal would deprive the President of an important
tool of foreign policy. In response, however, it should be noted
that a wide range of measures would still be available. In the
context of the human rights policy, for example, the State Department has spoken of the "rich mix of diplomatic tools" available to it843 and of the numerous tangible steps it has been able
to take in support of the policy.844 Many of these measures do
not interfere directly with private activity and do not carry the
economic and political costs of export controls; even under the
current legislative scheme they should ordinarily be used
before resort to trade controls. 845 Further, the President would
retain authority to impose political export controls and other
economic sanctions under the IEEPA in times of emergency 4 6
841. See H.R. REP. No. 96-200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1979); ILR. CoNE.
REP. No. 96-482, supra note 10, at 46.
842. House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 774 (remarks of Rep.
Bingham) (comparing trade embargo to restrictions on sales of food and
medicine).
843. Report on Human Rights Practice,supra note 200, at 6.
844. Human Rights Hearings,supra note 170, at 3-5 (statement of Mark L.
Schneider). See also Shestack & Cohen, InternationalHuman Rights: A Role
for the United States, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 682-701 (1974) (proposing a human
rights agenda and a variety of policy tools).
845. See note 761 supra and accompanying text.
846. One might in fact criticize the approach to export control authority recommended here for providing an incentive to the President to utilize his emergency powers. One would hope that the formal limitations in the emergency
statutes, see note 2 supra, and the political forces which a declaration of emergency would set in motion would restrain any impulse to declare emergencies
too freely.
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and could obtain authority for export controls in nonemergency
situations by convincing Congress of their importance.
Second, it might be objected that this approach would deprive the Executive of flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy. To some extent, this is the same objection as the first. To
the extent that it concerns the ability of the Executive to administer controls flexibly once they are imposed, 84 7 the answer
lies in proper drafting of the legislation that implements partic"ular controls. In mandating controls on crime detection devices, for example, Congress has left it to the Executive to
define the products covered-this is an appropriate executive
function. Moreover, EAA '79 granted the Executive greater
flexibility to impose and terminate such controls as to particular nations in line with their human rights practices 8 4 --this too
seems appropriate. Total flexibility in administering controls,
however, would be undesirable. At the minimum, the Executive should be given policy guidelines, in line with standard
delegation doctrine, 849 and should be required to publish a
statement of licensing policy for every control in effect.
Third, some might object that Congress acts too slowly to
utilize political trade controls effectively. 850 It is undoubtedly
true that Congress often acts slowly, but it has acted with some
dispatch on matters of this sort, an example being the Ugandan
embargo. With well-informed oversight committees familiar
with the workings of export controls851 and well-informed foreign relations committees familiar with the proposed target and
other nations potentially involved, Congress should be able to
act with sufficient speed on executive proposals. Special legislative procedures, if necessary, could also be provided. The
1979 House bill, for example, 852 borrowed from the Atomic Energy Act a procedure by which Congress takes up disapproval
(by concurrent resolution) of certain licenses for the export of
nuclear material. 853 That procedure permits full congressional
deliberation within sixty days; a similar procedure could be followed for action on executive requests for control authority.
847. For a discussion of the objections to rigid, nondiscretionary export controls, see Note, supra note 200, at 324-25.
848. EAA '79, § 6(j) (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (2) (Supp. I1 1979).
849. See Note, supra note 820, at 596-60.
850. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 296 (statements of
Rep. Pease, Arthur Downey).
851. But see Note, supra note 820, at 603-08 (Congress does not effectively
oversee the EAA).
852. H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6(e) (1979).
853. 42 U.S.C. § 2159(a) (Supp. 1II 1979).
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Congress' relative lack of speed, moreover, can be seen as a
virtue. A major reason why Congress would not act as swiftly
as some might wish is the time required to perform those information-gathering and deliberative functions that are among the
greatest advantages of legislative action: hearing the views of
affected interests, considering alternative measures, weighing
costs and benefits. Political trade controls should be imposed
with caution, after adequate consideration of their short- and
long-term economic and political consequences and a complete
airing of views. The legislative approach promises to produce
854
this kind of action more frequently.
On the other hand, Congress has sometimes acted as hastfly as the Executive. In the case of Uganda, for example, Congress overrode executive objections based on considerations of
effectiveness to impose broad political trade controls. Further,
such congressional actions have been and would continue to be
unrestrained by any of the limits now imposed on the Executive by EAA '79. Yet the fact that Congress is already deeply
involved in export controls 855-from imposing an embargo on
Uganda and requiring validated licenses for crime detection devices to exerting influence on particular licensing decisionspoints to an additional virtue of the recommended approach: it
would eliminate much of the duplication of authority between
President and Congress that presently exists and that seems
destined to grow as Congress plays a more active role in the
area. Lodging political export control authority solely in Congress seems likely to result in more restrained use of export
controls overall.
Fourth, members of Congress might object that the congressional workload is already excessive. 85 6 One would hope,
however, that requests for authority to impose foreign policy
export controls would be infrequent. Further, as noted above,
Congress could establish committees and parliamentary procedures to deal with such requests expeditiously. Congress has
in the past devoted a great deal of time to oversight of the Executive's use of political export controls, particularly in years
854. See House EAA HearingsPart I, supra note 21, at 290, 296 (statement of
Arthur Downey).
855. An example of congressional involvement is a Senate effort to formally
revoke a license for export of gas turbine engines to the Iraqi navy. See H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 96-1471, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADNmq. NEWS. 10,881, 10,889.
856. See House EAA Hearings Part I, supra note 21, at 290 (statement of
Rep. Bingham) ("the load on the legislative branch.., is already intolerable)."
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when the EAA had to be renewed;8 5 7 this demand on legislative
time would at least in part be relieved. In any case, Congress
already devotes a substantial amount of time to consideration
of similar measures. Every year's foreign assistance appropriations legislation, for example, disqualifies several nations from
various forms of aid or sets conditions on their eligibility, often
after lengthy hearings. The frequency of these measures suggests that, if a presidential request for export control authority
is truly important to the nation, time for its consideration can
be found.
Finally, beyond these largely institutional considerations, it
might be objected that repeal of foreign policy export control
authority would deprive the United States of a powerful instrument for doing good-promoting human rights, opposing terrorism, and the like-in the interest of mere economic gain. Yet
this Article proposes repeal not as a position of retreat on these
important issues but rather as a position of prudence on the
use of a dangerous policy instrument. It proposes repeal because no other scheme yet advanced seems capable of restraining the Executive from using political export controls
instrumentally when they cannot be effective; use of political
export controls in those circumstances is economically wasteful, perhaps profoundly so, and may be politically destructive
as well. It proposes repeal because no other scheme yet advanced seems capable of curbing the use of controls as symbolic expressions; and beyond some unascertainable point, the
symbolic use of controls may be even more wasteful and
equally destructive. It is true that this Article proposes repeal
in large part because of economic considerations, but no other
scheme yet advanced seems capable of forcing the Executive to
give sufficient weight to the costs it asks the American people,
and those of other nations, to bear when it embarks on a program of controls. To paraphrase a quotation cited earlier, the
world is not yet rich enough to be able to despise the economic
85 8
implications of political export controls.

857. See Note, supra note 820, at 604. In 1979, for example, Representative
Bingham's Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs devoted all or part of 16 days to hearings
on EAA '79; the full committee met on seven additional days.
858. See note 680 supra.

